“Lots Of Stories Written In These Ancient Papers, Showing A Lot. Good Moments, Bad Moments, Victories,
“Lots of stories written in these ancient papers, showing a lot. Good moments, bad moments, victories, defeats, lessons from the past. One small look in them can teach you what lies beneath those unlimited sands.”
More Posts from S-afshar and Others
Prof. Erol Manisali's Book Chapter about Me
Erol Manisali'nin Hakkımda Kitap Bölümü - Prof. Erol Manisali's Book Chapter about Me - Глава книги профессора Эрола Манисалы обо мне
1. Giriş – Introduction - Введение
Giriş
Rahmetli Prof. Dr. Erol Manisali (28/7/1940-29/10/2022) 2018 yılında yayınlanan kitaplarından birinde benim hakkımda bir bölüm yazmıştı; Kitabın adı 'Yolumun Kesiştiği Ünlüler'. Bu yeniden yayında, okuyucular art arda aşağıdaki materyali bulacaklar:
1- Türkçe, İngilizce ve Rusça kısa giriş,
2- bölümün metni (Türkçe),
3- resim olarak bölüm sayfaları ve kitap kapağı,
4- bölümün İngilizce çevirisi,
5- bölümün Rusça çevirisi,
6- Türkçe olmayan okuyucular için açıklayıcı notlar (İngilizce ve Rusça),
7- kitap tanıtımı ve verileri (Türkçe, İngilizce ve Rusça olarak),
8- Prof. Manisali'nin kitap bölümünde bahsettiği makalelerime ve kitaplarıma bağlantılar ve
9- Prof. Manisali ile ilgili biyografik notlara ve ölüm ilanlarına bağlantılar.
Mevcut sunum tüm bölümlerinde üç dillidir.
Introduction
In one of his books (published in 2018), the late Prof. Dr. Erol Manisali (28/7/1940-29/10/2022) wrote a chapter about me; the book title is 'Celebrities I crossed in my Path'. In the present re-publication, readers will successively find the following material:
1- the brief introduction in Turkish, English and Russian,
2- the text of the chapter (in Turkish),
3- the chapter pages and the book cover as pictures,
4- the English translation of the chapter,
5- the Russian translation of the chapter,
6- explanatory notes for non-Turkish readership (in English and Russian),
7- book presentation and data (in Turkish, English and Russian),
8- links to my articles and books mentioned by Prof. Manisali in his book chapter, and
9- links to biographical notes about Prof. Manisali and obituaries.
The current presentation is trilingual in all its parts.
Введение
В одной из своих книг (опубликованной в 2018 году) покойный профессор доктор Эрол Манисалы (28.07.1940-29.10.2022) написал обо мне главу; название книги - «Знаменитости, которых я встретил на своем пути». В настоящем переиздании читатели последовательно найдут следующий материал:
1- краткое введение на турецком, английском и русском языках,
2- текст главы (на турецком языке),
3- страницы главы и обложка книги в виде картинок,
4- английский перевод главы,
5- русский перевод главы,
6- пояснения для нетурецких читателей (на английском и русском языках),
7- презентация книги и данные книги (на турецком, английском и русском языках),
8- ссылки на мои статьи и книги, упомянутые профессором Манисалы в главе его книги, и
9- ссылки на биографические заметки о профессоре Манисалы и некрологи.
Текущая презентация является трехъязычной во всех ее частях.
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2. Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis'in dramı
Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis, Fransa ye Almanya'da hem tarih hem arkeoloji doktoralari yapmış, Yunanistan, Kıbrıs, Mısır ve ABD'de öğretim üyeliği olan, Türkçe dahil 15 dil bilen bir deha.
Nasıl mı tanıştık? 1980'1erin ortası ... Aylık İngilizce Middle East Business and Banking dergisini çıkarıyorum; yurtiçi ye yurtdışından yazılar geliyor.
Dr. Andrew Mango'dan Alman profesor Werner Gumpel'e, Doğan Kuban'dan Mümtaz Soysal'a kadar iktisadi, siyasi, sosyal, kiiltiirel yazılar geliyor ye yayımlıyorum.
Dr. Cosmas Megalommatis isimli bir Yunanlıdan Iran üzerine bir makale gelmış; değerli buluyorum ye yayımlanıyor. Daha sonra birkaç yazı daha geliyor.
Birkaç ay sonra kendisi derginin bürosuna geliyor, tanışıyoruz. Çok ilginç bir insan. Bana hikâyesini de anlatıyor. Atina Üniversitesinde asistan kadrosunda; Paris'te bir Fransız profesörle uzun çalışmalar yapıyor; "Hellenizm yoktur, oryantalizm vardır," içerikli bir çalışma ortaya çıkıyor.
Atina'da bir yayıneviyle anlaşıyor, basılacak. Ancak Atina Patriği'nin haberi oluyor ve Atina Üniversitesi rektörüne rnektup yazarak. Dr. Megalommatis'i üniversiteden attırıyor.
Dr. Cosmas çok kızıyor ye Yunanistan'ı terk ediyor. Hatta patriğe kızgınlığından Ortodoks mezhebinden ayrılarak Kahire'de Müslüman oluyor.
Ben bütün bunları gönderdiği yazılar dergide yayımlamdıktan çok sonra öğreniyorum. Levent'deki evime ziyarete geliyor. Sonra KKTC'deki bazı profesör arkadaşlar aracılığıyla Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi'nde öğretim üyeliğine başlıyor.
Bu arada 1991-1992'de benim Girne'de düzenlediğim konferansta, Türkiye ve Balkanlar konusunda tebliğ sunuyor. Bu geniş kapsamlı tebliğ, Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Vakfı tarafından kitap olarak 1992'de yayımlanıyor.
Bir sure sonra Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi'nde sebebini bilmediğim nedenlerden dolayı ayrılmak zorunda kalıyor ve Istanbul'a dönüyor.
Sık sık Levent'e bana geliyor. Halit Refiğ'le arası iyi, bir anlamda başımıza kalıyor. Bir Halit'te, bir bende.
Sonra Kahire'deki Fransız Arkeoloji Enstitüsü'nde çalışmaya başladığını öğreniyorum. Birkaç yıl sonra ABD'ye göçüyor ve bir üniversiteye kapağı atıyor.
Birkaç defa e-mail atıyor, temasımız çok sınırlı.
2007 yılında Türkiye'deki cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerine bir iki hafta kala Beyazit'ta Iktisat Fakültesi'ndeki odamdayım.
Bölüm asistanı Levent, heyencanla, kapıyı dahi vurmadan içeri dalıyor; "Erol Hoca bak bak, Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis Amerika'da seni yazmış". "Benim cumhurbaşkanı adayım Erol Manisalı" başlıklı uzun bir makale, bilgisayar çıktısı elimde. Kendi sayfasında yayınlamış ve bir iki yerel gazete tarafından iktibas edilmiş (www.americanchronicle, ID=24752).
Güler misiniz ağlar misiniz …. Beni gönlünde ve kafasında öyle yüceltmiş ki üstelik, hiç de önemsemediğim bir yere otutmuş.
Beni övdüğü için değil ama hayatımda karşılaştığım, ilginç bölgesel tezleri olan, biraz uçuk da olsa bir "daha"yı, "ünlü olmasa bile ilginç ve önemli kişi"yi, yolumun kesiştikleri arasına aldım.
Bu tür insanlar çok azınlıkta kalsalar bile yeni görüşlerin gizli öncüleri olmuşlardır.
Üstelik Prof. Megalommatis, 15 dünya dilini derinliğine bilen bir akademisyen.
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3. Bölüm sayfaları ve kitap kapağı - Chapter pages and the book cover - страницы главы и обложка книги
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4. Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis' drama
Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis prepared two doctorates in History and Archeology, in France and Germany,
He is a genius, who taught in Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the USA, and speaks 15 languages, including Turkish.
How did we meet? Mid 1980's ... I publish the monthly English magazine Middle East Business and Banking; articles are coming from home and abroad.
From Dr. Andrew Mango to German professor Werner Gumpel, from Doğan Kuban to Mümtaz Soysal, I receive and publish economic, political, social and cultural articles.
An article on Iran came from a Greek named Cosmas Megalommatis; I found it valuable and it was published. A few more articles followed.
A few months later, he came to the magazine's office and we met. He was a very interesting person. He also told me his story. He belonged to the cadre of assistants at the University of Athens; he had been doing long studies with a French professor in Paris; a study with the content "There is no Hellenism, there is Orientalism" emerged.
He contracted with a publishing house in Athens; the study would be published. However, the Patriarch of Athens was informed and he wrote a letter to the rector of the University of Athens. Dr. Megalommatis is kicked out of the university.
Dr. Cosmas got very angry and left Greece. He even became a Muslim in Cairo by leaving the Orthodox sect, out of anger at the patriarch.
I learned about all these developments long after the articles that he sent were published in the magazine. He came to visit me in my house in Levent1. Then, through some friends, who were professors in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, he started his teaching career at Eastern Mediterranean University.
By the way, he presented a paper on Turkey and the Balkans at the conference that I held in Girne2 in 1991-1992. This comprehensive paper was published as a book by the Cyprus Studies Foundation in 1992.
After a while, he had to leave the Eastern Mediterranean University for reasons I don't know, and he returned to Istanbul.
He often came to me in Levent. He was on good terms with Halit Refiğ3, and in a way he was up to us. Once in Halit's; once in my house.
Then, I learned that he started working at the French Archaeological Institute in Cairo. A few years later, he immigrated to the USA and went to a university.
He sent e-mails a few times; our contact was very limited.
One or two weeks before the 2007 presidential elections in Turkey, I was in my office at the Faculty of Economics in Beyazit4.
My Department assistant, Mr. Levent5, burst in excitedly, without even knocking on the door; "Professor Erol, look! Prof. Cosmas Megalommatis wrote about you in America". I have a long article titled "My presidential candidate is Erol Manisalı", a computer printout. Published on its own page and quoted by a few local newspapers (www.americanchronicle, ID=24752)6.
Would you laugh or cry …. He exalted me so much in his heart and mind that he made me sit in a place that I didn't care at all about.
Not because he praised me, but for having encountered in my life a man with regionally interesting approaches, albeit somewhat eccentric, an interesting and important person, who crossed my path, I included him in this book, although he is not famous.
Such people, though very few, have been the secret pioneers of new ideas.
Moreover, Prof. Megalommatis is an academic who has deep knowledge of 15 world languages.
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5. Драма профессора Космы Мегаломматиса
Профессор Космас Мегаломматис подготовил две докторские степени по истории и археологии во Франции и Германии.
Он гений, который преподает в Греции, на Кипре, в Египте и США и говорит на 15 языках, включая турецкий.
Как мы познакомились? Середина 1980-х ... Я издаю ежемесячный английский журнал Middle East Business and Banking; Статьи поступают из дома и за рубежом.
От доктора Эндрю Манго до немецкого профессора Вернера Гумпеля, от Догана Кубана до Мюмтаз Сойсал, я получаю и публикую экономические, политические, социальные и культурные статьи.
Статья об Иране была написана греком Космасом Мегаломматисом; Я нахожу это ценным, и оно опубликовано. Далее еще несколько статей.
Через несколько месяцев он приходит в редакцию журнала, и мы встречаемся. Он очень интересный человек. Он также рассказывает мне свою историю. Он принадлежит к числу ассистентов Афинского университета; он долго учился у французского профессора в Париже; появляется исследование с содержанием «Нет эллинизма, есть ориентализм».
Заключен контракт с издательством в Афинах, оно будет опубликовано. Однако Патриарх Афин был проинформирован и написал письмо ректору Афинского университета. Доктора Мегаломматиса выгнали из университета.
Доктор Космас очень злится и уезжает из Греции. Он даже стал мусульманином в Каире, выйдя из православной секты, из гнева на патриарха.
Обо всех этих событиях я узнал уже давно после того, как статьи, которые он присылал, были опубликованы в журнале. Он пришел навестить меня в моем доме в Левенте1. Затем через друзей, которые были профессорами в Турецкой Республике Северного Кипра, он начал свою преподавательскую деятельность в Университете Восточного Средиземноморья.
Кстати, он выступал с докладом о Турции и Балканах на конференции, которую я проводил в Гирне2 в 1991-1992 годах. Этот всеобъемлющий документ был опубликован в виде книги Фондом кипрских исследований в 1992 году.
Через некоторое время ему пришлось покинуть Восточно-Средиземноморский университет по непонятным мне причинам, и он вернулся в Стамбул.
Он часто приезжал ко мне в Левент. Он был в хороших отношениях с Халитом Рефигом3 и в чем-то нам подчинялся. Однажды у Халита; однажды в моем доме.
Потом я узнал, что он начал работать во Французском археологическом институте в Каире. Через несколько лет он иммигрировал в США и поступил в университет.
Он отправил электронные письма несколько раз; наши контакты были очень ограничены.
За одну или две недели до президентских выборов 2007 года в Турции я был в своем кабинете на экономическом факультете в Беязите4.
Мой ассистент, господин Левент5, взволнованно ворвался, даже не постучав в дверь; «Профессор Эрол, смотрите! Профессор Космас Мегаломматис писал о вас в Америке». У меня есть длинная статья под названием «Мой кандидат в президенты — Эрол Манисалы», компьютерная распечатка. Публикуется на собственной странице и цитируется несколькими местными газетами (www.americanchronicle, ID=24752) 6.
Вы бы смеяться или плакать .... Он так возвеличил меня в своем сердце и разуме, что заставил меня сесть на место, которое меня совершенно не заботило.
Не за то, что он хвалил меня, а за то, что встретил в своей жизни человека с регионально интересными подходами, хотя и несколько эксцентричного, интересного и важного человека, перешедшего мне дорогу, я включил его в эту книгу, хотя он и не известен.
Такие люди, хотя и очень немногие, были тайными пионерами новых идей.
Кроме того, профессор Мегаломматис является академиком, обладающим глубоким знанием 15 языков мира.
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6. Notlar - Notes - Примечания
Notes for non-Turkish readership in English & Russian:
1. Levent is a district in Istanbul.
2. Girne was also known as Keryneia.
3. Halit Refiğ (1934-2009) was one of Turkey's foremost film directors, film producers, screenwriters and writers.
4. Beyazit is a district in Istanbul.
5. Levent is also a Turkish personal name for men.
6. The correct link would be: https://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/24752
However, the site was hacked and closed down 2014.
Примечания на английском и русском языках (для нетурецких читателей):
1. Левент – район в Стамбуле.
2. Гирне также была известна как Кириния.
3. Халит Рефиг (1934-2009) был одним из ведущих турецких режиссеров, продюсеров, сценаристов и писателей.
4. Беязит — район в Стамбуле.
5. Левент также является турецким личным мужским именем.
6. Правильная ссылка: https://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/24752.
Однако в 2014 году сайт был взломан и закрыт.
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7- Kitap tanıtımı ve verileri - Book presentation and data - Презентация книги и данные книги
Prof. Manisali'nin kitabının adı:
Prof. Manisali's book title:
Название книги профессора Манисалы:
Erol Manisalı, Yolumun Kesiştiği Ünlüler
Erol Manisali, Celebrities I crossed in my Path
Эрол Манисалы, Знаменитости, которых я встретил на своем пути
Kitap hakkında
Prof. Dr. Erol Manisalı akademik çalışmaları sırasında ve yazarlık yaşamı boyunca tanıştığı yerli-yabancı ünlü simalarla ilgili anılarını paylaşıyor. Siyasetçiler, sanatçılar, bilim insanları, işadamları, Manisalı’nın gözlem gücünün süzgecinden geçerek, Türkiye’nin yakın tarihinde bıraktıkları izlerle yer alıyorlar Yolumun Kesiştiği Ünlüler’de.
Bülent Ecevit’ten Kirk Douglas’a, Süleyman Demirel’den Vehbi Koç ve Sakıp Sabancı’ya, Turgut Özal’dan Attila İlhan’a, Mümtaz Soysal’dan İlhan Selçuk’a, General Franco’dan Zekeriya Öz’e açılan yelpazede pek çok ismin adeta resmi geçit yaptığı elinizdeki kitap, hem bir anılar demeti, hem de yakın dönem siyaset notları niteliği taşıyor.
Yolumun Kesiştiği Ünlüler, Avrupa Birliği’yle ilişkileri, Kıbrıs sorununu, Ergenekon operasyonlarını, din sömürüsü ve darbeleri, Erol Manisalı’nın ilk kez dile getirdiği gerçekler ve yaşanmışlıklar temelinde yeniden yorumluyor.
"Yolumun kesiştiği ünlü kişiler ile olaylar arasındaki bağlar bazen üzücü bazen de trajikomik özellikler içeriyor. Bunları kamuoyuna aktarmadığım takdirde, ortaya çıkmaları mümkün olmayacaktı. Sadece benim hafızamda saklı kalmalarını istemedim".
About the book
Prof. Dr. Erol Manisalı shares his memories of famous local and foreign faces he met during his academic studies and throughout his writing life. Politicians, artists, scientists, businessmen take their place in 'Celebrities I crossed in my Path' with the traces they left in Turkey's recent history, passing through the filter of the observation power of Manisalı.
From Bülent Ecevit to Kirk Douglas, from Süleyman Demirel to Vehbi Koç and Sakıp Sabancı, from Turgut Özal to Attila İlhan, from Mümtaz Soysal to İlhan Selçuk, from General Franco to Zekeriya Öz. The book in your hand, in which many names have made an official parade, is both a bundle of memories and notes on recent politics.
'Celebrities I crossed in my Path' reinterprets the relations with the European Union, the Cyprus problem, the Ergenekon operations, religious exploitation and coups based on the facts and experiences that Erol Manisalı first voiced.
"The ties between the famous people I crossed with and the events sometimes contain sad and sometimes tragicomic features. If I did not make them public, they would not have been possible. I just didn't want them to remain hidden in my memory".
О книге
Профессор доктор Эрол Манисалы делится своими воспоминаниями об известных местных и иностранных лицах, с которыми он встречался во время учебы и на протяжении всей своей писательской жизни. Политики, художники, ученые, бизнесмены занимают свое место в «Знаменитости, которых я встретил на своем пути» со следами, которые они оставили в новейшей истории Турции, пройдя через фильтр наблюдательной силы Манисалы.
От Бюлента Эджевита до Кирка Дугласа, от Сулеймана Демиреля до Вехби Коча и Сакипа Сабанджи, от Тургута Озала до Аттилы Ильхана, от Мюмтаза Сойсала до Ильхана Сельчука, от генерала Франко до Зекерии Оз. Книга в вашей руке, в которой многие имена сделали официальный парад, представляет собой одновременно пачку воспоминаний и заметок о недавней политике.
«Знаменитости, которых я встретил на своем пути» переосмысливает отношения с Европейским Союзом, кипрскую проблему, операции «Эргенекон», религиозную эксплуатацию и перевороты на основе фактов и опыта, которые впервые озвучил Эрол Манисалы.
«Связи между известными людьми, с которыми я пересекался, и событиями иногда содержат печальные, а иногда и трагикомические черты. Если бы я не обнародовал их, они были бы невозможны. Я просто не хотел, чтобы они оставались скрытыми в моей памяти».
Kitap verileri / Book data / Данные книги
KIRMIZI KEDİ YAYINEVİ
Yayın Tarihi: 19.03.2018
ISBN: 9786050980936
Dil: TÜRKÇE
Sayfa Sayısı: 120
Cilt Tipi: Karton Kapak
Kağıt Cinsi: Kitap Kağıdı
Boyut: 13.5 x 19.5 cm
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RED CAT PUBLISHING HOUSE
Release Date: 19.03.2018
ISBN: 9786050980936
Language Turkish
Number of Pages: 120
Binding Type: Paperback
Paper Type: Book Paper
Size: 13.5 x 19.5 cm
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ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО КРАСНЫЙ КОТ
Дата выхода: 19.03.2018
ISBN: 9786050980936
Язык Турецкий
Количество страниц: 120
Тип переплета: Мягкая обложка
Тип бумаги: Книжная бумага
Размер: 13,5 х 19,5 см
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8. Prof. Manisali'nin kitap bölümünde bahsettiği makalelerime ve kitaplarıma bağlantılar - Links to my articles and books mentioned by Prof. Manisali in his book chapter - Ссылки на мои статьи и книги, упомянутые профессором Манисалы в главе его книги
Prof. Manisalı ile ilgili yazdığım yazının linkleri:
Links to my article about Prof. Manisali:
Ссылки на мою статью о профессоре Манисалы:
![Erol Manisali for President of Turkey (18th April 2007) - [DOCX Document]](https://64.media.tumblr.com/b1fe1889d22e1e7ad00ceee4b67e5839/a6ac1736a8f0d038-57/s1280x1920/579ae1d8d0fc10cbc7afa4624eca3eda7e5cf436.jpg)
Prof. Manisali'nin kitabının bölümünde adı geçen konuşmamın ve kitabın yayınlandığı linkler:
Links to the publication of my speech and the book that are mentioned in the chapter of the Prof. Manisali's book:
Ссылки на публикацию моего выступления и на книгу, которые упоминаются в главе книги профессора Манисалы:
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9. Prof. Manisali ile ilgili biyografik notlara ve ölüm ilanlarına bağlantılar - Links to biographical notes about Prof. Manisali and obituaries - Ссылки на биографические заметки о профессоре Манисалы и некрологи
The verso of the Narmer Palette. Narmer, considered by many Egyptologists to be the first ruler of a unified Egypt, stands over a defeated foe and is about to bring his mace down on the foe's head. Narmer is shown here wearing the white crown (hedyet) of Lower Egypt, while on the recto he is depicted with the red crown (desheret) of Upper Egypt, perhaps symbolizing his unification of the two realms. Artist unknown; sculpted ca. 3200-3000 BCE. Found at Hierakonpolis (Nekhen), pre-unification capital of Upper Egypt; now in the Egyptian Museum, Cairo. Photo credit: Heagy1/Wikimedia Commons.
Οι Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν (Σιρβάν-σαχ) και το Ανάκτορό τους στο Μπακού του Αζερμπαϊτζάν
The Shahs of Shirvan (Shirvanshahs) and their Palace in Baku, Azerbaijan
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 2η Σεπτεμβρίου 2019.
Ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης αναπαράγει τμήμα διάλεξής μου στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2018 για τα υπαρκτά και τα ανύπαρκτα έθνη του Καυκάσου, την ιστορική συνέχεια πολιτισμικής παράδοσης, την ιστορική ασυνέχεια ορισμένων διεκδικήσεων, καθώς και την σωστή κινεζική πολιτική στον Καύκασο. Στο σημείο αυτό, η ιστορική συνέχεια της προϊσλαμικής Ατροπατηνής στο ισλαμικό Αζερμπαϊτζάν καθιστά ταυτόχρονα το Αζερμπαϊτζάν "Ιράν" και το Ιράν "περιφέρεια του Αζερμπαϊτζάν".
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/02/οι-σάχηδες-του-σιρβάν-σιρβάν-σαχ-και-τ/ ================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Η περιοχή του Σιρβάν είναι το κέντρο του σημερινού Αζερμπαϊτζάν και ονομαζόταν έτσι από τα προϊσλαμικά χρόνια, όταν ο όλος χώρος του Αζερμπαϊτζάν και του βορειοδυτικού Ιράν ονομαζόταν Αδουρμπαταγάν, λέξη από την οποία προέρχεται η ονομασία του σύγχρονου κράτους και η οποία αποδόθηκε στα αρχαία ελληνικά ως Ατροπατηνή.
Το Σιρβάν βρισκόταν στα βόρεια όρια του ιρανικού κράτους και, όταν αυτό βρισκόταν σε κατάσταση παρακμής, αδυναμίας και προβλημάτων, συχνά ντόπιοι Ατροπατηνοί ηγεμόνες σχημάτιζαν μια ανεξάρτητη τοπική αρχή. Συνεπώς, ο τίτλος ‘Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν’ ανάγεται ήδη σε προϊσλαμικά χρόνια και μουσουλμάνοι ιστορικοί μας πληροφορούν ότι ένας ‘Σάχης του Σιρβάν’ προσπάθησε να ανακόψει εκεί τα επελαύνοντα ισλαμικά στρατεύματα τα οποία στα μισά του 7ου αιώνα έφθασαν και εκεί, όταν κατέρρευσε το σασανιδικό Ιράν. Το γιατί είχε το Σιρβάν γίνει ανεξάρτητο βασίλειο σε χρονιές όπως 630 ή 650 μπορούμε να καταλάβουμε πολύ εύκολα.
Οι συνεχείς εξουθενωτικοί πόλεμοι Ρωμανίας και Ιράν (601-628), και η αντεπίθεση του Ηράκλειου με σκοπό να αποσπάσει τον Τίμιο Σταυρό από τον Χοσρόη Β’ και να εκδιώξει τους Ιρανούς από την Αίγυπτο και την Συρο-Παλαιστίνη είχαν ήδη ολότελα εξαντλήσει και τις δύο αυτοκρατορίες πριν εμφανιστούν στον ορίζοντα τα στρατεύματα του Ισλάμ.
Το Ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν στο Μπακού
Το Σιρβάν καταλήφθηκε από τα ισλαμικά στρατεύματα (που πολεμούσαν υπό τις διαταγές του Σαλμάν ιμπν Ράμπια αλ Μπαχίλι) και μάλιστα αυτά έφθασαν βορειώτερα στον Καύκασο, αλλά στην τεράστια περιοχή που έλεγχε πρώτα το ομεϋαδικό και μετά το 750 το αβασιδικό χαλιφάτο, από την βορειοδυτική Αφρική μέχρι την Κίνα και την Ινδια, το Σιρβάν ήταν και πάλι ένα είδος περιθωρίου: δεν ήταν ούτε καν ένα σημαντικό σύνορο επειδή μετά το Σιρβάν δεν υπήρχε ένα μεγάλο αντίπαλο κράτος.
Αντίθετα, αυτό συνέβαινε ήδη σε άλλες περιοχές όπως στην Ανατολία (Ρωμανία), την Κεντρική Ασία (Κίνα), την Κοιλάδα του Ινδού (το κράτος του Χάρσα), και την Αίγυπτο (χριστιανική Νοβατία και Μακουρία).
Έτσι, αφού το Σιρβάν διοικήθηκε από μια σειρά διαδοχικών απεσταλμένων των χαλίφηδων (όπως για παράδειγμα, στα χρόνια του Αβασίδη Χαλίφη Χαρούν αλ Ρασίντ, ο Γιαζίντ ιμπν Μαζιάντ αλ Σαϋμπάνι: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazid_ibn_Mazyad_al-Shaybani), από τις αρχές του 9ου αιώνα οι απόγονοι του Γιαζίντ ιμπν Μαζιάντ αλ Σαϋμπάνι δημιούργησαν μια τοπική δυναστεία (γνωστή ως Γιαζιντίδες – άσχετοι από τους Γιαζιντί) που ανεγνώριζε την χαλιφατική αρχή της Βαγδάτης.
Ανατολική Μικρά Ασία, Βόρεια Μεσοποταμία, ΒΔ Ιράν και Καύκασος από το 1100 στο 1300
Μετά την αρχή της αβασιδικής παρακμής όμως, στο δεύτερο μισό του 9ου αιώνα, ο εγγονός του Γιαζίντ ιμπν Μαζιάντ αλ Σαϋμπάνι διεκήρυξε την ανεξαρτησία του από το χαλιφάτο της Βαγδάτης και έλαβε εκνέου τον ιστορικό τίτλο του Σάχη του Σιρβάν. Ο Χάυθαμ ιμπν Χάλεντ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haytham_ibn_Khalid) ήταν λοιπόν ο πρώτος από τους μουσουλμάνους Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν.
Γι’ αυτούς χρησιμοποιούνται σήμερα πολλά ονόματα που μπορεί να μπερδέψουν ένα μη ειδικό: Μαζιαντίδες (Mazyadids), Σαϋμπανίδες (Shaybanids), ή όπως προανέφερα Γιαζιντίδες (Yazidids). Αλλά εύκολα μπορείτε να προσέξετε ότι όλα αυτά αποτελούν απλώς διαφορετικές επιλογές συγχρόνων δυτικών ισλαμολόγων και ιστορικών από τα διάφορα ονόματα του ίδιου προσώπου: του Γιαζίντ ιμπν Μαζιάντ αλ Σαϋμπάνι (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yazid_ibn_Mazyad_al-Shaybani).
Το Ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν κτίσθηκε τον 15ο αιώνα όταν οι Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν μετέφεραν την πρωτεύουσά τους από την Σεμάχα (βόρειο Αζερμπαϊτζάν) που είχε καταστραφεί από σεισμούς στο Μπακού. Σχέδιο από: Ismayil Mammad
Αν και αραβικής καταγωγής ως δυναστεία, οι μουσουλμάνοι Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν βρέθηκαν σε ένα κοινωνικό-πολιτισμικό πλαίσιο Αζέρων, Ιρανών και Τουρανών και σταδιακά εξιρανίσθηκαν έντονα κι άρχισαν να παίρνουν ονόματα βασιλέων και ηρώων από το ιρανικό-τουρανικό έπος Σαχναμέ του οποίου η πιο μνημειώδης και πιο θρυλική καταγραφή ήταν αυτή του Φερντοουσί. Έτσι λοιπόν αρχής γενομένης από τον Γιαζίντ Β’ του Σιρβάν (ο οποίος βασίλευσε στην περίοδο 991-1027), οι μουσουλμάνοι Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν είθισται να αποκαλούνται και ως Κασρανίδες (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kasranids), επωνυμία που παραπέμπει σε ιρανικά βασιλικά ονόματα επικού και μυθικού χαρακτήρα. Αλλά πρόκειται για την ίδια πάντοτε δυναστεία.
Διακοσμήσεις με αραβουργήματα
Στην συνέχεια, οι μουσουλμάνοι Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν περιήλθαν διαδοχικά σε καθεστώς υποτέλειας προς τους Σελτζούκους, τους Μπαγκρατίδες της Γεωργίας (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bagrationi_dynasty), τους Τουρανούς Κιπτσάκ (Kipchak) Ελντιγκουζίδες (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eldiguzids), και τους Μογγόλους Τιμουρίδες.
Όμως η σύγκρουσή τους με τον Τουρκμένο Σεΐχη Τζουνέιντ, αρχηγό του τουρκμενικού αιρετικού τάγματος των Σούφι στην περίοδο 1447-1460 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaykh_Junayd), και ο θάνατος του εν λόγω σεΐχη στην μάχη του Χατσμάς (αζερ. Xaçmaz – αγγλ. Khachmaz) δημιούργησαν ένα τρομερό προηγούμενο.
Το μυστικό στρατιωτικό τάγμα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων (το οποίο οργανώθηκε ως στρατιωτική υποστήριξη του μυστικιστικού τάγματος των Σούφι από τον γιο του Σεΐχη Τζουνέιντ, Σεΐχη Χαϋντάρ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shaykh_Haydar), διατήρησε έντονη μνησικακία προς τους Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν, μια σειρά καταστροφικών πολέμων στην ευρύτερη περιοχή του Καυκάσου επακολούθησε κατά την περίοδο 1460-1488, και τελικά και ο Σεΐχης Χαϋντάρ βρήκε και αυτός οικτρό τέλος μαζί με όλους τους στρατιώτες του στην μάχη του Ταμπασαράν (σήμερα στο Νταγεστάν), όπου αντιμετώπισε συνασπισμένους τους Σάχηδες του Σιρβάν και τους Ακκουγιουλού (Τουρκμένους Ασπροπροβατάδες).
Και τελικά το 1500-1501, ο εγγονός του Σεΐχη Τζουνέιντ και γιος του Σεΐχη Χαϋντάρ, Ισμαήλ, επήρε εκδίκηση καταλαμβάνοντας το Σιρβάν και σκοτώνοντας τον Φαρούχ Γιασάρ, τελευταίο Σάχη του Σιρβάν, και την φρουρά του. Επακολούθησε μια βίαιη επιβολή σιιτικών δογμάτων στον τοπικό πληθυσμό και μια απίστευτη τυραννία ως εκδίκηση για την στάση των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν εναντίον των Σιιτών, των Σούφι και των Κιζιλμπάσηδων. Ο Ισμαήλ Α’ ανέτρεψε και το κράτος των Ακκουγιουλού ιδρύοντας την σαφεβιδική (σουφική) δυναστεία του Ιράν.
Η μάχη του Σάχη Ισμαήλ Α’ με τον Φαρούχ Γιασάρ, τελευταίο Σάχη του Σιρβάν από σμικρογραφία ιρανικού σαφεβιδικού χειρογράφου (1501)
Μόνον η νίκη του Σουλτάνου Σελίμ Α’ το 1514 στο Τσαλντιράν εμπόδισε το κιζιλμπάσικο τσουνάμι να καταλάβει όλη την επικράτεια του Ισλάμ.
Η δυναστεία των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν μετά από 640 χρόνια πήρε έτσι ένα τέλος, αλλά έμειναν κορυφαίες δημιουργίες στον τομέα της ισλαμικής τέχνης και αρχιτεκτονικής να μας θυμίζουν την προσφορά της.
Μερικοί από τους μεγαλύτερους επικούς ποιητές, πανσόφους επιστήμονες, και σημαντικώτερους μυστικιστές των ισλαμικών χρόνων, ο Νεζαμί Γκαντζεβί, ο Αφζαλεντίν Χακανί (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khaqani) και ο Τζαμάλ Χαλίλ Σιρβανί (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nozhat_al-Majales) έζησαν στο Σιρβάν και οι απαγγελίες τους ακούστηκαν στο ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν.
Όμως το τέλος της δυναστείας του Σιρβάν άφησε μέχρι τις μέρες μας μια βραδυφλεγή βόμβα, πολύ καλά κρυμμένη, που κανένας δεν ξέρει σε ποιο βαθμό μας απειλεί όλους ακόμη και σήμερα με ένα απίστευτο αιματοκύλισμα.
Πολλοί προσπάθησαν σε διαφορετικές στιγμές να απενεργοποιήσουνν αυτή την βόμβα και να εξαφανίσουν την απειλή. Ωστόσο και αυτοί στην προσπάθειά τους έχυσαν πολύ αίμα που ακόμη και σήμερα παίζει ένα σημαντικό ρόλο. Η καλά κρυμμένη αυτή απειλή κι ανθρώπινη βόμβα έχει ένα όνομα που θα έπρεπε να κάνει την Ανθρωπότητα να τρέμει:
– Κιζιλμπάσηδες!
Αυτοί είναι οι κυρίαρχοι της αέναης υπομονής και της ατέρμονος προσμονής. Και αν και υπάρχουν πολλές ενδείξεις για τις δραστηριότητές τους, κανένας δεν μπορεί σήμερα να πει αν όντως υπάρχουν και αν διατηρούν την δύναμη που φημίζονταν να έχουν. Για το θέμα μπορούμε να βρούμε μόνον νύξεις κι υπαινιγμούς.
Σ’ αυτό ωστόσο θα επανέλθω. Στην συνέχεια μπορείτε να δείτε ένα βίντεο-ξενάγηση στο Ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν και να διαβάσετε σχετικά με τα εκεί μνημεία, την πόλη και την δυναστεία που αποτελεί την ραχοκοκκαλιά της Ισλαμικής Ιστορίας του Αζερμπαϊτζάν. Επιπλέον συνδέσμους θα βρείτε στο τέλος.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Дворец ширваншахов – Shirvanshahs Palace, Baku – Ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν
https://www.ok.ru/video/1495285893741
Περισσότερα:
Дворец ширваншахов (азерб. Şirvanşahlar sarayı) — бывшая резиденция ширваншахов (правителей Ширвана), расположенная в столице Азербайджана, городе Баку.
Образует комплекс, куда помимо самого дворца также входят дворик Диван-хане, усыпальница ширваншахов, дворцовая мечеть 1441 года с минаретом, баня и мавзолей придворного учёного Сейида Яхья Бакуви. Дворцовый комплекс был построен в период с XIII[3] по XVI век (некоторые здания, как и сам дворец, были построены в начале XV века при ширваншахе Халил-улле I). Постройка дворца была связана с переносом столицы государства Ширваншахов из Шемахи в Баку.
Несмотря на то, что основные постройки ансамбля строились разновременно, дворцовый комплекс производит целостное художественное впечатление. Строители ансамбля опирались на вековые традиции ширвано-апшеронской архитектурной школы. Создав чёткие кубические и многогранные архитектурные объёмы, они украсили стены богатейшим резным узором, что свидетельствует о том, что создатели дворца прекрасно владели мастерством каменной кладки. Каждый из зодчих благодаря традиции и художественному вкусу воспринял архитектурный замысел своего предшественника, творчески развил и обогатил его. Разновременные постройки связаны как единством масштабов, так и ритмом и соразмерностью основных архитектурных форм — кубических объёмов зданий, куполов, порталов.
В 1964 году дворцовый комплекс был объявлен музеем-заповедником и взят под охрану государства. В 2000 году уникальный архитектурный и культурный ансамбль, наряду с обнесённой крепостными стенами исторической частью города и Девичьей башней, был включён в список Всемирного наследия ЮНЕСКО. Дворец Ширваншахов и сегодня считается одной из жемчужин архитектуры Азербайджана.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Palace of the Shirvanshahs – Şirvanşahlar Sarayı – Дворец ширваншахов
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240287
Περισσότερα:
The Palace of the Shirvanshahs (Azerbaijani: Şirvanşahlar Sarayı, Persian: کاخ شروانشاهان) is a 15th-century palace built by the Shirvanshahs and described by UNESCO as “one of the pearls of Azerbaijan’s architecture”. It is located in the Inner City of Baku, Azerbaijan and, together with the Maiden Tower, forms an ensemble of historic monuments inscribed under the UNESCO World Heritage List of Historical Monuments. The complex contains the main building of the palace, Divanhane, the burial-vaults, the shah’s mosque with a minaret, Seyid Yahya Bakuvi’s mausoleum (the so-called “mausoleum of the dervish”), south of the palace, a portal in the east, Murad’s gate, a reservoir and the remnants of a bath house. Earlier, there was an ancient mosque, next to the mausoleum. There are still ruins of the bath and the lamb, belong to the west of the tomb.
In the past, the palace was surrounded by a wall with towers and, thus, served as the inner stronghold of the Baku fortress. Despite the fact that at the present time no traces of this wall have survived on the surface, as early as the 1920s, the remains of apparently the foundations of the tower and the part of the wall connected with it could be distinguished in the north-eastern side of the palace.
There are no inscriptions survived on the palace itself. Therefore, the time of its construction is determined by the dates in the inscriptions on the architectural monuments, which refer to the complex of the palace. Such two inscriptions were completely preserved only on the tomb and minaret of the Shah’s mosque. There is a name of the ruler who ordered to establish these buildings in both inscriptions is the – Shirvan Khalil I (years of rule 1417–1462). As time of construction – 839 (1435/36) was marked on the tomb, 845 (1441/42) on the minaret of the Shah’s mosque.
The burial vault, the palace and the mosque are built of the same material, the grating and masonry of the stone are the same.
The plan of the palace
The Palace
Divan-khana
Seyid Mausoleum Yahya Bakuvi
The place of the destroyed Kei-Kubad mosque
The Eastern portal
The Palace Mosque
The Shrine
Place of bath
Ovdan
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Το Ανάκτορο των Σάχηδων του Σιρβάν (Σιρβάν-σαχ), Μπακού – Αζερμπαϊτζάν
Περισσότερα:
Τα ανάκτορα των Σιρβανσάχ (αζερικά: Şirvanşahlar Sarayı) είναι ανάκτορο κατασκευασμένο στο Μπακού, Αζερμπαϊτζάν, τον 13ο έως 16ο αιώνα.
Το ανάκτορο κατασκευάστηκε από τη δυναστεία των Σιρβανσάχ κατά τη διάρκεια της βασιλείας του Χαλίλ-Ουλλάχ, όταν η πρωτεύουσα μετακινήθηκε από τη Σαμάχι στο Μπακού.
Το ανάκτορο αποτελεί αρχιτεκτονικά συγκρότημα με το περίπτερο Ντιβανχανά, το ιερό των Σιρβανσάχ, το τζαμί του παλατιού, χτισμένο το 1441, μαζί με το μιναρέ του, τα λουτρά και το μαυσωλείο.
Το 1964, το ανάκτορο ανακηρύχθηκε μουσείο-μνημείο και τέθηκε υπό κρατική προστασία.
Το 2000 ανακηρύχθηκε μνημείο παγκόσμιας κληρονομιάς από τη UNESCO μαζί με την παλιά πόλη του Μπακού και τον Παρθένο Πύργο.
Παρά το γεγονός ότι το συγκρότημα κατασκευάστηκε σε διαφορετικές χρονικές περιόδους, το συγκρότημα δίνει ομοιόμορφη εντύπωση, βασισμένη στην αρχιτεκτονικό σχολή του Σιρβάν-Αμπσερόν.
Με τη δημιουργία κυβικών και με πολλές προσόψεις αρχιτεκτονικών όγκων, οι τοίχοι είναι διακοσμημένοι με ανάγλυφα μοτίβα.
Κάθε αρχιτέκτονας, εξαιτίας των παραδόσεων και της αισθητικής που χρησιμοποιήθηκε από τους προκατόχους του, τον ανέπτυξε και τον εμπλούτισε δημιουργικά, με αποτέλεσμα τα επιμέρους κτίσματα να έχουν δημιουργούν την αίσθηση της ενότητας, ρυθμού και αναλογίας των βασικών αρχιτεκτονικών μορφών, δηλαδή του κυβικού όγκου των κτιρίων, των θόλων και των πυλών.
Με την κατάκτηση του Μπακού από τους Σαφαβίδες το 1501, το παλάτι λεηλατήθηκε.
Όλοι οι θησαυροί των Σιρβανσάχ, όπλα, πανοπλίες, κοσμήματα, χαλιά, μπροκάρ, σπάνια βιβλία από τη βιβλιοθήκης του παλατιού, πιάτα από ασήμι και χρυσό, μεταφέρθηκαν από τους Σαφαβίδες στη Ταμπρίζ.
Αλλά μετά την μάχη του Τσαλντιράν το 1514 μεταξύ του στρατού του σουλτάνου της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας Σελίμ Α΄ και τους Σαφαβίδες, η οποία έληξε με ήττα των δεύτερων, οι Τούρκοι πήραν τον θησαυρό των Σιρβανσάχ ως λάφυρα.
Σήμερα βρίσκονται στις συλλογές μουσείων της Τουρκίας, του Ιράν, της Βρετανίας, της Γαλλίας, της Ρωσίας, της Ουγγαρίας.
Μερικά χαλιά του ανακτόρου φυλάσσονται στο μουσείο Βικτώριας και Αλβέρτου του Λονδίνου και τα αρχαία βιβλία φυλάσσονται σε αποθετήρια βιβλίων στην Τεχεράνη, το Βατικανό και την Αγία Πετρούπολη.
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The Shirvanshah Palace
The Splendor of the Middle Ages
No tour of Baku’s Ichari Shahar (Inner City) would be complete without a stop at the 15th-century Shirvanshah complex. The Shirvanshahs ruled the state of Shirvan in northern Azerbaijan from the 6th to the 16th centuries. Their attention first shifted to Baku in the 12th century, when Shirvanshah Manuchehr III ordered that the city be surrounded with walls. In 1191, after a devastating earthquake destroyed the capital city of Shamakhi, the residence of the Shirvanshahs was moved to Baku, and the foundation of the Shirvanshah complex was laid. This complex, built on the highest point of Ichari Shahar, remains as one of the most striking monuments of medieval Azerbaijani architecture.
Το Ντιβάν-χανέ
Much of the construction was done in the 15th century, during the reign of Khalilullah I and his son Farrukh Yassar in 1435-1442.
An Egyptian historian named as-Suyuti described the father in superlative terms: “He was the most honored among rulers, the most pious, worthy and just. He was the last of the great Muslim rulers. He ruled the Shirvan and Shamakhi kingdoms for 50 years. He died in 1465, when he was about 100 years old, but he had good eyes and excellent health.”
The buildings that belong to the complex include what may have been living quarters, a mosque, the octagonal-shaped Divankhana (Royal Assembly), a tomb for royal family members, the mausoleum of Seyid Yahya Bakuvi (a famous astronomer of the time) and a bathhouse.
All of these buildings except for the living premises and bathhouse are fairly well preserved. The Shirvanshah complex itself is currently under reconstruction. It has 27 rooms on the first floor and 25 on the second.
Like so many other old buildings in Baku, the real function of the Shirvanshah complex is still under investigation. Though commonly described as a palace, some experts question this. The complex simply doesn’t have the royal grandeur and huge spaces normally associated with a palace; for instance, there are no grand entrances for receiving guests or huge royal bedrooms. Most of the rooms seem more suitable for small offices or monks’ living quarters.
Divankhana
This unique building, located on the upper level of the grounds, takes on the shape of an octagonal pavilion. The filigree portal entrance is elaborately worked in limestone.
The central inscription with the date of the Assembly’s construction and the name of the architect may have been removed after Shah Ismayil Khatai (famous king from Southern Azerbaijan) conquered Baku in 1501.
However, there are two very interesting hexagonal medallions on either side of the entrance. Each consists of six rhombuses with very unusual patterns carved in stone. Each elaborate design includes the fundamental tenets of the Shiite faith: “There is no other God but God. Mohammad is his prophet. Ali is the head of the believers.” In several rhombuses, the word “Allah” (God) is hewn in reverse so that it can be read in a mirror. It seems looking-glass reflection carvings were quite common in the Oriental world at that time.
Scholars believe that the Divankhana was a mausoleum meant for, or perhaps even used for, Khalilullah I. Its rotunda resembles those found in the mausoleums of Bayandur and Mama-Khatun in Turkey. Also, the small room that precedes the main octagonal hall is a common feature in mausoleums of Shirvan.
The Royal Tomb
This building is located in the lower level of the grounds and is known as the Turba (burial vault). An inscription dates the vault to 1435-1436 and says that Khalilullah I built it for his mother Bika khanim and his son Farrukh Yamin. His mother died in 1435 and his son died in 1442, at the age of seven. Ten more tombs were discovered later on; these may have belonged to other members of the Shah’s family, including two more sons who died during his own lifetime.
The entrance to the tomb is decorated with stalactite carvings in limestone. One of the most interesting features of this portal is the two drop-shaped medallions on either side of the Koranic inscription. At first, they seem to be only decorative.
The Turba is one of the few areas in the Shirvanshah complex where we actually know the name of the architect who built the structure. In the portal of the burial vault, the name “Me’mar (architect) Ali” is carved into the design, but in reverse, as if reflected in a mirror.
Some scholars suggest that if the Shah had discovered that his architect inscribed his own name in a higher position than the Shah’s, he would have been severely punished. The mirror effect was introduced so that he could leave his name for posterity.
Remnants of History
Another important section of the grounds is the mosque. According to complicated inscriptions on its minaret, Khalilullah I ordered its construction in 1441. This minaret is 22 meters in height (approximately 66 feet). Key Gubad Mosque, which is just a few meters outside the complex, was built in the 13th century. It was destroyed in 1918 in a fire; only the bases of its walls and columns remain. Nearby is the 15th-century Mausoleum, which is said to be the burial place of court astronomer Seyid Yahya Bakuvi.
Murad’s Gate was a later addition to the complex. An inscription on the gate tells that it was built by a Baku citizen named Baba Rajab during the rule of Turkish sultan Murad III in 1586. It apparently served as a gateway to a building, but it is not known what kind of building it was or even if it ever existed.
In the 19th century, the complex was used as an arms depot. Walls were added around its perimeter, with narrow slits hewn out of the rock so that weapons could be fired from them. These anachronistic details don’t bear much connection to the Shirvanshahs, but they do hint at how the buildings have managed to survive the political vicissitudes brought on by history.
Visitors to the Shirvanshah complex can also see some of the carved stones from the friezes that were brought up from the ruined Sabayil fortress that lies submerged underwater off Baku’s shore. The stones, which now rest in the courtyard, have carved writing that records the genealogy of the Shirvanshahs.
The complex was designated as a historical site in 1920, and reconstruction has continued off and on ever since that time. According to Sevda Dadashova, Director, restoration is currently progressing, though much slower than desired because of a lack of funding.
https://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/82_folder/82_articles/82_shirvanshah.html
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The Palace of the Shirvanshahs
by Kamil Ibrahimov
Baku’s Old City is a treasure trove of Azerbaijani history. Its stone buildings and mazy streets hold secrets that have still to be discovered. A masterpiece of Old City architecture, rich in history but with questions still unanswered, is the medieval residence of the rulers of Shirvan, the Shirvanshahs´ Palace.
The State of Shirvan
The state of Shirvan was formed in 861 and became the longest-surviving state in northern Azerbaijan. The first dynasty of the state of Shirvan was the Mazyadi dynasty (861-1027), founded by Mahammad ibn Yezid, an Arab vicegerent who lived in Shamakhi.
In the 10th century, the Shirvanshahs took Derbent, now in the Russian Federation. Under the Mazyadis, the state of the Shirvanshahs stretched from Derbent to the Kur River. The capital of this state was the town of Shamakhi.
In the first half of the 11th century, the Mazyadi dynasty was replaced by the Kasrani dynasty (1028-1382). The state of Shirvan flourished under the Shirvanshahs, Manuchehr III and his son Akhsitan. The last ruler in this dynasty was Hushang. His reign was unpopular and Hushang was killed in a rebellion.
The Kasrani dynasty was later replaced by the Derbendi dynasty (1382-1538), founded by Ibrahim I (1382-1417). Ibrahim I was a well-known but bankrupt feudal ruler from Shaki. His ancestors had been rulers in Derbent, hence the dynasty´s name. Ibrahim was a wise and peace-loving ruler and for some time managed to protect Shirvan from invasion.
To prevent the country´s destruction by Timur (Tamerlane), Ibrahim I took gifts to Timur´s headquarters and obtained internal independence for Shirvan. Ibrahim I failed to unite all Azerbaijani lands under his rule, but he did manage to make Shirvan a strong and independent state.
Baku becomes capital of Shirvan
The 15th century was a period of economic and cultural revival for Shirvan. Since this was a time of peace in Shirvan, major progress was made in the arts, architecture and trade. Shamakhi remained the capital of Shirvan at the start of the century, but an earthquake and constant attacks by the Kipchaks, a Turkic people, led the capital to be moved to Baku.
The city of Baku was the capital of the country during the rule of the Shirvanshahs Khalilullah I (1417-62) and his son Farrukh Yasar (1462-1500).
While tension continued in Shamakhi, Baku developed in a relatively quiet environment. It is known that strong fortress walls were built in Baku as early as the 12th century. After the capital was moved to Baku, the Palace of the Shirvanshahs was erected at the highest point of the city, in what had been one of the most densely populated areas. The palace complex consists of nine buildings – the palace itself, the Courtroom, the Dervish´s Tomb, the Eastern Gate, the Shah Mosque, the Keygubad Mosque, the palace tomb, the bathhouse and the reservoir.
The buildings of the complex are located in three courtyards that are on different levels, 5.6 metres above one another. Since the palace is built on uneven ground, it does not have an orderly architectural plan. The entire complex is constructed from limestone. Of all the buildings, the palace itself has suffered the most wear and tear over the years. The palace was looted in 1500 after Farrukh Yasar was killed in fighting between the Shirvanshahs and the Safavids. As the Iranian and Ottoman empires vied for power in the South Caucasus, the state of Shirvan, on the crossing-point of various caravan routes, suffered frequent attacks. Consequently, the palace was badly damaged many times. Proof of this is the Murad Gate which was built during Ottoman rule.
What is now Azerbaijan was occupied by Russia on 10 February 1828. The Shirvanshahs´ Palace became the Russian military headquarters and many palace buildings were destroyed. In 1954, the Complex of the Palace of the Shirvanshahs was made a State Historic-Architectural Reserve and Museum. In 1960, the authorities of the Soviet republic decided to promote the palace as an architectural monument.
The Palace Building
The palace is a two-storey building in an irregular, rectangular shape. In order to provide better illumination of the palace, the south-eastern part of the building was constructed on different levels. Initially there were 52 rooms in the palace, of which 27 were on the ground floor and 25 on the first floor. The shah and his family lived on the upper floor, while servants and others lived on the lower floor.
The Tomb Built by Shirvanshah Farrukh Yasar (also known as the Courtroom or Divankhana)
Shirvanshah Farrukh Yasar had the tomb constructed in the upper courtyard of the palace complex. Its north side and one of its corners adjoin the residential building. The tomb consists of an octagonal rotunda, completed with a dodecagonal dome. Its octagonal hall is surrounded by an open balcony or portico. The balcony is edged with nine columns which still have their original capitals. The rotunda stands in a small courtyard which also has an open balcony running around its edge. The balcony´s columns and arches are the same shape as those of the rotunda. The outer side of the columns has a stone with the image of a dove, the symbol of freedom, and two stone chutes to drain water away. Some researchers believe that this building was used for official receptions and trials and call it the Courtroom. The architectural work in the tomb was not completed. The tomb is considered one of the finest examples of medieval architecture, not only in Azerbaijan but in the whole Middle East.
The Dervish´s Tomb
The Dervish´s Tomb is located in the southern part of the middle courtyard. Some historians maintain that it is the tomb of Seyid Yahya Bakuvi, who was a royal scholar and astronomer under Khalilullah I.
Other historians say that all the buildings in the lower courtyard of the palace, including the Dervish´s Tomb, are part of a complex where dervishes lived, but there is little evidence for this.
The Keygubad Mosque
Now in ruins, the Keygubad Mosque was a mosque-cum-madrasah joined to the Dervish´s Tomb.
The tomb was located in the southern part of the mosque.
The mosque consisted of a rectangular prayer hall and a small corridor in front of it. In the centre of the hall four columns supported the dome.
Historian Abbasgulu Bakikhanov wrote that Bakuvi taught and prayed in the mosque: “The cell where he prayed, the school where he worked and his grave are there, in the mosque”.
Keygubad Shirvanshah ruled from 1317 to 1343 and was Sheikh Ibrahim´s grandfather.
The Eastern Gate
The Eastern or Murad Gate is the only part of the complex that dates to the 16th century. Two medallions on the upper frame of the Murad Gate bear the inscription: “This building was constructed under the great and just Sultan Murad III on the basis of an order by Racab Bakuvi in 994” (1585-86).
The Tomb of the Shirvanshahs
There are two buildings in the lower courtyard – the tomb and the Shah Mosque. A round wall encloses the lower courtyard, separating it from the other yards. When you look at the tomb from above, you can see that it is rectangular in shape, decorated with an engraved star and completed with an octagonal dome. While the tomb was being built, blue glazed tiles were placed in the star-shaped mortises on the dome.
An inscription at the entrance says: “Protector of the religion, man of the prophet, the great Sultan Shirvanshah Khalilullah, may God make his reign as shah permanent, ordered the building of this light tomb for his mother and seven-year-old son (may they rest in peace) 839” (1435-36). The architect´s name is also inscribed between the words “God” and “Mohammad” on another decorative inscription on the portal which can be read only using a mirror. The inscription says “God, architect Ali, Mohammad”.
A skeleton 2.1 metres tall was found opposite the entrance to the tomb. This is believed to be Khalilullah I´s own grave. A comb, a gold earring and other items of archaeological interest were found there.
The Shah Mosque
The Shah Mosque is in the lower courtyard, alongside the mausoleum. The mosque is 22 metres high. An inscription around the minaret says: “The Great Sultan Khalilullah I ordered the erection of this minaret. May God prolong his rule as Shah. Year 845” (1441-42).
Stairs lead from a hollow in the wall behind the minbar or pulpit to another small room. Stone traceries on the windows decorate the mosque.
The Palace Bathhouse
The palace bathhouse is located in the lowest courtyard of the complex. Like all bathhouses in the Old City, this one was built underground to ensure that the temperature inside was kept stable. As time passed the level of the earth rose and covered it completely. The bathhouse was found by chance in 1939. In 1953 part of it was cleaned and in 1961 restoration work was done and the dome repaired. The walls in one of the side rooms are covered with glazed tiles and this room is thought to have been the shah´s room.
Cistern
The cistern, part of an underground water distribution system, was constructed in the lower part of the bathhouse to supply the Shirvanshahs´ Palace with water. Water came into the cistern via ceramic pipes which were part of the Shah´s Water Pipeline, laid from a high part of the city. The cistern is located underground and its entrance has the shape of a portal. Numerous stairs lead from the entrance down to the storage facility. A link between the cistern and the bathhouse can be seen from the side lobby. The cistern was found by chance during restoration work in 1954.
Literature
S.B. Ashurbayli: Государство Ширваншахов (The State of the Shirvanshahs), Baku, Elm, 1983; and Bakı şəhərinin tarixi (The History of the City of Baku), Baku, Azarnashr, 1998
F.A. Ibrahimov and K.F. Ibrahimov: Bakı İçərişəhər (Baku Inner City), Baku, OKA, Ofset, 2002. Kamil Farhadoghlu: Bakı İçərişəhər (Baku Inner City), Sh-Q, 2006; and Baku´s Secrets are Revealed (Bakının sirləri açılır), Baku, 2008
E.A. Pakhomov: Отчет о работах по шахскому дворцу в Баку (Report on Work in the Shah´s Palace in Baku), News of the AAK, Issue II, Baku, 1926; and Первоначальная очистка шахского дворца в Баку (Initial Clearing of the Shah´s Palace in Baku), News of the AAK, Issue II, Baku, 1926
Chingiz Gajar: Старый Баку (Old Baku), OKA, Ofset, 2007
M. Huseynov, L. Bretanitsky, A. Salamzadeh, История архитектуры Азербайджана (History of the Architecture of Azerbaijan). Moscow, 1963
M.S. Neymat, Корпус эпиграфических памятников Азербайджана (Azerbaijan´s Epigraphic Monuments), Baku, Elm, 1991
A.A. Alasgarzadah, Надписи архитектурных памятников Азербайджана эпохи Низами (Inscriptions on the architectural monuments of Azerbaijan from the era of Nizami) in the collection, Архитектура Азербайджана эпохи Низами (Azerbaijan in the Era of Nizami), Moscow, 1947.
http://www.visions.az/en/news/159/cdc770e3/
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Šervānšāhs
Šervānšāhs (Šarvānšāhs), the various lines of rulers, originally Arab in ethnos but speedily Persianized within their culturally Persian environment, who ruled in the eastern Caucasian region of Šervān from mid-ʿAbbasid times until the age of the Safavids.
The title itself probably dates back to pre-Islamic times, since Ebn Ḵordāḏbeh, (pp. 17-18) mentions the Shah as one of the local rulers given his title by the Sasanid founder Ardašir I, son of Pāpak. Balāḏori (Fotuḥ, pp. 196, 203-04) records that the first Arab raiders into the eastern Caucasus in ʿOṯmān’s caliphate encountered, amongst local potentates, the shahs of Šarvān and Layzān, these rulers submitting at this time to the commander Salmān b. Rabiʿa Bāheli.
The caliph Manṣur’s governor of Azerbaijan and northwestern Persia, Yazid b. Osayd Solami, took possession of the naphtha wells (naffāṭa) and salt pans (mallāḥāt) of eastern Šervān; the naphtha workings must mark the beginnings of what has become in modern times the vast Baku oilfield.
By the end of this 8th century, Šervān came within the extensive governorship, comprising Azerbaijan, Arrān, Armenia and the eastern Caucasus, granted by Hārun-al-Rašid in 183/799 to the Arab commander Yazid b. Mazyad, and this marks the beginning of the line of Yazidi Šervānšāhs which was to endure until Timurid times and the end of the 14th century (see Bosworth, 1996, pp. 140-42 n. 67).
Most of what we know about the earlier centuries of their power derives from a lost Arabic Taʾriḵ Bāb al-abwāb preserved within an Arabic general history, the Jāmeʿ al-dowal, written by the 17th century Ottoman historian Monajjem-bāši, who states that the history went up to c. 500/1106 (Minorsky 1958, p. 41). It was exhaustively studied, translated and explained by V. Minorsky (Minorsky, 1958; Ḥodud al-ʿālam, commentary pp. 403-11); without this, the history of this peripheral part of the mediaeval Islamic world would be even darker than it is.
The history of Šervānšāhs was clearly closely bound up with that of another Arab military family, the Hāšemis of Bāb al-abwāb/Darband (see on them Bosworth, 1996, pp. 143-44 n. 68), with the Šervānšāhs at times ruling in the latter town (at times invited into Darband by rebellious elements there, see Minorsky 1958, pp. 27, 29-30), and there was frequent intermarriage between the two families.
By the later 10th century, the Shahs had expanded from their capital of Šammāḵiya/Yazidiya to north of the Kura valley and had absorbed the petty principalities of Layzān and Ḵorsān, taking over the titles of their rulers (see Ḥodud al-ʿālam, tr. Minorsky, pp. 144-45, comm. pp. 403-11), and from the time of Yazid b. Aḥmad (r. 381-418/991-1028) we have a fairly complete set of coins issued by the Shahs (see Kouymjian, pp. 136-242; Bosworth, 1996, pp. 140-41).
Just as an originally Arab family like the Rawwādids in Azerbaijan became Kurdicized from their Kurdish milieu, so the Šervānšāhs clearly became gradually Persianized, probably helped by intermarriage with the local families of eastern Transcaucasia; from the time of Manučehr b. Yazid (r. 418-25/1028-34), their names became almost entirely Persian rather than Arabic, with favored names from the heroic national Iranian past and with claims made to descent from such figures as Bahrām Gur (see Bosworth, 1996, pp. 140-41).
The anonymous local history details frequent warfare of the Shahs with the infidel peoples of the central Caucasus, such as the Alans, and the people of Sarir (i.e. Daghestan), and with the Christian Georgians and Abḵāz to their west. In 421/1030 Rus from the Caspian landed near Baku, defeated in battle the Shah Manučehr b. Yazid and penetrated into Arrān, sacking Baylaqān before departing for Rum, i.e. the Byzantine lands (Minorsky, 1958, pp. 31-32). Soon afterwards, eastern Transcaucasia became exposed to raids through northern Persia of the Turkish Oghuz. Already in c. 437/1045, the Shah Qobāḏ b. Yazid had to built a strong stone wall, with iron gates, round his capital Yazidiya for fear of the Oghuz (Minorsky 1958, p. 33). In 458-59/1066-67 the Turkish commander Qarategin twice invaded Šervān, attacking Yazidiya and Baku and devastating the countryside.
Then after his Georgian campaign of 460/1058 Alp Arslan himself was in nearby Arrān, and the Shah Fariborz b. Sallār had to submit to the Saljuq sultan and pay a large annual tribute of 70,000 dinars, eventually reduced to 40,000 dinars; coins issued soon after this by Fariborz acknowledge the ʿAbbasid caliph and then Sultan Malekšāh as his suzerain (Minorsky 1958, pp. 35-38, 68; Kouymjian, pp. 146ff, who surmises that, since we have no evidence for the minting of gold coins in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus at this time, Fariborz must have paid the tribute in Byzantine or Saljuq coins).
Fariborz’s diplomatic and military skills thus preserved much of his family’s power, but after his death in c. 487/1094 there seem to have been succession disputes and uncertainty (the information of the Taʾriḵ Bāb al-abwāb dries up after Fariborz’s death).
In the time of the Saljuq sultan Maḥmud b. Moḥammad (r. 511-25/1118-31), Šervān was again occupied by Saljuq troops, and the disturbed situation there encouraged invasions of Šammāḵa and Darband by the Georgians. During the middle years of the 12th century, Šervān was virtually a protectorate of Christian Georgia. There were marriage alliances between the Shahs and the Bagratid monarchs, who at times even assumed the title of Šervānšāh for themselves; and the regions of Šakki, Qabala and Muqān came for a time directly under Georgian rule (Nasawi, text, pp. 146, 174). The energies of the Yazidi Shahs had to be directed eastwards towards the Caspian, and on various occasions they expanded as far as Darband.
The names and the genealogical connections of the later Šervānšāhs now become very confused and uncertain, and Monajjem-bāši gives only a skeletal list of them from Manučehr (III) b. Faridun (I) onwards. He calls this Shah Manučehr b. Kasrān, and the names Kasrānids or Ḵāqānids appear in some sources for the later shahs of the Yazidi line in Šervān (Minorsky, 1958, pp. 129-38; Bosworth, 1996, pp. 140-41). Manučehr (III) not only called himself Šervānšāh but also Ḵāqān-e Kabir “Great Khan,” and it was from this that the poet Ḵāqāni, a native of Šervān and in his early years eulogist of Manučehr, derived his taḵalloṣ or nom-de-plume. Much of the line of succession of the Shahs at this time has to be reconstructed from coins, and from these the Shahs of the 12th century appear as Saljuq vassals right up to the time of the last Sultan, Ṭoḡrïl (III) b. Arslān, after which the name of the caliphs alone appear on their coins (Kouymjian, pp. 153ff, 238-42).
In the 13th century, Šervān fell under the control first of the Khwarazmshah Jalāl-al-Din Mengüberti after the latter appeared in Azerbaijan; according to Nasawi (p. 75), in 622/1225 Jalāl-al-Din demanded as tribute from the Šervānšāh Garšāsp (I) b. Farroḵzād (I) (r. after 600/1204 to c. 622/1225) the 70,000 dinars (100,000 dinars?) that the Saljuq sultan Malekšāh had exacted a century or more previously (see Kouymjian, pp. 152-53). Shortly afterwards, Šervān was taken over by the Mongols, and at times came within the lands of the Il-Khanids and at others within the lands of the Golden Horde.
At the outset, coins were minted there in the name of the Mongol Great Khans, with the names of the Kasrānid Shahs but without their title of Šervānšāh, but then under the Il-Khanids, no coins were struck in Šervān. The Kasrānids survived as tributaries of the Mongols, and the names of Shahs are fragmentarily known up to that of Hušang b. Kayqobāḏ (r. in the 780s/1370s; see Bosworth, 1996, p. 141; Barthold and Bosworth, 1997, p. 489).
This marked the end of the Yazidi/Kasrānid Shahs, but after their disappearance there came to power in Šervān a remote connection of theirs, Ebrāhim b. Moḥammad of Darband (780-821/1378-1418). He founded a second line of Shahs, at first as a tributary of Timur but latterly as an independent ruler, and his family was to endure for over two centuries.
The 15th century was one of peace and prosperity for Šervān, with many fine buildings erected in Šammāḵa/Šemāḵa and Baku (see Blair, pp. 155-57), but later in the century the Shahs’ rule was threatened by the rise of the expanding and aggressive shaikhs of the Ṣafavi order; both Shaikh Jonayd b. Ebrāhim and his son Ḥaydar were killed in attempted invasions of Šervān and the Darband region (864/1460 and 893/1488 respectively).
Once established in power in Persia, Shah Esmāʿil I avenged these deaths by an invasion of Šervān in 906/1500, in which he killed the Šervānšāh Farroḵ-siār b. Ḵalil (r. 867-905/1463-1500), then reducing the region to dependent status (see Roemer, pp. 211-12).
The Shahs remained as tributaries, and continued to mint their own coins, until in 945/1538 Ṭahmāsp I’s troops invaded Šervān, toppled Šāhroḵ b. Farroḵ, and made the region a mere governorship of the Safavid empire.
In the latter half of the 16th century, descendants of the last Shahs endeavored, with Ottoman Turkish help, to re-establish their power there, and in the peace treaty signed at Istanbul in 998/1590 between the sultan Morād III and Shah ʿAbbās I, Šervān was ceded to the Ottomans; but after 1016/1607 Safavid authority was re-imposed and henceforth became permanent till the appearance of Russia in the region in the 18th century (see Roemer, pp. 266, 268; Barthold and Bosworth, 1997, p. 489).
Την αναφερόμενη βιβλιογραφία θα βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/servansahs
==========================
Šervān (Širvān, Šarvān)
Šervān (Širvān, Šarvān), a region of Eastern Transcaucasia, known by this name in both early Islamic and more recent times, and now (since 1994) substantially within the independent Azerbaijan Republic, being bounded by the Islamic Republic of Iran on the south, the independent Armenian Republic on the west, and Daghestan of the Russian Federation of States on its north.
Geography and topography
Šervān proper comprised during the early Islamic centuries, as its northern part, the south-easternmost spurs of the main Caucasus range (which here rises to 4,480 m/13,655 ft), and then as its southern part the lower lands sloping down to the course of the Korr/Kura river, this last in its lower reaches below sea level. Hence to the south of this river boundary and of its confluent the Aras or Araxes, lay the region of Muqān, whilst to the northwest of Šervān lay the region of Šakki (q.v.) and to its west that of Arrān (see the maps in Minorsky, 1953, p. 78, and idem, 1958, p. 174).
However, throughout much of its history, the rulers of Šervān, and especially the Šervānšāhs who ruled from the beginning of the 9th century to the beginning of the 17th century, strove to extend their boundaries northwards into the mountain region of Layzān, and eastwards to the Caspian shores, to Qoba and to Masqat or Maškat in the direction of Bāb al-abwāb or Derbend and further southwards to Baku.
The lowland regions of Šervān were exposed to pressure from powerful neighbors like the Alans or Ossets of the central Caucasus, the Hashimid rulers of Bāb al-abwāb, the predatory Rus from the Caspian waters, and Kurdish and Daylami powers to the south like the Šaddādids and Mosāferids (qq.v.).
The towns of Šarvān included Šāvarān/Šābarān, the ancient center of the southern Qoba district, but above all, Šammāḵa or Šammāḵiya, which is said to have been named after an Arab governor of the region, Šammāḵ b. Šojāʿ, a subordinate of the governor of Azerbaijan, Arrān and Armenia for Hārun-al-Rašid, Saʿid b. Salm b. Qotayba Bāheli (see Balāḏori, Fotuḥ, p. 210).
Soon afterwards it became the capital for the founder of the line of Yazidi Šervānšāhs, Yazid b. Mazyad Šaybāni (d. 185/201), and is described by the 10th century Arab geographers as a town built of stone in the midst of a fertile, corn-growing region (see Le Strange, Lands, pp. 179-80).
In 306/918 it was apparently temporarily renamed Yazidiya, but it has been the old name that has survived (cf. Yāqut, Boldān [Beirut] III, p. 361; V, p. 436), and at the present time Shemakha is the administrative centre of this district of the Azerbaijan Republic.
History
With the decline of the Safavids in the early 18th century, Šervān again came under Ottoman rule, but Peter the Great’s expansionist policies were now a new factor, as Russian ambitions in Eastern Caucasia became apparent.
By the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1724 the coastal region of Baku was for the first time severed from inland Šervān, which was left to the Turkish governor in Šemāḵa (see Shaw, pp. 299-300).
This arrangement was held firm after Persian control was reasserted by Nāder Shah, who captured Šemāḵa in 1734, and by the Russo-Persian Treaty of Ganja of 1735, Nāder’s control over Darband, Baku, and the coastal lands was conceded by the Empress Catherine I (see Kazemzadeh, pp. 323-24).
However, Persian influence in the eastern Caucasus receded after Nāder’s death in 1160/1747, and various local princes took power there, including in Šervān and Darband.
Russian pressure increased towards the end of the 18th century. Moṣṭafā Khan of Šervān submitted to Tsar Alexander I in 1805, whilst still continuing secretly to seek Persian aid, and in 1806 the Russians occupied Darband and Baku.
The Golestān Treaty of 1813 between Russia and Persia definitively allocated Darband, Qoba, Šervān. and Baku to the Tsar (Kazemzadeh, p. 334). In 1820 Russian troops occupied Šemāḵa, Moṣṭafā Khan despairingly fled to Persia, and Šervān was definitively incorporated into the Russian Empire.
Under Tsarist rule, Šervān and Šemāḵa came within various administrative divisions of the empire.
Many of the older Islamic buildings of the city were damaged in an earthquake of 1859, but as late as this time, Šemāḵa still had a larger population (21,550) than Baku (10,000), before the latter’s demographic and industrial explosion as a centre of oil exploitation over the next two or three decades.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, these regions came within the nominally Soviet Azerbaijan, with Šemāḵa becoming the centre of a raǐon or administrative district, though its estimated population of 17,900 in 1970 was still well below the 19th century level. (See also Barthold and Bosworth).
Την αναφερόμενη βιβλιογραφία θα βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/servan
==============================
Περισσότερα:
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ανάκτορο_των_Σιρβανσάχ
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дворец_ширваншахов
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palace_of_the_Shirvanshahs
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Государство_Ширваншахов
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirvan
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ширван
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shirvanshah
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ширваншах
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Σιρβανσάχ
============================
Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250734946
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/the_shahs_of_shirvan_and_their_palace_at_baku.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_622142368
https://www.docdroid.net/bEG3d9g/oi-sakhides-toy-sirvan-sirvan-sakh-kai-to-anaktoro-toys-sto-mpakou-docx
A depiction of iconoclasm, from a 9th-century psalter. The iconoclasts believed that praying to works of religious art was tantamount to idolatry. Several Byzantine rulers encouraged the destruction of religious icons, which helped to widen the gap between Byzantine Christians and the Popes.
{WHF} {Ko-Fi} {Medium}
The Spiritual Potency of Simple People: from J. B. Duroselle to today's Manichaean Rulers of Europe to a Crushed Greek Antichrist
Few days ago, an Egyptian friend wrote to me and commented on my article 'Plea for Jean Baptiste Duroselle’s Brilliant Book, Europe: A History of its Peoples':
Table of Contents
I. How Simple People can utterly destroy today's World
II. Jean Baptiste Duroselle and Yahya Ibn Zakariya
III. Lassalian Monks and Schools
IV. Western European Elites hide their Manichaean Nature and Evil Faith
V. "Gods" do not accept Multipolar Worlds!
VI. A Greek World Leader and False Messiah: One of the several Antichrists to come
VII. The Duroselle Affair in Greece, and I
I. How Simple People can utterly destroy today's World
His pessimistic viewpoint forced me to write a rather long response, because it is an essential issue of Moral and a supreme moral obligation for anyone not to associate himself with the injustice and the lawlessness of today's world, and even more so, to do all that it takes to dissociate himself from the surrounding environment, to reject it and to denounce it as inhuman, impermissible and subject to monstrous, terminal annihilation.
It is only due to the prevailing worldwide, overwhelming and compact materialism, evolutionism and relativism that people lost their faith and cannot duly assess the eventually great spiritual power of the wish and of the negative wish. A faithless person that does not truly believe in the spiritual world cannot bring forth results in either wishes or negative wishes; I have to point out that I fully distinguish between negative wish and curse. In the latter case, one person invokes something harmful to someone, whereas in the former case, one demands forcefully that a negative development be averted or cancelled. Although a curse may be at times morally imposed to be uttered, a negative wish is essential to be thunderously expressed every time one person encounters a case of injustice, a wrongdoing, evilness, and any sort of falsehood, deceit, perfidy, scheme, chicanery or lie.
Today's faithless Muslims, Christians, Confucians, Taoists, Hindus, Buddhists and others have lost real faith in the spiritual, 'supernatural', world. They stupidly believe only in diverse stories and unimportant narratives, which -in spite of their possible veracity- do not constitute an inherent part of the true religion; their faith to God is only nominal. The ensuing catastrophic consequences lead to indiscriminate feelings of inefficiency, impotency and, even worse, self-depreciation. Due to this situation, they become effectively irreligious, because they practice their religion only mechanically (imitating ancestors) or hypocritically (to show to the society that they are faithful); but this is utter disbelief. What follows this encumbering situation is spiritual apathy; this involves also emotional indifference, and full purposelessness in life. These people are characterized by moral depravity indeed, not in the sense of being genuinely corrupt, but for not reacting, for keeping silent, and for tolerating the wrongdoing.
A positive wish can do wonders for many; and a negative wish has the power to prevent many evil acts and ominous developments from happening. Virtually any taciturn or vociferous person, who has strong faith, can express formidable negative wishes and bring forth results. This actually happens, but today's idiotic materialists simply cannot 'see' or understand it. A very well focalized negative wish cancels everything; from a simple governmental act to an assassination attempt to a war. And I can conclude that the chaotic situation in which all the powerful and evil lobbies of today's world find themselves, failing to achieve what they intend, has much to do with highly synchronized negative wishes that resolutely cancel the Satanic plans of all the 'Christian', 'Jewish', 'Muslim', 'Hindu', 'Buddhist', 'Taoist', 'Confucian', 'Shinto' or other governments, which sooner or later will disappear in utmost ruination.
In fact, all the forthcoming disasters come -also- from the negative wishes expressed in our world by people who -thanks to their moral standards and irrespective of their religion- fully understand that this world is impermissible to exist and has therefore to vanish in monstrous extermination. All negative wishes expressed against today's lawless world are the path of the few to the Paradise; and every sort of reluctance, every form of indifference, and every aspect of apathy toward today's criminal governments, Satanic presidents, demonic prime ministers, and other anomalous magistrates open the Gates of the Hell to all the idiots who think that Eternal Life can possibly hinge on meaningless cults hypocritically performed just to ensure later 'reward'.
Quite unfortunately for the present, diabolical but perishing world's establishment, God is not as malleable and as stupid as they delusionally imagine He is; and I am not referring to the 'Demiurge'….
You can herewith find my friend's comment and my lengthy response.
-- A friend's comment about my Plea for J. B. Duroselle’s Book --
Very interesting story about this guy Jean Baptiste! His name reminded me of my college: College St. Jean Baptiste De La Salle in Bab El Louk, then Khoronfich, then in Daher...
This shows how Europeans are like the other crooks, how they plan things in advance, and they pass them on.
What do we have in our hands to change things, except to write and express our views, without any results…
-------------------- My response ------------------
Dear Awadallah,
Thank you for your response, which so well shows that you understand that the Jean Baptiste Duroselle affair (in Greece 1990-1991), although it looks like an ‘internal’ European story (as an indication of the barbaric, ultra-nationalist and paranoid character of the basically uneducated and absolutely uncultured Greek society), has indeed wider implications. That is true.
II. Jean Baptiste Duroselle and Yahya Ibn Zakariya
All neighboring states must demonstrate a particular concern when, in a wretched country, people react with such hysteria, every time the lies that they stupidly believe in are overwhelmingly rejected by the world’s leading scholars.
Your email offered me the chance of a flash back and of a self-reappraisal; I will tell you what I mean.
However, let me start with a funny episode of the Greek, absurd and paranoid, reaction (back in 1990-1991) against Duroselle’s book, which is nowadays the cornerstone of all the EU member states’ secondary education — except for the backward trash of Greece where the education manuals are more racist than those in Nazi Germany at the time of Hitler.
In the fever of the anti-Duroselle madness that turned the average Greeks to rabid dogs back in 1989-1991, every famous person felt stupidly obliged to contribute to that mental and intellectual cholera, to promote the local chauvinism, and to speak against Jean Baptiste Duroselle.
The ignorant, uneducated and clownish «poet» Odysseas Elytis wanted to add his childish nonsense to the insults aired against the excellent French academician and his pertinent book. Bear in mind that his fake Nobel Prize was purchased by the Greek government of Constantine Caramanlis with the money of the idiotic average Greek taxpayer! I have to also add that Elytis’ real surname is Alepoudellis, which sounds very low and even derogatory in Greek (as it means «puppy fox» or «fox-relative»), and that is why he changed it (due to his enormous psychological complex of inferiority). By the way, you have to also know, when it comes to the filthy rascal Elytis, that when he found out that his wife had multiple sclerosis, he locked her in a clinic to get rid of her and to enjoy his cursed life with the company of a young prostitute.
So, this stinky trash of Elytis, in order to «prove» (!!!??!!!) that Jean Baptiste Duroselle was wrong for not including events of the otherwise unimportant Ancient Greek History in his comprehensive book of European History, said the following silly sentence: «Duroselle forgot that even his name is Greek»!
This is an allusion to the academician’s two personal names, namely «Jean Baptiste».
Although it appears that the French names originate from the respective Latin names (Ioannes Baptista), and that subsequently the Latin names derive from Ancient Greek, this is simply false.
https://la.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ioannes_Baptista / https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_the_Baptist
John Baptist (known to Muslims as Hz. Yahya ibn Zakariya / يحيى ابن زكريا,) was not a Greek, but an Aramaean-speaking Jew.
John Baptist’s real name was Yohannan ha’Matbil ( יוחנן המטביל / and in Syriac Aramaic/Suryani: ܘܚܢܢ ܡܥܡܕܢܐ)
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/יוחנן_המטביל and https://arc.wikipedia.org/wiki/ܝܘܚܢܢ_ܡܥܡܕܢܐ
{There is already, thank God (!), a Syriac-Aramaic Wikipedia: https://arc.wikipedia.org/wiki/ܦܐܬܐ_ܪܝܫܝܬܐ }
The conclusion is that Duroselle, when baptized as a Christian, got from his parents the two names 'Yohannan ha’Matbil' (Hz. Yahya ibn Zakariya) as personal names in their own language (French). His parents wanted apparently to commemorate the forerunner of the Christian faith.
There is no Greek involvement in this, and surely Yohannan ha’Matbil (Hz. Yahya) did not bother to learn Greek or any other foreign language.
This episode shows clearly that chauvinistic ideas, concepts and thoughts are prevailing in the pseudo-European state of Greece.
III. Lassalian Monks and Schools
This being one point, I have to add that I also know the Cairo-based institution that you attended when a schoolboy.
It is named after a (relatively recent) saint of the Catholic Church, namely Jean Baptiste de la Salle, who lived at the time of the Roi Soleil (Louis XIV). More: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Baptiste_de_La_Salle
France is inundated with colleges like the one where you you took secondary education courses in Cairo.
The first of all of them was launched by the saint Jean Baptiste de la Salle himself, when he was in life. The instructors and administrators were members of the religious order that he also initiated.
They are known as Lassalian monks (after «de La Salle»).
IV. Western European Elites hide their Manichaean Nature and Evil Faith
Now about Europe I wrote many articles back in the middle 2000s; I don’t intend to repeat myself. Friends turned the most important of them into a video:
When the good friend of mine, who expressed his readiness to make of this article a video, asked me what music to add, I said «undoubtedly Uighur instrumental»! The result was excellent. I really love Uighur instrumental music.
Russian friends turned the slides prepared my friend to be used in the video, and they published my article as a presentation (although it is in English):
No one understands that today’s real centers of power and secret societies, which shape the Western European process, are all Oriental of origin and they simply try to hide their Oriental past and identity by appearing as descendants of the Greeks and the Romans. That’s why they persistently over-magnified the significance of the Roman civilization, they fabricated the myth about Ancient Greece's supposedly important ancient civilization, and they threw all this filthy stuff to the eyes of stupid and uneducated people worldwide as a smokescreen.
As a matter of fact, there cannot be one Europe (not because the Germans, the Russians, the Italians, the French, and the Spaniards cannot hypothetically cohabitate in a sizeable Confederacy, but) due to the fact that the powerful secret societies that hide in the coulisses, behind the impotent governments, have different plans and divergent projects for Europe.
What average people do not know is that all these groups of power (the Jesuits, the Freemasons and the Zionists) have opposite plans of eschatological and messianic character. In simple terms, this means that all these groups prepare (or rather have already prepared) their own Messiahs, one for each of them, and they intend to launch them in public. Soon, you will see new, very influential statesmen to appear in clash with one another. They will be slandering one another as the Antichrist.
These centers of power existed for thousands of years; they are not new. And they existed mainly for this reason: in order to launch their Messiah (each of them). So, the clash will be ferocious and it will bring devastating disasters. Countries or people do not matter for them. What matters for each of them is their plan (by saying this, I mean its implementation). They will make entire countries disappear. What you saw in Pakistan is nothing. Bangladesh will disappear in one day.
V. "Gods" do not accept Multipolar Worlds!
Putin understood it very correctly and said it openly. What you and I believe about Allah, Islam, the Quran, etc. does not matter to them. These people believe utterly that they are «God». And they behave like that, using their power to destroy the enemy and the enemy’s pawns. One group of them, the Jesuits, has the secret plan of Russia’s Consecration to the Heart of Virgin Mary.
Do you know what this means? This means that the execrable Satanist, i.e. the Anti-Christian pope Francis I, does not consider Russia as a Christian state. He wants to turn it first to a Catholic dependency and then to use it. He tries to mobilize every stupid and idiotic politician anywhere on Earth for this purpose. Stupid and fake Muslim politicians, who have relations with this subordinate of the impending Antichrist (Masih al Dajjal), will lose their countries in a matter of few weeks (when the confrontation will start), because their enemies will manage to take benefit of the developments.
Now, the people who launched European Union (back in the late 40s and the early 50s), like Jean Monnet and all the others, known as founders of the European Union (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Founding_fathers_of_the_European_Union), were opposite to the Jesuits. But they did not protect their project (European Union) well. Then, after the late 1980s, the Jesuits marked a significant comeback.
Duroselle was a close associate of Jean Monnet and a French Freemason. But their plans about Europe included also the split and destruction of Russia (then known as USSR). This became very evident with de Gaulle, who did not say the words «Union soviétique» (or U.R.S.S.) even once. He used to call that state «la Russie». So, de Gaulle spoke about a Europe «de Lisbonne aux Ourals», which means a de facto split of Russia.
But naive Russians misread this very threatening discourse, by taking it as friendly!!!
Quite unfortunately, guileless Lavrov, like the absolutely idiotic Gorbachev, thinks that de Gaulle meant «one state from the Pacific to the Atlantic». There could not be worse reading than that. He keeps speaking in a most apologetic manner instead of invading Ukraine in its entirety, and ending the problem once forever.
The Russian establishment keeps maintaining useless, fraudulent hopes. They only confuse themselves and endanger their country.
Every word uttered by English, Americans, French, Canadians and Australians is a ruse and a fraud.
China makes the same disastrous mistake, speaking about a new multipolar world.
There isn’t going to be any new multipolar world.
The evil, crypto-Manichaean forces that control the Western world, when they will understand that, in their fight against one another, they allowed significant part of force to be obtained by others (Russia, China, India, Brazil, but also Turkey and Iran), will launch suddenly and unexpectedly a nuclear war — not at the scale that most people are afraid, but a nano-nuclear war like what you saw in Beirut.
VI. A Greek World Leader and False Messiah: One of the several Antichrists to come
Then, there is also a fake Freemasonic lodge that wants to make of Greece a larger state with control over both sides of the Aegean Sea, the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporus - after the Treaty of Sevres.
They don’t hate Turkey and Islam only; they despise Christianity enormously, and they want to bring back the charlatan - pseudo-gods of the Ancient Greeks. They want also to create a phantasmagoric appearance of UFOs and extraterrestrials, who will ‘land’ on Mount Olympus; of course, as you can guess, these will be fake extraterrestrials.
In reality, they will be demons in humanoid form and they will start having sex in the brothel-temples of Ancient Greece that they will entirely rebuild. Every story that you heard about homosexuality, prostitution, sexual orgies, etc. revolves around this project.
For 1600 years, Theater was -thank God- banned among Christians, but with the establishment of Modern Greece, the French and the English started pushing for the return of the old, evil habits.
To fully prepare for the aforementioned, absurd and evil project, they re-introduced Ancient Theater in Modern Greece only in the 1950s, i.e. 130 years after the country became independent. Due to the shameless pseudo-art of Theater, Modern Greeks lost their religion and they indulge in every abomination, being the shame of their Eastern Roman Christian Orthodox ancestors.
This villainous Freemasonic lodge wants to make of Greece the center of the world and their Messiah will be ruling from Crete where enormous treasures are going to be discovered (these Freemasons know the details). This is the whole secret behind the French-Greek alliance. You have a lot to wait in this regard.
VII. The Duroselle Affair in Greece, and I
And for this reason, the duplicitous and evil Western European authorities rapidly covered the scandal «Greece», which exploded around the book of Duroselle.
Few people remember it today, but it is good to bring it to the surface and to show the level of ignorance and the fake education that prevails in that country in which still today private universities are not allowed to open and function.
Do you know why?
- In order not to allow anyone to challenge the tyrannically imposed bogus-historical dogma of Hellenism.
«Hellenism» is worse than Nazism. Unfortunately, «Hellenism» is merely the filthy, disreputable showcase; but in the abominable backstage, you have an exorbitantly disproportionate dose of sexual anomalies among the evil spirits that the ignorant and uneducated Ancient Greeks accepted as possibly 'gods'! All to the glory of Satan whose Ancient Greek name was Zeus!
Many friends asked me why I defended Duroselle, although my worldview is different and my approach to European History is very divergent from his.
I responded that their evaluation is correct, but they basically misunderstood me, if they thought -even for a moment- that knowledge is a value for me. Knowledge is never a value. In the past, wisdom was accepted by the spiritually and intellectually superior as the real value. Ultimately, wisdom means accurate evaluation, pertinent judgment, and moral utilization of knowledge. There is no wisdom without Moral, and there is no Moral without Spirituality.
What are then the proper criteria of evaluation and the standards of investigation?
Nothing else except those stated clearly by the Moral.
Without Moral there is no religion, there is no faith, and spirituality ends up in black magic.
Revisiting these days the Duroselle affair and getting a brief retrospective view on it, I noticed how much it helped me.
In younger age, I had never thought to live in Greece; since my childhood, my future was «set» in the regions, lands and cities that my grandparents narrated to me. I then can say that, during the period 1978-1990, a) my postgraduate studies in France, England and Belgium, b) my doctoral studies in Germany, and c) my archaeological explorations in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Iran fully equipped me with detailed knowledge and understanding.
The barbarian, ignorant, narrow-minded and intolerant stance of the Greek elite, society and state, as expressed in the Duroselle affair, simply showed to me that I had to take distance from, and never return to, Greece.
I then drew the conclusion that a rubbish-collector in Sudan, Yemen, Chad, Somalia or Tanzania is superior to a professor of university, an academician, a prime minister or a president in Greece. Why? Because rubbish collectors are cleaner than all those who are plunged in the Satanic contamination and the falsehood of Hellenism!
Then, it did not matter whether I agreed or not with Duroselle; what mattered was that I disagreed with the disgusting sewerage of Greece. Ever since, my position has been irreversible, intransigent and unconditionally uncompromising.
Best regards,
Shamsaddin
20 Μαρτίου 1739: Ο Τουρκμένος Ναντέρ Σάχης του Ιράν καταλαμβάνει το Δελχί, Βαθύπλουτη Πρωτεύουσα των Γκορκανιάν, Πανίσχυρων Μογγόλων της ‘Ινδίας’
March 20, 1739: The Turkmen Nader Shah of Iran occupies Delhi, the Opulent Capital of the Gorkanian, i.e. the Formidable Mongols of ‘India’
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 20η Μαρτίου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης ενσωματώνει τμήματα δύο ομιλιών μου, οι οποίες δόθηκαν τον Ιανουάριο του 2019 στο Πεκίνο σχετικά με την γεωστρατηγική του αφρο-ευρασιατικού χώρου, την πτώση των μεγάλων ιστορικών αυτοκρατοριών, και την δυναμική μιας αυτοκρατορικής-οικουμενιστικής επιστροφής στην Γη.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/08/04/20-μαρτίου-1739-ο-τουρκμένος-ναντέρ-σάχης-το/ ====================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Μια φορά όταν είπαν στον Ναντέρ ότι δεν υπάρχει πόλεμος στον Παράδεισο, λέγεται ότι ρώτησε: “Μπορεί να υπάρχει ευχαρίστηση εκεί”;
Πριν από 280 χρόνια, το αδιανόητο έγινε γεγονός! Το (σιιτικό) Ιράν κατέλαβε την (σουνιτική) Ισλαμική Αυτοκρατορία των Μεγάλων Μογγόλων (Μουγάλ), η οποία ήταν ένα πολύ μεγαλύτερο, πολυπληθέστερο και πλουσιώτερο κράτος. Καμμιά χώρα στον κόσμο δεν είχε ποτέ κατακτήσει την Κοιλάδα του Γάγγη. Αλλά για τον Αφσάρ Τουρκμένο γεωργό – πολεμιστή Ναντέρ όλα ήταν δυνατά!
Οι Αχαιμενιδείς είχαν κατακτήσει όλες τις εκτάσεις από την Μακεδονία μέχρι την Κοιλάδα του Ινδού, από τα βόρεια παράλια της Μαύρης Θάλασσας μέχρι το Σουδάν, κι από την Κεντρική Ασία μέχρι το Ομάν. Αλλά εκεί που τελειώνει η Πενταποταμία (Παντζάμπ: ‘Πέντε Ποτάμια’ στα φαρσί και στα ουρντού) τερματίζονταν και τα ανατολικά όρια του Ιράν.
Ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος που άτρομος διεξήγαγε και νικούσε σε μάχες έναντι συντριπτικά υπερτέρων δυνάμεων δεν κατέλαβε ‘πολλές’ χώρες! Αυτό είναι κάτι που πολλοί ξεχνούν στην Ελλάδα. Ουσιαστικά , ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος κατέκτησε μία χώρα: το Ιράν. Απέραντη, τεράστια, με πολυπληθή στρατεύματα, ναι! Αλλά μία. Ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος προχώρησε πέραν της Πενταποταμίας και νίκησε τον Πώρο, βασιλιά ενός βόρειου ινδικού βασιλείου. Και θα προχωούσε περισσότερο αλλά ξεσηκώθηκαν οι στρατιώτες του και τον απέτρεψαν.
Ι. Δεν υπάρχει ‘Ινδία’: είναι ένας ψεύτικος, αποικιοκρατικός, οριενταλιστικός όρος
Υπάρχει στο σημείο αυτό μια σύγχυση που δημιουργήθηκε από αρχαίους Έλληνες και Ρωμαίους συγγραφείς: προερχόμενος από το όνομα του Ινδού ποταμού, ο όρος ‘Ινδία’ (Χεντ και Σιντ) απέκτησε σιγά-σιγά μια τεράστια ασάφεια, ακριβώς επειδή η γνώση για εκτάσεις πέραν του ποταμού ήταν μικρή.
Τα βασίλεια ανατολικά του Ινδού αποτελούσαν βέβαια την Ινδία και ήταν εθνοφυλετικά συγγενή προς τους Πέρσες και τους Άρειους, αλλά πιο πέρα στα ανατολικά και στα νότια εκτείνονταν δραβιδικά βασίλεια που δεν είχαν καμμιά συγγένεια – εθνική, γλωσσική, πολιτισμική – με τους πραγματικούς Ινδούς των βασιλείων αμέσως ανατολικά του Ινδού. Οι Δραβίδες είναι τόσο διαφορετικοί από τους Ινδούς όσο οι Έλληνες από τους Κινέζους.
Στα χρόνια της Ύστερης Αρχαιότητας, ο αρχαιοελληνικός όρος ‘Ινδία’ απέκτησε τόση ασάφεια και γενίκευση όση κι ο όρος ‘Αιθιοπία’, ο οποίος περιέγραφε αρχικά το σημερινό Σουδάν (όχι την Αβησσυνία που σήμερα ψευδώς ονομάζεται Αιθιοπία). Οι δυο όροι τελικά αλληλο-επικαλύφθηκαν και ουσιαστικά κατάντησαν συνώνυμα του ‘Νότου’ κατά τους πρώτους χριστιανικούς αιώνες.
Όλα αυτά μας οδηγούν στο συμπέρασμα ότι σήμερα η χρήση της λέξης ‘Ινδίας’ – είτε για αναφορά στην Αρχαιότητα και στα Ισλαμικά Χρόνια, είτε για περιγραφή του συγχρόνου κράτους – είναι λαθεμένη και βεβαρυμένη με πολιτικές, αποικιοκρατικές κι οριενταλιστικές, σκοπιμότητες. Άλλωστε κι η περσική και ουρντού λέξη ‘Χιντουστάν’ σήμαινε και σημαίνει βασικά την περιοχή του Ινδού ποταμού, της Πενταποταμίας και ομόρων περιοχών.
Σχεδόν οι μισοί κάτοικοι του ψευτοκράτους ‘Ινδία’ είναι δραβιδικοί και δεν μιλούν ινδικά (χίντι). Η σημερινή Ινδία μπορεί να είναι μεγάλη αλλά αποτελεί κατ’ ουσίαν ένα νεο-αποικιακό ψευτοκράτος, όπως η Νιγηρία, η Αλγερία ή η Αίγυπτος, που δεν αποτελεί ‘έθνος’ αλλά απαρτίζεται από πολλά και διαφορετικά μεταξύ τους έθνη.
Κλείνω αυτή την αναφορά προσθέτοντας ότι η παραπάνω εθνοφυλετική και γεωγραφική διαφορά είναι ολότελα άσχετη από την θρησκευτική διαφορά Ισλάμ – ‘Ινδουϊσμού’ (μουσουλμάνων – ‘ινδουϊστών’), δεδομένου ότι μουσουλμάνοι υπάρχουν και ανάμεσα στους Ινδούς (: ‘ινδο-ευρωπαίους’) του Βορρά και ανάμεσα στους Δραβίδες του Ντεκάν, όπως είναι το όνομα του νότιου μισού της λεγόμενης ‘Ινδίας’.
Αν, τέλος, θέτω εντός εισαγωγικών τους όρους ‘Ινδουϊσμός’ και ‘ινδουϊστές’, αυτό οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι είναι τόσο ψεύτικοι και λαθεμένοι όσο κι ο όρος ‘Ινδία’. Κατ’ ουσίαν δεν υπάρχει ‘ένας’ Ινδουϊσμός αλλά πολλοί (όπως κι η Χριστιανωσύνη δεν είναι μία, το Ισλάμ δεν είναι ένα, ο Βουδισμός δεν είναι ένας, κοκ). Κι επιπλέον υπάρχουν κι άλλες θρησκείες είτε στο Ντεκάν είτε στην βόρεια Ινδία. Γενικώτερα, στην ψευδή, αποικιοκρατική, οριενταλιστική Ιστορία της ‘Ινδίας’ θα επανέλθω με πολλά κείμενα.
Ό,τι ξέρει ο σημερινός κόσμος για την Ινδία είναι μια αγγλογαλλική παραχάραξη της Ιστορίας: για παράδειγμα, υπάρχουν αρχαιοελληνικά κείμενα του 1ου χριστιανικού αιώνα, όπως ο Περίπλους της Ερυθράς Θαλάσσης, που αναφέρουν τα πολλά και διαφορετικά κράτη, τα οποία βρίσκονταν τότε στον χώρο που στρεβλά σήμερα αποκαλούμε ‘Ινδία’, και όμως δεν τα αποκαλούν ‘ινδικά βασίλεια’, επειδή δεν ήταν ινδικά βασίλεια.
ΙΙ. Κοιλάδα του Ινδού, Πενταποταμία και Κοιλάδα του Γάγγη από τον Μεγάλο Αλέξανδρο στους Μεγάλους Μογγόλους Αυτοκράτορες
Μετά τον θάνατο του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου και μέχρι τα χρόνια της μογγολικής κατάκτησης της Κοιλάδας του Ινδού και της Κοιλάδας του Γάγγη, καμμιά ξένη δύναμη δεν κατέκτησε εκτάσεις που σήμερα ανήκουν στην χώρα που συμβατικά ονομάζεται Ινδία. Μόνον οι Ιρανοί Σασανίδες (Σασανιάν: 224-651) έφθασαν τα ανατολικά σύνορά τους τόσο μακριά όσο οι Αχαιμενιδείς κι ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος. Αλλά και εκείνοι σταμάτησαν εκεί.
Όταν οι Επίγονοι Σελευκιδείς και οι Πάρθες Αρσακιδείς (Ασκανιάν: η πιο μακραίωνη ιρανική δυναστεία – 250 π.Χ.-224 μ.Χ.) βρίσκονταν σε αδυναμία, πολλά αυτόνομα βασίλεια σχηματίζονταν από τα έθνη που κατοικούσαν στις ανατολικές επαρχίες τους, δηλαδή τον χώρο όπου σήμερα βρίσκονται το Πακιστάν, το Αφγανιστάν, το Ουζμπεκιστάν, το Τατζικιστάν, η Κιργιζία, οι ανατολικές εσχατιές του Ιράν και τα βορειοδυτικά άκρα της Ινδίας: η Σογδιανή, το ελληνιστικό κράτος της Βακτριανής, το ινδοπαρθικό κράτος, το ινδοσκυθικό κράτος, το κάποτε πανίσχυρο Κουσάν, οι Τόχαροι, και άλλα κεντρασιατικά τουρκόφωνα ή ινδοευρωπαϊκά κράτη.
Το τι αποκαλείται ‘αυτοκρατορία’ στην Αρχαία Ιστορία της ‘Ινδίας’, όπως την έχουν παρασκευάσει Άγγλοι, Γάλλοι, Ολλανδοί κι Αμερικανοί οριενταλιστές ‘Ινδολόγοι’, είναι βασικά μικρά κράτη (για τα μέτρα των Αχαιμενιδών, των Σελευκιδών και των Σασανιδών) που εκτείνονται κυρίως ανάμεσα στην Πενταποταμία και το Δέλτα του Γάγγη: το βασίλειο των Μαουρύα (322–185 π.Χ.) ή το βασίλειο των Γκούπτα (319-543 μ.Χ.). Αυτά ήταν όντως ινδικά – ινδοευρωπαϊκά βασίλεια. Όμως τα περισσότερα άλλα βασίλεια στα νότια δεν μπορούν να ονομασθούν ινδικά γιατί ήταν δραβιδικά. Και ήταν όλα πάντοτε μικρά τοπικά βασίλεια: όλη η Νότια Ασία ήταν κατά κανόνα πάντοτε κατακερματισμένη.
Οι πρώιμοι μουσουλμάνοι κι οι ισλαμικές στρατιές των μέσων του 7ου αιώνα που έφθασαν στο Πεντζάμπ και τα βορειοδυτικά άκρα της σημερινής Ινδίας ουσιαστικά επανέλαβαν την Ιστορία: εκμεταλλεύθηκαν κάτι το οποίο ‘είχαμε’ ξαναδεί! Όπως ο Μέγας Αλέξανδρος, καταλύοντας το αχαιμενιδικό Ιράν, βρέθηκε σχεδόν ‘αυτόματα’ κυρίαρχος των ανατολικών σατραπειών κι εκτάσεών του, έτσι κι οι ισλαμικές στρατιές μετά τις μάχες στην Καντισίγια (636), Νεχαβέντ (642) και Μερβ (651) βρέθηκαν κυρίαρχοι των ανατολικών σατραπειών κι εκτάσεων του σασανιδικού Ιράν.
Ανάποδα, η Ιστορία επαναλήφθηκε και πάλι λίγους αιώνες αργότερα: στους χρόνους της αργής παρακμής και βαθμιαίας αποδυνάμωσης του αβασιδικού χαλιφάτου της Βαγδάτης. Ό,τι χαρακτήρισε τους Σελευκιδείς και τους Αρσακιδείς, συνέβη και τότε: πολλά μικρότερα ισλαμικά βασίλεια ξεφύτρωσαν κι αλληλοδιαδέχθηκαν το ένα το άλλο στην περιοχή ανάμεσα το κεντρικό ιρανικό οροπέδιο, την Αράλη στην Κεντρική Ασία και την Πενταποταμία.
Η μογγολική κατάκτηση της σημερινής βόρειας Ινδίας πιστοποιεί διαχρονικά ότι όλος ο χώρος ανάμεσα στο Δέλτα του Ινδού και στο Δέλτα του Γάγγη καταλαμβάνεται πιο εύκολα από τον βορρά παρά από τα δυτικά. Και δεν αναφέρομαι σε στρατιωτικές κατακτήσεις μόνον. Από τον 8ο αιώνα, με την διάδοση του Ισλάμ στην Κεντρική Ασία, πολλά τοπικά τουρκόφωνα φύλα αποψιλώνονταν από τους πιο ικανούς πολεμιστές τους, οι οποίοι έβλεπαν ότι, αν αποδέχονταν το Ισλάμ, θα μπορούσαν να έχουν μια πολύ επιτυχημένη σταδιοδρομία ως στρατιωτικοί σε μια τεράστια αυτοκρατορία.
Έτσι, πολλοί ευχαρίστως προσέρχονταν για να προσλήφθούν ως δούλοι-πολεμιστές. Στο αβασιδικό χαλιφάτο υπήρχαν ήδη πολυάιθμοι και για όλους τους εχρησιμοποιείτο η αραβική λέξη ‘ιδιοκτησία’, διότι ως σκλάβοι αποτελούσαν την ιδιοκτησία (‘μαμλούκ’ / πληθυντικός: μαμαλίκ) των κυρίων τους. Αυτοί είναι οι Μαμελούκοι.
Μαμελούκοι υπήρχαν παντού: στην Κεντρική Ασία, στην Πενταποταμία, στις κεντρικές περιοχές του χαλιφάτου, στην Αίγυπτο, και στην βορειοδυτική Αφρική. Η κατά τόπους ιστορία τους είναι απλή: πρώτα ήταν σκλάβοι-πολεμιστές, έπειτα απελεύθεροι, ύστερα παράκλητοι ως εμπειροπόλεμοι, και τελικά κυρίαρχοι ηγεμόνες.
Αλλά δεν υπήρχε πουθενά ένας εθνικού χαρακτήρα συντονισμός. Και δεν μπορούσε να υπάρχει, επειδή οι ‘μαμελούκοι’ ανήκαν σε διαφορετικές τουρκόφωνες φυλές, μιλούσαν σχετικά διαφορετικές γλώσσες, κι ενθυμούνταν τις πάντοτε υπαρκτές ενδοτουρκικές εχθρότητες κι αντιπαλότητες. Όποιοι πετύχαιναν σε ένα κάποιο τόπο κυριαρχούσαν εκεί. Δεν υπήρχε δυναστεία Μαμελούκων μόνον στην Αίγυπτο, όπως είναι περισσότερο γνωστό στην Ελλάδα.
Υπήρχαν πολλές κατά τόπους δυναστείες Μαμελούκων που όλοι τους ήταν τουρκόφωνοι – αν κι αυτό δεν σημαίνει την ίδια γλώσσα, εφόσον άλλα τα Κιπτσάκ, άλλα τα Τσαγατάι, άλλα τα τουρκμενικά, άλλα τα των Ογούζων (ή Ούζων – Ουζμπέκων), κοκ.
Αλλά τα φαρσί ήταν πάντοτε η γλώσσα της λογοτεχνίας και της ιστορίας και τα αραβικά η γλώσσα της επιστήμης και της θρησκείας.
Μετά την πρώιμη ισλαμική επέλαση μέχρι την Κοιλάδα του Ινδού και την Πενταποταμία, η διάδοση του Ισλάμ στην Νότια Ασία (βόρεια Ινδία: ανάμεσα στο Δέλτα του Ινδού και στο Δέλτα του Γάγγη / Ντεκάν: το κατοικούμενο από μη Ινδούς, Δραβίδες, νότιο ήμισυ της σημερινής Ινδίας) δεν ήταν ποτέ θέμα του Ισλαμικού Χαλιφάτου της Δαμασκού (661-750) και της Βαγδάτης (750-1258), όπως συχνά σήμερα Ινδουϊστές εθνικιστές εσφαλμένα ισχυρίζονται.
Αντίθετα, ήταν υπόθεση πολέμου ανάμεσα σε ινδικά ινδουϊστικά βασίλεια της Κοιλάδας του Γάγγη και σε μικρότερα ισλαμικά βασίλεια που ξεφύτρωσαν κι αλληλοδιαδέχθηκαν το ένα το άλλο στην περιοχή ανάμεσα το κεντρικό ιρανικό οροπέδιο, την Αράλη στην Κεντρική Ασία και την Πενταποταμία, όπως προανέφερα, εξαιτίας της βαθμιαίας αποδυνάμωσης του αβασιδικού χαλιφάτου της Βαγδάτης.
Αυτά τα ισλαμικά βασίλεια, όπως οι Γαζνεβίδες (977–1186 / το Γαζνί βρίσκεται στο σημερινό Αφγανιστάν), είτε διέθεταν Μαμελούκους είτε είχαν συσταθεί από Μαμελούκους.
Οι πόλεμοι αυτών των βασιλείων με τα ινδικά ινδουϊστικά βασίλεια απέληξαν στην διάδοση του Ισλάμ στον ευρύτερο χώρο της Νότιας Ασίας.
Έτσι, αυτό που αποκαλούμε ‘Σουλτανάτο του Δελχί’, ουσιαστικά αποτελεί μια διαδοχή πέντε διαφορετικών δυναστειών που προέρχονται από Μαμελούκους, δηλαδή διάφορα τουρκόφωνα αλλά και άλλα κεντρασιατικά φύλα.
Αυτές οι πέντε ισλαμικές δυναστείες με βάση το Δελχί (: το Παλαιό Δελχί) διεξήγαγαν πολέμους με τα ινδικά και τα δραβιδικά βασίλεια είτε του χώρου ανάμεσα στο Δέλτα του Ινδού και στο Δέλτα του Γάγγη είτε του Ντεκάν.
Οι πέντε δυναστείες καλύπτουν ένα διάστημα άνω των τριών αιώνων: Μαμελούκοι (1206–1290), Χάλτζι (Khalji: 1290–1320), Τούγλακ (Tughlaq: 1320–1414), Σαγίντ (Sayyid: 1414–51), και Λόντι (Lodi: 1451–1526).
Αυτοί μάλιστα ήταν ικανοί να σταθούν με επιτυχία απέναντι στον Χουλάγκου και να αποκρούσουν τις πρώτες μογγολικές επελάσεις (1221-1327), ενώ η Βαγδάτη κατέρρευσε το 1258.
Τότε διαμορφώθηκε μια κοσμοπολίτικη και πολύ ανεκτική κοινωνική κατάσταση που προσέλκυσε Ιρανούς, Κεντρασιάτες, Τουρκόφωνους και Μογγόλους που ελάχιστη σημασία απέδιδαν σε θρησκευτικές διαφορές – σιίτες ή σουνίτες, μουσουλμάνους, χριστιανούς (Νεστοριανούς), μανιχεϊστές, βουδιστές ή ινδουϊστές.
Η εθνοφυλετική σύνθεση των Ινδο-Ευρωπαίων Ινδών του χώρου της σημερινής βόρειας Ινδίας άλλαξε ολότελα και δημιουργήθηκε ένα τουρκο-μογγολο-κεντρασιατο-ιρανο-ινδικό εθνογλωσσικό μείγμα, το οποίο φτάνει μέχρι τις μέρες μας: η επίσημη γλώσσα του Πακιστάν (ουρντού) είναι μια τουρκική λέξη (ordu) που σημαίνει ‘στρατός’.
Αυτή είναι μια μεικτή τουρκική (Turkic), περσική, αραβική κι ινδική γλώσσα, στην οποία το ινδικό λεξιλόγιο (που προέρχεται από αρχαίες ινδικές – ινδο-ευρωπαϊκές γλώσσες όπως τα σανσκριτικά και τα πρακριτικά) είναι σχετικά μικρό.
Η ίδια γλώσσα είναι επίσημη και στην Ινδία, πλην όμως εκεί λέγεται χίντι, γράφεται σε Ντεβαναγκάρι σύστημα (οφειλόμενο σε αρχαία Μπραχμί γραφή) και όχι σε φαρσί (όπως τα ουρντού που έχουν μερικά επιπλέον γράμματα για φθόγγους ανύπαρκτους στα φαρσί), και απλώς δεν έχει τους ισλαμικούς όρους που έχει κάθε γλώσσα μουσουλμάνων. Αλλά κατ’ ουσίαν ουρντού και χίντι είναι μία γλώσσα και με εκτεταμένο τουρκικό (Turkic) λεξιλόγιο.
Αν το Σουλτανάτο του Δελχί γλύτωσε από τον Τσενγκίζ Χαν, δεν απέφυγε τον Ταμερλάνο. Το 1398 ο στρατός του Τιμούρ Λενγκ κατέλαβε το Δελχί κι επακολούθησε μια απερίγραπτη λεηλασία και σφαγή. Η πόλη εκθεμελιώθηκε. Στην συνέχεια αναθεμελιώθηκε και το Σουλτανάτο συνεχίστηκε αν και ιδιαίτερα αποδυναμωμένο.
Το τέλος της τελευταίας δυναστείας του Δελχί δόθηκε από τον Μπαμπούρ (στα περσικά σημαίνει ‘Τίγρης’) απόγονο του Ταμερλάνου, ο οποίος ήταν γιος του κυβερνήτη της Φεργάνα του Τουρκεστάν (σήμερα στο ανατολικό Ουζμπεκιστάν).
Μετά από πολλές πολεμικές κατακτήσεις στην Κεντρική Ασία, στράφηκε στην Ινδία και μετά από τη νίκη στην μάχη του Πανιπάτ θεμελίωσε το 1526 την δυναστεία που αποκαλείται Μουγάλ (Mughal) στην διεθνή βιβλιογραφία.
Ουσιαστικά, ο όρος Μογγόλος σήμαινε στρατιωτική βαθμίδα στα Τσαγατάι τουρκικά, την σήμερα νεκρή πλέον γλώσσα του Ταμερλάνου. Το πραγματικό όνομα, με το οποίο οι ίδιοι οι Μεγάλοι Μογγόλοι αυτοκράτορες (‘σάχηδες’) αποκαλούσαν τους εαυτούς τους και το κράτος τους, ήταν η περσική λέξη Γκουρκανιάν που (στον πληθυντικό) σημαίνει ‘Γαμπροί’.
Ο όρος κατάγεται από πολεμικές – βασιλικές πρακτικές τουρκόφωνων φύλων από τα χρόνια του Τσενγκίζ Χαν (και ίσως και πιο πριν, αλλά τουλάχιστον τότε έγινε γνωστός στους Ιρανούς κι άρχισαν να τον χρησιμοποιούν).
Κατ’ αυτές τις πρακτικές, ένας πολύ γενναίος στρατιώτης – πολεμιστής από μια μάλλον κατώτερη τουρκόφωνη φυλή, αφού επιδείξει ανδρεία σε μια ή περισσότερες μάχες, ζητάει να παντρευτεί την κόρη ενός στρατιωτικού ηγέτη από μια άλλη, ανώτερη τουρκόφωνη φυλή, κι αφού αυτό γίνει, αποκτάει ο ίδιος μεγαλύτερη σημασία και κοινωνική, δηλαδή στρατιωτική, υπόσταση.
Μετά τον Μπαμπούρ (1504 – 1530), οι Γκορκανιάν κυριάρχησαν σε όλες τις εκτάσεις ανάμεσα στο Δέλτα του Ινδού και το Δέλτα του Γάγγη, επέκτάθηκαν τόσο προς Αφγανιστάν και Κεντρική Ασία (από όπου κατάγονταν) όσο και προς τα νότια στο Ντεκάν, κι αναγνωρίστηκαν ως σύμμαχοι από τους Ιρανούς Σαφεβίδες που δεν ήταν Πέρσες αλλά Τουρκμένοι.
Και έτσι δημιουργήθηκε μια εκπληκτική τουρκόφωνη κυριαρχία από την Αλγερία και την Δυτική Μεσόγειο μέχρι την Μυανμάρ, Ταϋλάνδη και την Κίνα, κατά την οποία τρεις τουρκόφωνοι μουσουλμάνοι αυτοκράτορες, ένας Οθωμανός, ένας Σαφεβίδης κι ένα Γκουρκανί, έλεγχαν το μεγαλύτερο τμήμα του τότε γνωστού κόσμου.
Η κοινή καταγωγή και η κοινή θρησκεία δεν εξασφάλισαν ωστόσο καμμία ενότητα.
Οι Σαφεβίδες θεμελίωσαν το πρώτο σιιτικό κράτος στην Παγκόσμια Ιστορία και κατασφάζονταν ασταμάτητα με τους σουνίτες Οθωμανούς από την σημερινή νότια Ρωσσία μέχρι το Ομάν, ενώ οι επίσης σουνίτες Μεγάλοι Μογγόλοι Γκουρκανιάν παρέμειναν ως επί το πλείστον ουδέτεροι.
Σάχης Ταχμάσπ Α’ του Ιράν, στα αριστερά, και Σάχης Χουμαγιούν των Γκορκανιάν (Μεγάλη Μογγολική Αυτοκρατορία της ‘Ινδίας’), στα δεξιά
Μάλιστα μερικές φορές οι Γκουρκανιάν είχαν και καλές σχέσεις με τους Σαφεβίδες, όπως τεκμηριώνει η επίσκεψη (1544) του Χουμαγιούν (γιου του Μπαμπούρ) στο Εσφαχάν του Ιράν και οι απίστευτες ευωχίες και συμπόσια που έλαβαν χώραν εκεί με τον Σάχη Ταχμάσπ Α’ (1524-1576), ο οποίος βοήθησε τον Μεγάλο Μογγόλο να εξαφανίσει την απειλή που ήταν για τον θρόνο του ο Σερ Σάχης Σουρί (Sher Shah Suri), ένας Παστούνος που είχε στήσει μια εξουσία στην Βεγγάλη.
Οι Μεγάλοι Μογγόλοι συσσώρευσαν τεράστιο πλούτο, τον οποίο όμως δεν χρησιμοποίησαν για κάτι το συγκεκριμένο. Μετά τον Αουράνγκζεμπ (1658-1707) άρχισε η παρακμή. Η κατάσταση στο Ιράν ήταν παράλληλη: το 1736 η σαφεβιδική δυναστεία έπαιρνε ένα τέλος.
Ήταν η ώρα για τον Δεύτερο Μεγαλέξανδρο, όπως τον αποκαλούσαν οι σύγχρονοί του Ιρανοί, Κεντρασιάτες, Οθωμανοί κι άλλοι ή τον Ναπολέοντα της Ασίας, όπως τον επονόμαζαν αργότερα Ευρωπαίοι συγγραφείς: τον Ναντέρ Σάχη. Γνωρίζουμε ότι στην εξορία του ο Ναπολέων διάβαζε συγγράμματα Ευρωπαίων που αναφέρονταν στους πολέμους και στις τακτικές του Ναντέρ Σάχη.
ΙΙΙ. Ο Ναντέρ Σάχης (1736-1747) κι η Κατάληψη του Δελχίου (1739)
Ο Ναντέρ Σάχης ήταν μια από τις πάμπολλες περιπτώσεις που πιστοποιούν την υπεροχή των γεωργών προ όλων των άλλων τομέων ανθρώπινης εργασίας και δραστηριότητας.
Μια από τις αναρίθμητες περιπτώσεις που βεβαιώνουν ότι οι άνθρωποι των πόλεων είναι καθοριστικά κι απόλυτα κατώτεροι από τους ανθρώπους που δουλεύουν την γη. Γεννήθηκε σε μια μικρή πόλη του Χορασάν (σήμερα ΒΑ Ιράν) σε μια φτωχή οικογένεια Τουρκμένων αγροτών της φυλής Αφσάρ (افشار / Afshar). Το όνομα αυτό απαντάται σήμερα ακόμη ως επώνυμο σχεδόν σε όλα τα μήκη και πλάτη του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου, ιδιαίτερα βέβαια από την Τουρκία μέχρι την Κίνα.
Αφού πέρασε μια παιδική και νεανική ζωή με πολλές δοκιμασίες (έχασε τον πατέρα του, αιχμαλωτίσθηκε με την μητέρα του, κλπ) κι αφού έγινε Κιζιλμπάσης (‘Ερυθρίνος’), συνέχισε να ζει μια απλή ζωή στρατιώτη μέχρι τα 30 του. Είχε έτσι πάρει ένα πολύ σπάνιο μάθημα από την ζωή, το μόνο απαραίτητο για να γίνει κάποιος άνθρωπος ένας πραγματικά κορυφαίος αυτοκράτορας: περιφρονούσε τα πλούτη, τα αξιώματα, την χλιδή και την πολυτέλεια των ανακτόρων. Ζούσε στα τελευταία σαφεβιδικά χρόνια.
Η αδύναμη εξουσία των τελευταίων σάχηδων του Εσφαχάν ήταν αιτία απόσχισης τοπικών κυβερνητών (στο Αφγανιστάν), ρωσσικών κατακτήσεων στον Καύκασο, οθωμανικής επιθετικότητας και γενικευμένου χάους από την απόπειρα των Αφγανών επαναστατών υπό τον Μαχμούντ Χοτακί να ανατρέψει τον Σουλτάν Χουσεΰν, τελευταίο Σαφεβίδη.
Από το 1722 μέχρι το 1736 (δηλαδή σε ηλικία 34-48 ετών), ο Ναντέρ πολέμησε σε πολλές μάχες για να καταστείλει την αφγανική εξέγερση, να εκδιώξει τους επαναστάτες από την πρωτεύουσα Εσφαχάν και να την αποδώσει στον νόμιμο σάχη Ταχμάσπ Β’, πριν οριστεί διοικητής των ανατολικών επαρχιών και συνενώσει όλες τις ανατολικές επαρχίες της χώρας.
Επίσης πολέμησε ενάντια στους Οθωμανούς, έσπευσε στο Αφγανιστάν για να καταστείλει νέα εξέγερση, υποχρέωσε τον Ταχμάσπ Β’ να παραιτηθεί, όταν ο ανήμπορος σάχης από ζήλεια είχε επιχειρήσει μόνος του μια αποτυχημένη εκστρατεία στον Καύκασο, κι ορίστηκε αντιβασιλέας του γιου του Ταχμάσπ Β’ Αμπάς Γ’.
Μετά από μια σειρά σημαντικών μαχών και νικών κατά των Οθωμανών στον Καύκασο και μετά την εκ μέρους του κατάληψη της Βαγδάτης, υποχρέωσε τους Οθωμανούς να παραχωρήσουν τα ιρανικά εδάφη που είχαν παλαιότερα κατακτήσει στον Καύκασο (Γεωργία και Αρμενία). Και στις 8 Μαρτίου 1736 στέφθηκε σάχης από μια γενική συνέλευση στρατιωτικών, ευγενών και κληρικών που καταλάβαιναν ότι ο μικρός Αμπάς Γ’ ήταν ανίκανος να βασιλεύσει.
Η εκπληκτική ικανότητα του Ναντέρ να ηγείται αριθμητικά μικρότερων στρατευμάτων και να σημειώνει σημαντικές νίκες εναντίον εχθρών – με υπέρτερες δυνάμεις χάρη σε εντυπωσιακούς αιφνιδιασμούς και τεχνικές, απατηλές κινήσεις και πλευροκοπήματα – χαρακτήρισε την περίοδο των έντεκα ετών κατά την οποία βασίλευσε. Σε μια εποχή χωρίς τανκς και μηχανοκίνητες μονάδες, στρατεύματα μετακινούνταν με εκπληκτικές ταχύτητες μέσα από πολύ δύσβατες και δυσπρόσιτες περιοχές, από τον Καύκασο στον Ινδό, από την Κεντρική Ασία στη Μεσοποταμία, κι από το Αφγανιστάν στον Περσικό Κόλπο.
Ο Ναντέρ Σάχης γεννήθηκε σε μια σιιτική οικογένεια αλλά σε μεγαλύτερη ηλικία έδειξε συμπάθεια προς το σουνιτικό Ισλάμ και προσπάθησε να οργανώσει μια σύνθεση και συνένωση των δύο θεολογιών.
Ως άτομο ήταν ίσως ο πιο ανεξίθρησκος ηγεμόνας του Ιράν και η φιλία του προς χριστιανικούς πληθυσμούς ήταν τέτοια που συμπεριέλαβε συχνά Γεωργιανούς κι Αρμένιους στο στράτευμά του.
Θα μπορούσε κανείς εύκολα να τον περιγράψει και ως ένα Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ πριν τον Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ, επειδή καμμιά στρατιωτική του επιχείρηση δεν είχε θρησκευτικά κίνητρα ή σκοπιμότητες.
Όπου έκρινε κι αποφάσιζε ο Ναντέρ Σάχης, η θρησκεία δεν είχε θέση κι όλοι οι άνθρωποι ήταν ίσοι και κρίνονταν με βάση τις ικανότητές τους.
Οι σιίτες μολάδες κι αγιατολάδες κι ο σεϊχουλισλάμης της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας είχαν βρει τον μπελά τους μαζί του.
Η κατάκτηση του Δελχί κι η εκτεταμένη λαφυραγώγηση του πλουσιώτατου γείτονα του Ιράν δεν έγιναν ούτε με σκοπό το κέρδος ούτε για να προσπορισθεί ο Ναντέρ Σάχης φήμη και δόξα.
Απλώς του χρειάζονταν έσοδα για τους πολέμους κατά των Οθωμανών που προετοίμαζε στο μυαλό του.
Ο ετήσιος προϋπολογισμός του κράτους του Αουράνγκζεμπ μόλις 25 χρόνια πριν καταλάβει το Δελχί ο Ναντέρ Σάχης ήταν δεκαπλάσιος εκείνου της Γαλλίας του Λουδοβίκου ΙΔ’ (‘βασιλιά ήλιου’)!
Η στρατιωτική τεχνική του Ναντέρ Σάχη στην μάχη του Καρνάλ (13 Φλεβάρη 1739) ήταν εκπληκτική.
Και η λαφυραγώγηση των ανακτόρων των Μεγάλων Μογγόλων στο Δελχί ξεπερνάει κάθε ιστορική αναφορά και κάθε τρελή φαντασία.
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Οι Ατελείωτες Μάχες του Ναντέρ Σάχη
Πρώτη εκστρατεία στο Αφγανιστάν – 1729
Η Μάχη στο Μαλαγιέρ, στην οροσειρά του Κεντρικού Ζάγρου, κατά των Οθωμανών – 1730
Η Μάχη στο Μπαγκαβάρντ του Καυκάσου κατά των Οθωμανών – 1735
Μάχη στα Στενά Χάυμπερ, στα βουνά μεταξύ των σημερινών Πακιστάν κι Αφγανιστάν, στην πορεία για κατάληψη του Δελχί – 1738. Πολέμησαν 10000 Ιρανοί υπό τον Ναντέρ Σάχη και νίκησαν 70000 στρατιώτες της Μογγολικής Αυτοκρατορίας των Γκορκανιάν της ‘Ινδίας’.
Η μάχη του Καρνάλ όπου ο Ναντέρ Σάχης πολέμησε εναντίον εξαπλασίων στρατευμάτων (55000 κατά 300000) και νικώντας τα εβάδισε εναντίον του Δελχί – 1739. Οι αντίπαλοι υποστηρίζονταν από 2000 εκπαιδευμένους για πόλεμο ελέφαντες και 3000 κανόνια.
Η μάχη του Καρς: 80000 Ιρανοί κατά 140000 Οθωμανών – 1745. Ιρανική νίκη με νεκρούς και τραυματισμένους 8000 Ιρανούς και Οθωμανούς 12000 νεκρούς, 18000 τραυματισμένους και 5000 αιχμαλώτους
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Κι όμως ο συνεχώς μάχιμος αυτός γεωργός – στρατιώτης – σάχης δεν θεώρησε αυτή την ιστορική νίκη γεγονός άξιο για να πανηγυρίσει κι αμέσως στράφηκε σε άλλους πολέμους.
Επιστρέφοντας όμως από το Δελχί πήρε τους στρατηγούς του (που ήταν όλοι τους Ιρανοί ευγενείς) και τους οδήγησε στο μικρό χωριό του Χορασάν όπου είχε γεννηθεί. Εκεί τους είπε:
– Βλέπετε σε τι ύψη εξυψώνει ο Μεγαλοδύναμος αυτούς που επιλέγει; Γι’ αυτό, ποτέ μην περιφρονείτε ένα άνθρωπο με ταπεινή καταγωγή και με ελάχιστη περιουσία!
Μετά από άλλα οκτώ χρόνια γεμάτα πολέμους κατά της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας στην αραβική χερσόνησο, την Μεσοποταμία και τον Καύκασο, μετά από εκστρατείες στην Κεντρική Ασία και στα παράλια του Ομάν, ο Ναντέρ Σάχης είχε το τέλος που οι ήρωες αντιμετωπίζουν στα χέρια δειλών συνωμοτών (εκτός κι αν συνωμοσίες δεν υπάρχουν!).
Δολοφονήθηκε όταν κοιμόταν από δέκα πέντε συνωμότες την 20 η Ιουνίου 1747.
Στην συνέχεια θα βρείτε μια σειρά από διαφωτιστικές δημοσιεύσεις σχετικά με την ζωή, το έργο, τις στρατιωτικές κατακτήσεις και την κοσμοαντίληψη του πιο τρομερού Ιρανού της δεύτερης χιλιετίας.
Ο Σάχης Ναντέρ κάθεται στον Θρόνο του Παγωνιού, τον μυθικής αξίας χρυσοποίκιλτο κι εμβληματικό θρόνο των Μεγάλων Μογγόλων Αυτοκρατόρων Γκορκανιάν του Δελχί τον οποίο λαφυραγώγησε μαζί πολλά άλλα αμύθητα πλούτη και πετράδια.
Αποσπάσματα από Ιστορικά Κείμενα-Quotes
Afterwards Nadir Shah himself, with the Emperor of Hindustan, entered the fort of Delhi. It is said that he appointed a place on one side in the fort for the residence of Muhammad Shah and his dependents, and on the other side he chose the Diwan-i Khas, or, as some say, the Garden of Hayat Bakhsh, for his own accommodation. He sent to the Emperor of Hindustan, as to a prisoner, some food and wine from his own table.
One Friday his own name was read in the khutba, but on the next he ordered Muhammad Shah’s name to be read. It is related that one day a rumour spread in the city that Nadir Shah had been slain in the fort. This produced a general confusion, and the people of the city destroyed five thousand men of his camp. On hearing of this, Nadir Shah came of the fort, sat in the golden masjid which was built by Rashanu-d daula, and gave orders for a general massacre.
For nine hours an indiscriminate slaughter of all and of every degree was committed. It is said that the number of those who were slain amounted to one hundred thousand. The losses and calamities of the people of Delhi were exceedingly great….
After this violence and cruelty, Nadir Shah collected immense riches, which he began to send to his country laden on elephants and camels.
Tarikh-i Hindi
by Rustam ‘Ali
In: The History of India as Told by its own Historians
The Posthumous Papers of the Late Sir H. M. Elliot
John Dowson, ed. 1st ed. 1867. 2nd ed., Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1956, vol. 22, pp. 37-67
When the Shah departed towards the close of the day, a false rumour was spread through the town that he had been severely wounded by a shot from a matchlock, and thus were sown the seeds from which murder and rapine were to spring. The bad characters within the town collected in great bodies, and, without distinction, commenced the work of plunder and destruction….
On the morning of the 11th an order went forth from the Persian Emperor for the slaughter of the inhabitants. The result may be imagined; one moment seemed to have sufficed for universal destruction. The Chandni chauk, the fruit market, the Daribah bazaar, and the buildings around the Masjid-i Jama’ were set fire to and reduced to ashes.
The inhabitants, one and all, were slaughtered. Here and there some opposition was offered, but in most places people were butchered unresistingly. The Persians laid violent hands on everything and everybody; cloth, jewels, dishes of gold and silver, were acceptable spoil….
But to return to the miserable inhabitants. The massacre lasted half the day, when the Persian Emperor ordered Haji Fulad Khan, the kotwal, to proceed through the streets accompanied by a body of Persian nasakchis, and proclaim an order for the soldiers to resist from carnage. By degrees the violence of the flames subsided, but the bloodshed, the devastation, and the ruin of families were irreparable. For a long time the streets remained strewn with corpses, as the walks of a garden with dead flowers and leaves.
The town was reduced to ashes, and had the appearance of a plain consumed with fire. All the regal jewels and property and the contents of the treasury were seized by the Persian conqueror in the citadel. He thus became possessed of treasure to the amount of sixty lacs of rupees and several thousand ashraf is… plate of gold to the value of one kror of rupees, and the jewels, many of which were unrivalled in beauty by any in the world, were valued at about fifty krors.
The peacock throne alone, constructed at great pains in the reign of Shah Jahan, had cost one kror of rupees. Elephants, horses, and precious stuffs, whatever pleased .the conqueror’s eye, more indeed than can be enumerated, became his spoil. In short, the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed masters in a moment.
About Shah’s sack of Delhi
Tazrikha by Anand Ram Mukhlis
A history of Nâdir Shah’s invasion of India
In The History of India as Told by its own Historians
The Posthumous Papers of the Late Sir H. M. Elliot.
John Dowson, ed. 1st ed. 1867. 2nd ed., Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1956, vol. 22, pp. 74-98.
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Nader_Shah
Ανδριάντας του Ναντέρ Σάχη σήμερα στο Ιράν
Nāder Shah
Nāder Shah, ruler of Iran, 1736-47. He rose from obscurity to control an empire that briefly stretched across Iran, northern India, and parts of Central Asia. He developed a reputation as a skilled military commander and succeeded in battle against numerous opponents, including the Ottomans and the Mughals.
During Nāder’s campaign in India, and several years after he had replaced the last Safavid ruler on the Persian throne, the elimination of much of the Safavid family effectively ended any real possibility of a Safavid restoration. The decade of Nāder’s own tumultuous reign was marked by conflict, chaos, and oppressive rule. Nāder’s troops assassinated him in 1747, after he had come to be regarded as a cruel and capricious tyrant. His empire quickly collapsed, and the resulting fragmentation of Iran into several separate domains lasted until the rise of the Qajars decades later.
Born in November 1688 into a humble pastoral family, then at its winter camp in Darra Gaz in the mountains north of Mashad, Nāder belonged to a group of the Qirqlu branch of the Afšār Turkmen. Beginning in the 16th century, the Safavids had settled groups of Afšārs in northern Khorasan to defend Mashad against Uzbek incursions.
The first major international political event that directly affected Nāder’s career was the Afghan invasion of Iran in the summer of 1719 that resulted in the capture of Isfahan and deposition of Shah Solṭān Ḥosayn, the last Safavid monarch, by the autumn of 1722. After the fall of Isfahan, Safavid pretenders emerged all over Iran. One was Solṭān Ḥosayn’s son Ṭahmāsb, who escaped to Qazvin, where he was proclaimed Shah Ṭahmāsb II.
He led a resistance movement against the Afghans during the 1720s. The Russians and Ottomans saw the Afghan conquest as their own opportunity to acquire territory in Iran, so both invaded and occupied some land in 1723. The following year they signed a treaty in which they recognized each other’s territorial gains and agreed to support the restoration of Safavid rule.
Around this time, Nāder began his career in Abivard, an Afšār-controlled town just north of Mashad. He made himself so useful to the local ruler Bābā ʿAli Beg that he gave Nāder two of his daughters in marriage. Due to internal tribal rivalries, Nāder was not able to become Bābā ʿAli’s successor, so he vied for power with various upstart military chiefs in northeastern Iran who had emerged in the wake of the Afghan invasion.
In the mid 1720s, Nāder played an important role in defeating Malek Maḥmud Sistāni, one of that area’s main warlords, who had set himself up as the scion of the 9th-10th century Saffarid dynasty. Nāder was his ally for a while but soon turned against him. His role in suppressing this usurper brought him to Ṭahmāsb’s attention. Ṭahmāsb chose him as his principal military commander to replace Fatḥ ʿAli Khan Qajar (d. 1726), whose descendants (the founders of the Qajar dynasty) blamed Nāder for the murder of their ancestor.
With this promotion, Nāder assumed the title Ṭahmāsb-qoli (servant of Ṭahmāsb). His prestige steadily increased as he led Ṭahmāsb’s armies to numerous victories. He first defeated the Abdāli (later known as Dorrāni) Afghans near Herat in May 1729, then achieved victory over the Ḡilzi Afghans led by Ašraf at Mehmāndust on 29 September 1729.
After this battle, when Ašraf fled from Isfahan to Qandahar, Ṭahmāsb became finally established in Isfahan (with Nāder in actual control of affairs) by December 1729, marking the real end of Afghan rule in Iran. In the wake of Ašraf’s defeat, many Afghan soldiers joined Nāder’s army and proved helpful in many subsequent battles.
Three months before the Mehmāndust victory, Nāder had sent letters to the Ottoman Sultan Aḥmad III (r. 1703-30) to ask for help, since Ṭahmāsb “was made the legitimate successor of his esteemed father [Solṭān Ḥosayn]” (Nāṣeri, p. 210). Receiving no response, Nāder attacked the Ottomans as soon as Ašraf was defeated and Isfahan reoccupied. He waged a successful campaign during the spring and summer of 1730 and recaptured much territory that the Ottomans had taken in the previous decade.
But, just as the momentum of his offensive was building, news came from Mashad that the Abdāli Afghans had attacked Nāder’s brother Ebrāhim there and pinned him down inside the city’s walls. Nāder rushed to relieve him. (This distraction came at just the right time for the Ottomans, since in Istanbul the Patrona Halil rebellion, which led to the deposition of Aḥmad III, broke out in September 1730). Nāder arrived in Mashad in time to attend the wedding of his son Reżā-qoli to Ṭahmāsb’s sister Fāṭema Solṭān Begum.
Nāder spent the next fourteen months subduing Abdāli forces led by Allāh-Yār Khan. To commemorate his victory over them, he endowed in Mashad a waqf (pious foundation) at the shrine of Imam ʿAli al-Reżā (d. ca. 818). Nāder’s personal seal, preserved on the waqf deed of June 1732, showed his unremarkable Shiʿite loyalty at that time: Lā fatā illā ʿAli lā sayf illā Ḏu’l-Faqār / Nāder-e ʿaṣr-am ze loṭf-e Ḥaqq ḡolām-e hašt o čār (There is no youth more chivalrous than ʿAli, no sword except Ḏu’l-Faqār / I am the rarity of the age, and by the grace of God, the servant of the Eight and Four [i.e., the Twelve Imams].” (Šaʿbāni, p. 375; cf. Rabino, p. 53).
Ṭahmāsb took Nāder’s absence in Khorasan as his own chance to attack the Ottomans and pursued a disastrous campaign (January 1731–January 1732), in which the Ottomans actually reoccupied much of the territory recently lost to Nāder. Sultan Maḥmud I (r. 1730-54) negotiated with Ṭahmāsb a peace agreement that allowed the Ottomans to retain these lands, while returning Tabriz to avoid angering Nāder.
Three weeks later, Russia and Persia signed the Treaty of Rašt, in which Russia, trying to curry favor with Persia against the Ottomans, agreed to withdraw from most of the Iranian territory it had annexed in the 1720s.
When Nāder learned that Ṭahmāsb had relinquished substantial territory to the Ottomans, he quickly returned to Isfahan. He used the peace treaty as an excuse to remove Ṭahmāsb from the throne in August 1732 and replace him with Ṭahmāsb’s eight-month-old son, who was given the regnal name ʿAbbās III. Now regent, Nāder resumed hostilities against the Ottomans.
After a decisive round of victories, interspersed with short excursions to quell uprisings in Fārs and Baluchistan, he signed a new treaty in December 1733 with Aḥmad Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad. It marked an attempt to reinstate the provisions of the 1049/1639 Ottoman-Safavid Treaty of Qaṣr-e Širin (Ḏohāb), since it called for the restoration of the borders stipulated at that time, a prisoner exchange, and Ottoman protection for all Persian ḥajj pilgrims. The Ottoman sultan would not ratify it, because disputes persisted over control of parts of the Caucasus, and so intermittent hostilities continued.
In March 1734, Šāhroḵ was born to Reżā-qoli and Fāṭema Begum. Šāhroḵ thus formed a direct link between the lineages of Nāder and the Safavids—an important basis for Šāhroḵ’s eventual right to rule. The choice to name his grandson after Šāhroḵ b. Timur (r. 1409-47) revealed Nāder’s growing interest in emulating the conqueror Timur (r. 1369-1405).
There followed another series of Ottoman-Persian battles in the Caucasus, and Nāder’s capture of Ganja, during the siege of which Russian engineers provided assistance. Russia and Persia then signed a defensive alliance in March 1735 at Ganja. In the treaty, the Russians agreed to return most of the territory conquered in the 1720s.
This agreement shifted the regional diplomatic focus to a looming Ottoman-Russian confrontation over control of the Black Sea region and provided for Nāder a military respite on his western border.
By the end of 1735, Nāder felt that he had gained enough prestige through a series of victories and had secured the immediate military situation well enough to assume the throne himself. In Feburary 1736, he gathered the nomadic and sedentary leaders of the Safavid realm at a vast encampment on the Moḡān steppe.
He asked the assembly to choose either him or one of the Safavids to rule the country. When Nāder heard that the molla-bāši (chief cleric) Mirzā Abu’l-Ḥasan had remarked that “everyone is for the Safavid dynasty,” he was said to have had that cleric arrested and strangled the next day (Lockhart, p. 99). After several days of meetings, the assembly proclaimed Nāder as the legitimate monarch.
The newly appointed shah gave a speech to acknowledge the approval of those in attendance. He announced that, upon his accession to the throne, his subjects would abandon certain religious practices that had been introduced by Shah Esmāʿil I (r. 1501-24) and had plunged Iran into disorder, such as sabb (ritual cursing of the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, ʿOmar, and ʿOṯmān, termed “rightly guided” by the Sunnites) and rafż (denial of their right to rule the Muslim community).
Nāder decreed that Twelver Shiʿism would become known as the Jaʿfari madòhab (legal school) in honor of the sixth Imam Jaʿfar al-Ṣādeq (d. 765), who would be recognized as its central authority.
Nāder asked that this madòhab be treated exactly like the four traditionally recognized legal schools of Sunnite Islam. All those present at Moḡān were required to sign a document indicating their agreement with Nāder’s ideas.
Just before his actual coronation ceremony on 8 March 1736, Nāder specified five conditions for peace with the Ottoman empire (Astarābādi, p. 286), most of which he continued to seek over the next ten years.
They were:
(1) recognition of the Jaʿfari maḏhab as the fifth orthodox legal school of Sunnite Islam;
(2) designation of an official place (rokn) for a Jaʿfari imam in the courtyard of the Kaʿba [Perry, 1993, p. 854 and “Kaʿba,” in EI2 IV, p. 318 vs. Lockhart, p. 101] analogous to those of the Sunnite legal schools;
(3) appointment of a Persian pilgrimage leader (amir al-ḥajj);
(4) exchange of permanent ambassadors between Nāder and the Ottoman sultan; and
(5) exchange of prisoners of war and prohibition of their sale or purchase. In return, the new shah promised to prohibit Shiʿite practices objectionable to the Ottoman Sunnites.
Nāder tried to redefine religious and political legitimacy in Persia at symbolic and substantive levels.
One of his first acts as shah was to introduce a four-peaked hat (implicitly honoring the first four “rightly-guided” Sunni caliphs), which became known as the kolāh-e Nāderi, to replace the Qezelbāš turban cap, which was pieced with twelve gores (evocative of the twelve Shiʿite Imams).
Soon after his coronation, he sent an embassy to the Ottomans (Maḥmud I, r. 1730-54) carrying letters in which he explained his concept of the “Jaʿfari maḏhab” and recalled the common Turkmen origins of himself and the Ottomans as a basis for developing closer ties.
During this negotiation and subsequent ones, the Ottomans rejected all proposals related to Nāder’s Jaʿfari maḏhab concept but ultimately agreed to Nāder’s demands concerning recognition of a Persian amir al-ḥajj, exchange of ambassadors, and that of prisoners of war.
These demands paralleled the provisions of a long series of Ottoman-Safavid agreements, especially an accord, drawn up in 1727 but never signed, between the Ottoman sultan and Ašraf, the Ḡilzay Afghan ruler of Persia (r. 1725-29).
At the end of the 1148/1736 negotiations, both sides approved a document that mentioned only the issues of the ḥajj pilgrimage caravan, ambassadors, and prisoners because of disagreement over the Jaʿfari maḏhab concept.
Although no actual peace treaty was signed at that time, mutual acceptance of these other points became the basis for a working truce that lasted several years.
Nāder departed substantially from Safavid precedent by redefining Shiʿism as the Jaʿfari maḏhab of Sunni Islam and promoting the common Turkmen descent of the contemporary Muslim rulers as a basis for international relations.
Safavid legitimacy depended on the dynasty’s close connection to Twelver Shiʿism as an autonomous, self-contained tradition of Islamic jurisprudence as well as the Safavids’ alleged descent from the seventh Imam Musā al-Kāżem (died between 779 and 804). Nāder’s view of Twelver Shiʿism as a mere school of law within the greater Muslim community (umma)glossed over the entire complex structure of Shiʿite legal institutions, because his main goal was to limit the potential of Sunnite-Shiʿite conflict to interfere with his empire-building dreams.
The Jaʿfari maḏhab proposal also seems intended as tool to smooth relations between the Sunni and Shiʿite components of his own army. In addition, the proposal had economic implications, since control of a ḥajj caravan would have provided the shah with access to the revenue of the lucrative pilgrimage trade.
Nāder’s focus on common Turkmen descent likewise was designed to establish a broad political framework that could tie him, more closely than his Safavid predecessors, to both Ottomans and Mughals.
When describing Nāder’s coronation, Astarābādi called the assembly on the Moḡān steppe a quriltāy, evoking the practice of Mughal and Timurid conclaves that periodically met to select new khans. In various official documents, Nāder recalled how he, Ottomans, Uzbeks, and Mughals shared a common Turkmen heritage.
This concept for him resembled, in broad terms, the origin myths of 15th century Anatolian Turkmen dynasties. However, since he also addressed the Mughal emperor as a “Turkmen” ruler, Nāder implicitly extended the word “Turkmen” to refer, not only to progeny of the twenty-four Ḡozz tribes, but to Timur’s descendants as well.
Nāder’s novel concepts regarding the Jaʿfari maḏhab and common “Turkmen” descent were directed primarily at the Ottomans and Mughals. He may have perceived a need to unite disparate components of the omma against the expanding power of Europe at that time, however different his view of Muslim unity was from later concepts of it. But both ideas had less domestic importance.
On coins and seals, and in documents issued to his subjects, Nāder was more conservative in his claim to legitimacy. For example, the distich on one of his official seals focused only on the restoration of stability: Besmellāh – nagin-e dawlat-e din rafta bud čun az jā / be-nām-e Nāder Irān qarār dād Ḵodā (In the name of God – when the seal of state and religion had disappeared from Iran / God established there order in the name of Nāder; Rabino, p. 52).
In a proclamation sent to the ulamaof Isfahan soon after the coronation, the Jaʿfari maḏhab was depicted as nothing more than an attempt to keep peace between Sunnites and Shiʿites.
The document explained that ʿAli would continue to be venerated as one especially beloved by God, although henceforth the Shiʿite formula ʿAli wali Allāh (ʿAli is the deputy of God) would be prohibited.
In contrast to the shah’s letters to foreign rulers, this proclamation did not even mention the Safavids (Qoddusi, p. 540).
Nāder’s domestic policies introduced major economic, military, and social changes. He ordered a cadastral survey in order to produce the land registers known as raqabat-e Nāderi. Because of the establishment of the Jaʿfari maḏhab, the Safavid framework of pious foundations was suspended (Lambton, p. 131), although their revenues were the main source of financial support for important ulama.
Only in the last year of his reign did Nāder decree the resumption of pious foundations.
After his accession to the throne, Nāder claimed the ruler’s privilege to issue coinage in his name. His monetary policy linked the Persian currency system to the Mughal system, since he discontinued the Safavid silver ʿAbbāsi and minted a silver Nāderi whose weight standard corresponded with the Mughal rupee (Rabino, p. 52).
Nāder also attempted to promote fixed salaries for his soldiers and officials instead of revenues derived from land tenure. Continuing a shift that had begun in the late Safavid era, he increased substantially the number of soldiers directly under his command, while units under the command of provincial and tribal leaders became less important.
Finally, he continued and expanded the Safavid policy of a forced resettlement of tribal groups (Perry, 1975, pp. 208-10).
All these reforms can be viewed as attempts to address weaknesses that had emerged in the late Safavid era, but none solved the problems that were tied to larger trends in the world economy. Iran had suffered from a swift rise in the popularity of Indian silk in Europe during the last few decades of Safavid rule, a shift that dramatically reduced Iran’s foreign income and indirectly contributed to the draining of bullion away from Persian state treasuries (Matthee, pp. 13, 67-68, 203-06, 212-218).
This crisis, in turn, put more pressure on the provinces to produce tax revenue, which led provincial governors to take oppressive measures and fueled the Afghan revolt that had resulted in the Safavid collapse in the first place.
After his ascension to the throne Nāder’s main military task was the ultimate defeat of the remaining Afghan forces that had ended Safavid rule. After laying siege to Qandahar for almost a year, Nāder destroyed it in 1738—the last redoubt of the Ḡilzi, who were led by Shah Ḥosayn Solṭān, the brother of Shah Maḥmud, who had been the first Ḡilzay to rule Persia (1722-1725). On the site of his camp Nāder built a new city, Nāderābād, to which he transferred Qandahar’s population and Abdāli Afghans.
The destruction of Qandahar completed the reconquest of territory lost since the reign of Shah Solṭān Ḥosayn. Nāder’s career now entered a new phase: the invasion of foreign territory to pursue dreams of a world empire that could resemble the domains of Chinghis Khan (d. 1227) and Timur. After the fall of Qandahar, many Afghans joined his army.
His pursuit of Afghans who had fled across the Mughal frontier grew into an invasion of India when Nāder accused the Mughals of providing them with shelter and aid. Nāder had appointed Reżā-qoli as his deputy in Iran. While his father was away, Reżā-qoli feared a pro-Safavid revolt and had Moḥammad Ḥasan (the leader of the Qajars between 1726 and 1759) execute Ṭahmāsb and his sons.
After a successful offensive that culminated in the final defeat of the Mughal forces at the battle of Karnāl near Delhi in February 1739, Nāder made the Mughal emperor Moḥammad Šāh (r. 1719-48) his vassal and divested him of a large part of his fabulous riches, including the Peacock Throne and the Koh-i-Noor diamond. When the rumor spread that Nāder had been assassinated, the Indians attacked and killed his troops. In retaliation, Nāder gave his soldiers permission to plunder Delhi and massacre its inhabitants.
The peace treaty restored control of India to Moḥammad Šāh under Nāder’s distant suzerainty; it proclaimed Moḥammad Šāh’s legitimacy, citing the Turkmen lineage that he shared with Nāder (Astarābādi, p. 327). Nāder arranged a ceremony in which he placed the crown back on Moḥammad Shah’s head. To further emphasize Moḥammad Šāh’s subordinate status, he assumed the title šāhānšāh.
To further strengthen his ties to the Mughals, Nāder married his son Naṣr-Allāh to a great granddaughter of the Mughal emperor Awrangzēb (r. 1658-1707). His chroniclers represent his victory over Moḥammad Šāh as another sign of his similarity to Timur. The shah himself was so obsessed with emulating Timur that he moved, for a time, to Mashad (Lockhart, pp. 188-89, note 4).
While Nāder was invading India, Reżā-qoli was securing more territory for Nāder north of Balḵ and south of the Oxus river. His campaign aroused the ire of Ilbars, the khan of Khwarazm, and of Abu’l-Fayż (r. 1711-47), the Toqay-Timurid khan of Bukhara. When they threatened counterattacks, Nāder engaged in a swift campaign against them on his way back from India. He executed Ilbars and replaced him with a more compliant ruler, but this new vassal would soon be overthrown. Abu’l–Fayż, like the Mughal emperor, accepted his status as Nāder’s subordinate and married his daughter to Nāder’s nephew.
After the campaigns in India and Turkestan, particularly with acquisition of the Mughal treasury, Nāder found himself suddenly wealthy. He issued a decree canceling all taxes in Iran for three years and decided to press forward on several projects, such as creation of a new navy.
Nāder had sent his naval commanders at various times on expeditions in the Persian Gulf, particularly to Oman, but these missions were unsuccessful, in part because it was difficult to secure naval vessels of good quality and in adequate numbers. In the summer of 1741, Nāder began to build ships in Bušehr, arranging for lumber to be carried there from Māzāndarān at great trouble and expense. The project was not completed, but by 1745 he had amassed a fleet of about thirty ships purchased in India (Lockhart, p. 221, n. 3).
However, Nāder experienced several major setbacks after his return to Iran. In 1741-43 he launched a series of quixotic attacks in the Caucasus against the Dāḡestānis in retaliation for his brother’s death. In 1741, an attempt was made on Nāder’s life near Darband. When the would-be assassin claimed that he had been recruited by Reżā-qoli, the shah had his son blinded in retaliation, an act for which he later felt great remorse.
Marvi reported that Nāder began to manifest signs of physical deterioration and mental instability. Finally, the shah was forced to reinstate taxes due to insufficient funds, and the heavy levies sparked numerous rebellions.
In spite of mounting problems, in 1741 Nāder sent an embassy to the Ottomans to resubmit his 1736 proposal for a peace treaty. But Maḥmud I had just won wars against Russia and Austria and was not receptive.
The sultan rejected the shah’s claim to Iraq (a claim based on Timur’s earlier control of the province).
Then the Ottoman legal authority, the šayḵ al-Eslām, issued a fatwā (legal opinion) formally declaring the Jaʿfari maḏhab heretical.
In response, Nāder besieged several cities in Iraq in 1743, with no results, and in December of that year he signed a ceasefire with Aḥmad Pāšā, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad (d. 1747). Subsequently, Nāder convened a meeting of ulama from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia in Najaf at the shrine of ʿAli b. Abi Ṭāleb (d. 661), the fourth of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the first Imam.
After several days of lively debate on the question of the Jaʿfari maḏhab, the participants signed a document which recognized the Jaʿfari maḏhab as a legitimate legal school of Sunnite Islam.
The Ottoman sultan, however, remained unimpressed by this outcome.
Nāder soon had to leave Iraq to suppress several domestic rebellions.
The most serious of these began near Shiraz in January 1744 and was led by Moḥammad Taqi Khan Širāzi, the commander of Fārs province and one of Nāder’s favorites.
In June 1744, Nāder sacked Shiraz, and by winter he had crushed these revolts.
He resumed his war against the Ottomans and defeated them in August 1745 at Baḡāvard near Yerevan.
Although Nāder’s victory led to new negotiations, his bargaining position was not strong because of new, large-scale domestic uprisings.
The shah dropped his demands for territory and for recognition of the Jaʿfari maḏhab, and the final agreement was based only on the long mutually acceptable positions regarding frontiers, protection of pilgrims, treatment of prisoners, and exchange of ambassadors (Lockhart, p. 255).
The agreement recognized the shared Turkmen lineage and ostensibly proclaimed the conversion of Iran to Sunnism.
Yet the necessity to guarantee the safety of pilgrims to the Shiʿite shrines (ʿatabāt-e ʿāliya) in Iraq reveals the formal character of this concession.
The treaty was signed in September 1746 in Kordān, northwest of Tehran.
It made possible the official Ottoman recognition of Nāder’s rule, and the sultan dispatched an embassy with a huge assortment of gifts in the spring of 1747, although the shah did not live to receive it.
Nāder had spent the winter and spring of 1746 in Mashad, where he formulated a strategy to suppress the plethora of internal revolts. He also oversaw the construction of a treasure house for his Indian booty at nearby Kalāt-e Nāderi.
The building complex that Nāder constructed within this natural mountain fortress, near his birthplace in northern Khorasan, became his designated retreat, and he created there a secure showplace for his accomplishments.
Nāder followed the nomadic custom of not staying long in any permanent capital city, and Kalāt and Mashad (in, as he saw it. a complementary relationship) served as his main official sites in ways that resembled capital cities of other nomadic empires.
Under Nāder’s patronage, Mashad flourished at the midpoint of a trading route between India and Russia and grew in importance as a major pilgrimage center with its Emam Reẓā shrine complex.
In June 1747, a cabal of Afšār and Qajar officers succeeded in killing Nāder.
The succession struggle embroiled Persia in civil war for the next five years.
Two months before the assassination, Nāder’s nephew ʿAli-qoli, son of his brother Ebrāhim (d. 1738), had risen in revolt, and in July he followed his uncle on the throne as ʿĀdel Shah (r. 1747-48).
Nāder’s grandson Šāhroḵ, although blinded after an earlier coup attempt, finally secured the throne in Khorasan in 1748 as a vassal of the Afghan Aḥmad Shah Dorrāni (r. 1747-73).
This former deputy of Nāder founded the Dorrāni dynasty and is credited with being the first ruler of an independent Afghan state.
Šāhroḵ ruled for almost fifty years until 1795, when Āqā Moḥammad Khan Qajar (r. 1779-97) deposed him, marking the end of the rule of the Afsharids in Iran.
Text and bibliography in detail:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/nader-shah
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Koh-i-Noor and Nadir Shah’s Delhi loot
The legendary treasure trove of Hindustan has changed hands en masse on two occasions, once in 1739, when it was taken by Nadir Shah, and then again in 1857, by the prize agents of the East India Company. Apart from these two conquests, a great many priceless gems and jewels were acquired by the early European traders in India and sold in Europe. Today, many of the world’s famous diamonds have been attributed conclusively to the 1739 sack of Delhi. The most well-known jewels and artifacts among them are listed below—the little compressed and crystallized charcoal that have wended their way through a labyrinth of mankind’s violent history.
During Nadir Shah’s homeward march from Delhi to Persia, he ordered all the acquired jewels to be decorated on a tent. The tent is described in great details by an eyewitness Abdul Kurreem, who accompanied Nadir Shah on his return journey, in his memoir:
“The outside was covered with fine scarlet broadcloth, the lining was of violet coloured satin, upon which were representations of all the birds and beasts in the creation, with trees and flowers, the whole made of pearls, diamonds, rubies, emeralds, amethysts, and other precious stones: and the tent poles were decorated in like manner.
On both sides of the Peacock Throne was a screen, upon which were the figures of two angels in precious stones. The roof of the tent consisted of seven pieces, and when it was transported to any place, two of these pieces packed in cotton, were put into a wooden chest, two of which were a sufficient load for an elephant; and the screen filled another chest.
The walls of the tent, the tent poles and the tent pins, which latter were of massy gold, loaded five more elephants; so that for the carriage of the whole required seven elephants. This magnificent tent was displayed on all festivals in the Dewan Khaneh at Heart, during the remainder of Nadir Shah’s reign. After his death, his nephew Adil Shah, and his grandson Shahrokh, whose territories were very limited, and expenses enormous, had the tent taken to pieces, and dissipated the produce.”
In the well-known book ‘The History of Nadir Shah’ published in the 18th century from London, James Fraser estimates that 70 crores of wealth was carried away by Nadir Shah from Delhi:
Jewels from emperors and amirs: 25 crores
Utensils and handles of weapons set with jewels, with the Peacock Throne, etc.: 9 crores
Money coined in gold and silver coins: 25 crores
Gold and silver plates which he melted into coins: 5 crores
Fine clothes and rich stuff, etc.: 2 crores
Household furniture and other commodities: 3 crores
Weapons, etc.: 1 crore
Peacock Throne
Ten years after Nadir Shah returned from India with unimaginable treasure in 1739, he was assassinated by his own guards. Immediately, the famed Peacock Throne was dismantled, and its gems and stones were cut out and dispersed in the world market, though the entire lot can never be accounted for.
The Peacock Throne or the Mayurasan has been described by many, including historians Abdul Hamid Lahori, Inayat Khan, and French travellers Bernier and Tavernier, but Tavernier’s account can be considered the most authentic as he was officially allowed to inspect it in the Mughal court by Aurangzeb.
Tavernier was a French gem merchant who travelled between Persia and India six times between 1630 and 1668. According to him, the throne was of almost the size of a bed, being 6 ft x 4 ft in dimension. There were four horizontal bars connecting its four legs, upon which 12 columns stand to hold a canopy. At the centre of each of the 12 columns, a cross design was made of a ruby surrounded by four emeralds.
There were 108 large rubies (100-200 carats), 116 large emeralds (30-60 carats), innumerable diamonds and gemstones studded in the throne made of solid gold. Its paraphernalia included cushions, swords, a mace, a round shield, and umbrellas—all studded with gemstones and pearls. The underside of the canopy was covered with pearls and diamonds. Besides, Abdul Lahori describes the throne and its well-known stones, including Koh-i-Noor, the Akbar Shah diamond, the Shah diamond, the Timur Ruby, and the Shah Jahan diamond.
Koh-i-Noor
This diamond—known as ‘Babur’s Diamond’ before 1739—was acquired from the Kakatiya dynasty by Allauddin Khilji. When Ibrahim Lodi was defeated by Babur, it was apparently handed over to Humayun by the mother of Ibrahim Lodi to guarantee the family’s safety. However, other sources say that it was gifted to Humayun by the Gwalior Royal Family.
Thereafter, it was presented by Humayun to the Persian Shah Tamasp (to garner his support to regain Hindustan), who then gave it to the Deccan Kingdom as a gift. It came back to the Mughals during Shah Jahan’s reign, via a Persian diamond dealer Mir Jumla, and remained with the Mughal emperors until 1739.
It is rumoured that Nadir Shah was tipped off that the emperor Muhammad Shah was hiding the diamond in his turban. Nadir Shah then invited the emperor to a customary turban-exchange ceremony to foster eternal supportive ties between the two empires. He could not believe his eyes when he found the diamond concealed within the layers of the turban, and exclaimed, ‘Koh-i-Noor!’ (‘Mountain of Light!’). Since then, it has been known by that name.
After Nadir Shah was assassinated, the diamond fell into the hands of Ahmad Shah Abdali of Kabul. After Abdali, it was ceded by the Afghans to Sikh King Ranjit Singh of Punjab. On his death-bed in 1839, Ranjit Singh willed the Koh-i-Noor to the Jagannath Temple at Puri. The British East India Company acquired it from his son (Duleep Singh) in 1843.
It is said that the diamond was kept by John Lawrence, who had absent-mindedly put the box in his coat pocket. When Governor General Dalhousie asked for it to be sent from Lahore to Mumbai, Lawrence asked his servant to find it; while rummaging through his wardrobe, the servant replied, “there is nothing here, Sahib, but a bit of glass!”
The Koh-i-Noor was transported to England aboard HMS Madea, with Dalhousie carrying it personally. It was cut and put in a crown by the crown jewellers Garrard & Co.; Queen Mary wore this crown to the Delhi Coronation Durbar in 1911.
The Orloff
Prior to 1739, this unusual half-egg shaped diamond was known as the Great Mogul. After Nadir Shah’s murder, one of his soldiers sold it to an Armenian merchant, and it was acquired subsequently by the Russian nobleman Grigorievich Orlov. The nobleman presented it to his lover, the Grand Duchess Catherine, who mounted it in the Imperial Sceptre during her reign between 1762 and 1796.
Another version of the diamond’s history states that it was one of the eyes in a temple in South India, which was stolen by a French army deserter who had converted to Hinduism solely to gain access to the sanctum sanctorum of the temple to steal the diamond.
The Shah Diamond
This diamond remained in Iran for nearly a century until 1829, when the Russian diplomat and writer, Alexandr Griboyedov, was murdered in Tehran. Fearing a backlash from Russia, the grandson of Shah visited Moscow and presented the diamond as a gift to Russian Tsar Nicholas I.
The Great Table Diamond
Jean Baptiste Tavernier, a French traveller to India, mentioned a huge diamond of more than 400 carats that was set in the Peacock Throne, and called it the Diamanta Grande Table.
After Nadir Shah’s murder, the diamond was cut many times and distributed throughout the world. Researchers are still trying to locate all the pieces of this diamond, but only three have been confirmed to date—Darya-i-Noor (Sea of Light), Noor-ul-Amin (Light of the Eye), and Shah Jahan Table Cut.
The former two are among the Iranian Crown Jewels, as confirmed by a Canadian team from the Royal Ontario Museum that conducted a study on Iranian Crown Jewels in 1965.
The Darya-i-Noor is the most celebrated diamond among the Iranian Crown Jewels, and has a status similar to that of the Koh-i-Noor in the British Crown Jewels. The Shah Jahan Table Cut appeared mysteriously at a Christie’s auction in 1985, and was acquired by H.H.Sheikh Naseer Al-Sabah of Kuwait. It is assumed that it was not sold thereafter and remains in his family.
Timur Ruby
After Nadir Shah, Ahmed Shah Abdali of Kabul acquired a huge ruby along with the Koh-i-noor diamond, and later the Afghans ceded it to the Sikh King Ranjit Singh.
The British later acquired this mammoth 361 carat ruby from Maharaja Duleep Singh of Punjab. The names and dates of its six original owners are inscribed on the stone, as follows—Timur, Akbar (1612), Jahangir (1628), Aurangzeb (1659), Farrukhsiyar (1713), and Ahmad Shah Durrani (1754).
The ruby may be the one that was mentioned in Jauhar-i-Samsam while describing its acquisition by Nadir Shah from Muhammad Shah as “his majesty bestowed on Nadir Shah, with his own munificent hand, as a parting present, the peacock throne, in which was set a ruby upwards of a girih (three fingers’ breadth) in width, and nearly two in length, which was commonly called khiraj-i-alam or the tribute of the world”.
Below is a list of those few translucent rocks that are sprinkled around the world, of whose heritage we know about, thanks to the researchers and historians.
Till date, these are the only jewels that could have been conclusively traced back to Nadir Shah’s sack of Delhi in 1739. An unknown vast majority of the precious stones that Nadir Shah took with him is simply untraceable and most are probably lost in the passage of time.
Few may be lying in private collections, and then also, it is doubtful if their historicity is known even to their owners.
In this context, it does not really matter in which museum, or which city of the world these are located and preserved.
The important thing is that they are well conserved by experts to be passed down to future generations to cherish and appreciate these priceless items.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/destinations/koh-i-noor-and-nadir-shahs-delhi-loot/as49934879.cms
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Afsharid Dynasty (Nader Shah)
Nader Shah or King Nader (1688-1747), the founder of Afsharid Dynasty, an enigmatic figure in Iranian history ruled from 1736 – 1747 A.D.
Nader Shah, or Nader Qoli Beg was born in Kobhan, Iran, on October 22, 1688, into one of the Turkish tribes loyal to the Safavid shahs of Iran. He was the son of a poor peasant, who lived in Khorasan and died while Nader was still a child. Nader and his mother were carried off as slaves by the Ozbegs, but after death of his mother in captivity Nader managed to escape and became a soldier. Soon he attracted the attention of a chieftain of the Afshar in whose service Nader rapidly advanced. Eventually, the ambitious Nader fell out of favour. He became a rebel and gathered a substantial army.
In 1719 the Afghans had invaded Persia. They deposed the reigning Shah of the Safavid dynasty in 1722. Their ruler, Mahmoud Ghilzai (±1699-1725), murdered a large number of Safavid Princes, hacking many of them to death by his own hand. After he had invited the leading citizens of Esfahan to a feast and massacred them there, his own supporters assassinated Mahmoud in 1725. His cousin, Ashraf (±1700-1730), took over and married a Safavid princess.
At first, Nader fought with the Afghans against the Ozbegs until they withheld him further payment. In 1727 Nader offered his services to Tamasp II (±1704-1740), heir to the Safavid dynasty. Nader started the reconquest of Persia and drove the Afghans out of Khorasan. The Afghans suffered heavy losses, but before they fled Ashraf massacred an additional 3000 citizens of Esfahan. Most of the fleeing Afghans were soon overtaken and killed by Nader’s men, while others died in the desert. Ashraf himself was hunted down and murdered.
By 1729 Nader had freed Persia from the Afghans. Tamasp II was crowned Shah, although he was little more than a figurehead. While Nader was putting down a revolt in Khorasan, Tamasp moved against the Turks, losing Georgia and Armenia. Enraged, Nader deposed Tamasp in 1732 and installed Tamasp’s infant son, Abbas III (1732-1740), on the throne, naming himself regent. Within two years Nader recaptured the lost territory and extended the Empire at the expense of the Turks and the Russians.
In 1736 Nader evidently felt that his own position had been established so firmly that he no longer needed to hide behind a nominal Safavid Shah and ascended the throne himself. In 1738 he invaded Kandahar, captured Kabul and marched on to India. He seized and sacked Delhi and, after some disturbances, he killed 30000 of its citizens.
He plundered the Indian treasures of the Moghal Emperors, taking with him the famous jewel-encrusted Peacock Throne and the Koh-i Noor diamond. In 1740 Nader had Tamasp II and his two infant sons put to death. Then he invaded Transoxania. He resumed war with Turkey in 1743. In addition, he built a navy and conquered Oman.
Gradually Nader’s greedy and intolerant nature became more pronounced. The financial burden of his standing armies was more than the Persians could bear and Nader imposed the death penalty on those who failed to pay his taxes. He stored most of his loot for his own use and showed little if any concern for the general welfare of the country. Nader concentrated all power in his own hands.
He was a brilliant soldier and the founder of the Persian navy, but he was entirely lacking any interest in art and literature. Once, when Nader was told that there was no war in paradise, he was reported to have asked: “How can there be any delights there?”.
He moved the capital to Mashhad in Khorasan, close to his favourite mountain fortress. He tried to reconcile Sunnism with Shi’itism, because he needed people of both faiths in his army, but the reconciliation failed.
In his later years, revolts began to break out against his oppressive rule. Nader became increasingly harsh and exhibited signs of mental derangement following an assassination attempt.
He suspected his own son, Reza Qoli Mirza (1719-1747), of plotting against him and had him blinded. Soon he started executing the nobles who had witnessed his son’s blinding.
Towards the end, even his own tribesmen felt that he was too dangerous a man to be near. In 1747 a group of Afshar and Qajar chiefs decided “to breakfast off him where he should sup off them”. His own commanders surprised him in his sleep, but Nader managed to kill two of them before the assassins finished him off.
Nader was Persia’s most gifted military genius and is known as “The Second Alexander” and “The Napoleon of Persia”.
Although he restored national independence and effectively protected Iran’s territorial integrity at a dark moment of the country’s history, his obsessive suspicions and jealousies plunged Iran into political turmoil.
Little is known about Nader’s personal life. His grandiosity, his insatiable desire for more conquests and his egocentric behaviour suggest a narcissistic personality disorder and in his last years he seems to have developed some paranoid tendencies.
Nader was married four times and had 5 sons and 15 grandsons.
Afsharid Kings:
Nader Shah 1737 – 1747
Ali Gholi 1747 – 1748
Ebrahim 1748 – 1749
Shahrokh 1748 – 1749
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/afsharids/afsharids.php
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Nader Shah in Iranian Historiography
Warlord or National Hero?
By Rudolph Matthee · Published 2018
Western—European and North American—historiography generally portrays the years between the death of Louis XIV in 1715 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 as having given birth to the modern world—a republican world founded on rational discourse and popular sovereignty, an empirically grounded, industrializing world built on progress and productivity, an aggressive, market-driven world espousing expansion as agenda and organizing principle.
In the traditional interpretation of Islamic Middle Eastern history, the “eighteenth century” projects an entirely different image. Rather than evoking energy and innovation, it conjures up stasis, decline and defeat. It speaks of exhausted, mismanaged empires that either succumbed to regional competitors or proved too weak to resist the juggernaut of European imperialism. Examples abound.
The state that had ruled Iran since the early sixteenth century, the Safavids, in 1722 collapsed under the onslaught of Afghan insurgents from the tribal periphery. The Ottomans, having failed to take Vienna in 1683, subsequently retreated against the Austrians and the Russians in the Balkans and later lost Egypt, first to the French and then to the Albanian warlord, Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha. In the Indian Subcontinent, meanwhile, the once mighty Mughal Empire disintegrated and was brought into the British orbit.
Iran was doubly disadvantaged in this process of “regression.” The Ottomans suffered defeat and lost territory yet maintained military, diplomatic and commercial contact with the nations of Western Europe, the source of most of what was new at the time. The so-called Tulip Period of the early eighteenth-century reflects a fascination with things European among the ruling classes of Istanbul.
The Mughal state became tributary to the English East India Company and then was absorbed into the expanding British Empire. Yet that same process caused its elite gradually to become familiar with the ways and means of the new colonizers, creating models and generating ideas that helped the country keep in touch with developments in the wider world.
Iran, by contrast, in this period not just fell precipitously from stability to chaos, but in the process it became disconnected from the world in ways not experienced by the other “gunpowder empires.” Until the late seventeenth century the Safavids had been roughly on par with the Ottomans and the Mughals in their projection of wealth, power and cultural prestige.
Sophisticated Europeans knew Iran as the legendary land of the Sophy, a term personified by the most dynamic ruler of the dynasty, Shah ‘Abbas I (r. 1587–1629). Shah ‘Abbas had connected his country to the world in unprecedented ways. After proclaiming Isfahan his capital and endowing it with a newly designed awe-inspiring center, he had turned this centrally located city into a nexus of trade links between Europe, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and India—and a favored destination for European traders and travelers, who saw in it a latter-day reflection of the Persian Empire as they imagined it from reading Herodotus, Strabo, and Pliny.
All this energy and efflorescence had come crashing down with the fall of Isfahan in 1722. The Afghan tribesmen who brought down the Safavid state failed to build their own on its ruins and were soon swept aside. What followed was seventy-five years of chaos and anarchy during which the Iranian plateau became remote and forbidding territory, run by warlords and mostly shunned by Westerners.
As the world was radically reconfigured in this period, Iranians continued to live in a rather self-congratulatory, inward-looking mode, secure in the knowledge that their country was, if no longer the center of the world, a place of consequence. In reality, Iran in this period rapidly “retreated” from the global scene as its ties with the outside world diminished in frequency and intensity. Iran’s short “eighteenth century,” the roughly seventy-five years that separate the fall of the Safavids from the rise of the Qajars, thus runs contrary to the perceived “global eighteenth century” and its presumed new level of (elite) connectivity.
This relative insularity was shattered in the early nineteenth century as the newly acceded Qajar regime (r. 1796–1925) with its largely tribally organized and poorly disciplined army suffered several terrible defeats against the well-equipped Russians, people the Iranians had always thought of and dismissed as bibulous, thick-skulled barbarians. As the Russians occupied large swaths of Iranian territory in the north—much of the southern Caucasus, comprising the modern countries of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—the British intruded from the other side, the Persian Gulf.
Historians of late have turned away from this type of narrative with its focus on a golden age followed by decline and on great rulers and their deeds as organizing principles, to call for contingency, indeterminacy and attention to the common man. Yet, modern nationalism demands linearity and purposefulness, and shows little patience for revisionist complication.
Faced with the flux and reflux of history, nationalism likes to tell a story of loss and regeneration through resilience, of foreign-inflicted defeat followed by phoenix-like resurgence. It is therefore hardly surprising that modern Iranian historiography—and certainly the Iranian popular imagination—tends to portray the Safavids and the Qajars in starkly contrasting terms—the first symbolizing pride and glory, the second representing fecklessness and submissiveness.
Iranians have come to look back at the Safavid period nostalgically, as the last time their country was proud, independent, and the envy of the world. The Qajars, by contrast, the dynasty that would bring the country to the threshold of the modern age, count as spineless, corrupt rulers who blithely led the country into defeat and humiliation at the hand of foreigners, and who facilitated the country’s creeping incorporation into a Western-dominated imperialist network, preventing it from regaining its “natural” greatness.
The period in between is not so easily classified, for it seems neither a glorious moment in national history nor a century of potential splendor snatched away by foreign powers. Dark, seemingly directionless, and relatively short on written sources, the eighteenth century in Iranian history remains an awkward interlude.
Modern Iranian historians have nevertheless sought to weave this period into a continuous national narrative by adopting a Carlylean “great man” view of history, highlighting the stature of the two rulers who created identifiable albeit short-lived states and thus present a semblance of coherence and direction to Iranian history in an otherwise tumultuous period: Nader Shah (r. 1736–47) and Karim Khan Zand (r. 1763–69).
Both stand out, not just as the only two rulers who defied the period’s centrifugal forces, but as national heroes who revived Iran’s genius. The first, a brilliant warrior, redeemed the nation by restoring the honor it had lost with the fall of Isfahan to foreign tribesmen. The second represents the quintessentially Iranian search for justice.
The first also stirred the Western imagination in ways the second never did—especially after he marched into India in 1739, ransacked Delhi and returned home with fabulous treasures. Indeed, the reception of Nader Shah in eighteenth-century Europe was as swift and dramatic as it was complex. The image it created, half brutal warlord, half national liberator, would significantly contribute to the image modern Iranians would construct of him.
Nader Shah: Scourge of God or National Hero?
The portrayal of Nader in the eighteenth-century West was the combined outcome of eyewitness accounts, Persian-language sources, and Enlightenment anxieties. Europeans, still puzzled by the sudden fall of the Safavids, learned of him even before he took power in 1736 as the warrior who reconquered Isfahan from the Afghans in 1729.
The Mercure de France of November 1731 contained an “eyewitness report” that portrayed Tahmasp Quli Khan, as Nader Shah was still called at the time, as a savior, a man of valor and fidelity, brave and full of esprit. His stature as the dynamic warlord who might rescue his nation by liberating it from the barbarians who had invaded this old, sophisticated land—the Afghans, the Ottomans, and the Russians—only grew with time.
In 1738 a huge tome appeared in Germany depicting Nader as the divinely inspired savior of a collapsed nation. The notion of Nader the savior resonated with the political philosophy of the Enlightenment as articulated by Montesquieu, Diderot and Holbach, who distinguished between the legitimate right to defend and recover one’s home country, and illegitimate wars of conquest.
A rather different Nader burst onto the European scene soon thereafter, with his defeat of the Mughal Emperor Mohammad Shah at Karnal in 1739 and his subsequent sack of Delhi. News of these exploits spread quickly, carried by missionaries and agents of the European maritime companies, and soon gave rise to numerous pamphlets and books.
The earliest narrative about Nader’s Indian exploits seems to have been a report written in 1739 by Dutch East India Company agents in Bengal. Published in Holland in 1740, this report may have been the source of the anonymous two-volume work that came out in Amsterdam a year later as Histoire de Thamas Kouli-Kan Sophi de Perse, a text that subsequently was translated into English, Italian, and Spanish.
In the next few years the Asian warlord was the subject of a number of articles in the British press, some of which have plausibly been attributed to Samuel Johnson. Two years later the Anglo-Saxon world became thoroughly acquainted with Nader through James Fraser’s History of Nader Shah, which was mostly based on reports by William Cockell, an agent of the English India Company who had served in Iran while Nader was in power.
In the same year, 1742, James Spilman, a Russia Company merchant, published an account of a journey he had undertaken to Iran in 1739 and to which was appended a brief account of the rise of Nader Shah. In 1743 André de Claustre published Histoire de Thamas Kouli-Kan, roi de Perse. A generation later the French reading public was reminded of Nader through the translation the famous Orientalist William Jones made of a Persian chronicle written in Nader Shah’s orbit, Mirza Mohammad Mahdi Astarabadi’s Tarikh-e Naderi.
A fictionalized Nader quickly followed. The first novel—in which a young Swiss man sets out on an Asian adventure that includes his participation in Nader’s Indian campaign—appeared in 1754. A second, presented as the memoirs of Shah Tahmasp II, Nader’s protégé until he deposed him, followed in 1758.
Both reflect the spirit of a relatively pacific European age in search of a heroic cause in their portrayal of young, poor, and intelligent men who in Europe find no outlet for their martial inclinations. They also reflect the prevailing notion that the East, unfettered by feudal stratification, was open to talent. The same theme appears in the contemporaneous theatrical representation of Nader Shah in Holland, France, and Italy.
The way Nader was in Europe represented varied by context. In the Dutch setting, he became an emblem of republicanism, a “protagonist of lowly origins whose right to the throne sprang from his desire to serve his subjects.” Yet a more common theme in the earliest European references to him was the image of the disciplined warrior, the type Europe lacked until the appearance of Frederick the Great on the European scene in 1740.
As in the case of Alexander the Great, to whom he was sometimes likened, the more negative aspects of Nader’s career over time received ample attention as well. Several authors highlighted his rapaciousness and linked the vast treasure he bought back from India to the typical Oriental despot who plunders and hoards rather than builds.
Nader’s cruelty and growing madness, as the ultimate symbol of the descent into violence and cruelty of a land previously known for its humanism, tolerance and sophistication, did not go unnoticed either; the English merchant-traveler Jonas Hanway, for instance, who in 1743 had visited Nader’s army camp, at once presented the ruler’s appearance as punishment for Iranian sloth and dissolution and painted a lurid portrait of a usurper driven by greed and brutality.
Contemporary Iranian sources evince a similar ambivalence. The chroniclers writing in Nader Shah’s immediate orbit naturally hedge their bets and defuse the ruler’s obvious ruthlessness and gathering madness by turning a blind eye to these uncomfortable facts or by blaming the victims. They generally portray Nader as a ruler of military virtue and sound lineage, hail him as a strongman who had restored order, and defend him against the indictment of having usurped power. The afore-mentioned Astarabadi set the tone for an enduring narrative by lauding Nader for expelling all foreign occupiers from Iranian soil. At pains to rationalize the ruler’s growing craziness and cruelty, he claimed that Nader changed only after his expedition to the Caucasus, eventually bringing ruin to his country.
As a new dynasty of questionable roots and legitimacy, the Qajars had to expunge the legacy of those who came before them—other than the Safavids, to whom they paid allegiance on account of the Shi‘i credentials they themselves so sorely lacked. Nader Shah was one of those.
Agha Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Qajar dynasty and a ruthless warlord himself, chose to distance himself from Nader for having deviated from the Shi‘i foundations laid by the Safavids and invoked by Agha Mohammad Shah to buttress his own legitimacy.
Yet the first Qajar ruler must have been impressed by his forebear as well, for he had two figures added to the two huge battle scenes adorning the walls of the Chehel Sotun palace in Isfahan, one of which represents Nader’s defeat of the Mughal Emperor Mohammad Khan at Karnal in 1739. Nader also figured in the one of the main halls of the Golestan palace that was built in the newly chosen capital Tehran and renovated in 1806—in a pose of returning the crown of India to the Mughal king.
A More Complex Nader Shah
The early nineteenth century saw two developments that helped shape a new or at least a more complex image of Nader Shah. The first was the string of humiliating military defeats the Qajars suffered against their most formidable enemies, the Russians. The second was the meteoric rise of Napoleon followed by a career that affected the world from the East Coast of the United States to the shores of the Indian Ocean.
The military weakness of the Qajars against the Russians and the tremendous loss of land their defeats entailed quickly detracted from the new dynasty’s aura and made the Iranian public long for a success story. A direct relationship can be discerned between these defeats and the continuing, indeed growing popularity of Nader Shah among Iranians, as exemplified in the more than fourteen editions that appeared of Astarabadi’s popular account of Nader’s life and exploits, the Jahan-gosha-ye Naderi.
The relationship between the reputation of Napoleon and that of Nader Shah in Iran—and Europe—seems something like a dialogic engagement: Napoleon saw himself as a latter-day Nader. Iranians, in turn, came to admire Napoleon as the strongman they themselves so sorely missed in the nineteenth century. Nader in due time and in good Orientalist fashion became known, first in Europe, then in Iran, as the Asian or Persian Napoleon; and, completing the cycle in an anti-Orientalist manner, Napoleon is now often called the European Nader Shah.
All indications are that Napoleon was greatly impressed with Nader Shah. It is almost certain that, as a young man, Napoleon read about Nader’s exploits, and it is likely that he identified with the story of a lad of humble origins who had risen to great heights through sheer will power and energy.
His Asian dreams—his own search for a heroic cause—are neatly summed up in his famous exclamation before a group of bickering German princes in 1804 to the effect that Europe had no longer anything to offer ambitious men, that only in the Orient great prestige and wealth could be acquired.
That Napoleon greatly admired Nader emerges from the record of Amédée Jaubert, the French Orientalist who in 1807 visited Iran to conclude a Franco-Iranian alliance. Jaubert carried a letter from Napoleon with him in which the French emperor, somewhat injudiciously in front of the rather sedentary Fath ‘Ali Shah, praised Nader Shah as a “great warrior, who was “able to conquer a great power,” who “struck the insurgents with terror and was fearsome to his neighbors, while he “triumphed over his enemies and reigned gloriously.”
It is also surely no coincidence that ‘Askar Khan Afshar, Fath ‘Ali Shah’s envoy to Paris in 1808, presented a copy of the Jahangosha-ye Naderi to the Imperial Library in Paris when he came to Paris the following year. L’Histoire de Thamas Kouli-Kan, finally, was one of the books available to Napoleon during in years in exile on Saint Helena between 1815 and 1821.
Napoleon, in turn, made quite an impression in Iran—and a lasting one at that. He became and long remained a familiar figure in part because the country was part of his strategic vision, making him deal directly with its rulers by way of diplomacy. But the main reason for his enduring fame and popularity may have been the same as what made eighteenth-century Europeans look up to Nader Shah—because his strong character spoke to the imagination of the Iranians and projected something that they found missing in their own rulers. Mir ‘Abd al-Latif Khan Shushtari, an Iranian who seems to have imbibed some anti-French sentiments during his long stay in British India, nevertheless called Napoleon a leader who stood out for his organizational skills, his wisdom and his sophistication.
In Iran, meanwhile, the admiration for the French strongman was no less strong. John Malcolm, Britain’s first ambassador to Iran and the author of the first modern history of the country, relates how in 1810, Napoleon’s “name was familiar to numbers in Persia, and some few understood the character of his power.” An “old friend” of his, a poet and a philosopher, told Malcolm that, in his opinion, “this Buonaparte…is a wonderful man; he wields empires as if they were clubs.” Speculating that, after coming to terms with the Ottomans, this Western Chengiz Khan might take on Iran and Russia and then, “make use of both to overthrow your [British] power in India.”
Other Iranian officials were great admirers of Napoleon as well. ‘Abbas Mirza (1789–1833), crown prince, governor of Azerbaijan and Iran’s first modern reformer, was one. His newly constructed royal summer palace at Ujan near Soltaniya was decorated with four paintings, two of which represented the Russian Tsar, Alexander I, and Napoleon respectively.
Another one was Hajji Baba, a “prince” in Hamadan who, when Robert Cotton Money met him in 1824, “asked all about Napoleon,” and collected “all the anecdotes he could of him” because he seemed to adore his character. The third Qajar shah, Mohammad Shah (r. 1834-48) had his palace in Tehran “hung round with various prints of Napoleon, Prince Albert and Queen Victoria.”
Mohammad Shah is said to have been interested in acquiring a copy of the Life of Napoleon, with engravings of the emperor’s battles, and he ordered Mirza Reza Mohandes, who earlier had translated biographies of Peter I, Alexander the Great, and Charles XII into Persian, to produce a translation of a history of the French general, from an English rendering of an originally French work. Richard Khan, too, in 1869 translated A Brief History of Napoleon into Persian.
In the early twentieth century ‘Abbas Mirza Salar Lashkar, a.k.a. Nayeb al-Saltana, picked up a book titled Napoleon Ier et la Perse and decided to translate it into Persian.
As noted, the revised image of Nader, from usurper and brutal tyrant to savior of the nation, was greatly facilitated by widespread Iranian disappointment with the feeble Qajars, and further built, in a dialectical way, on the analogy with Napoleon. James Morier, British envoy and the author of the picaresque novel, Hajji Baba of Isfahan, in 1808 said about the Iranians that, “of Bonaparte, from the likeness of that of their own Nadir Shah, they have a very high idea.”
But the way in which the warlord was fashioned in the twentieth century was in some way a calque on the way Western authors and especially John Malcolm portrayed him. To Malcolm, Nader Shah was a force of nature, a brute who acted to purify the overripe, decadent civilization from which he himself sprang.
Where the Polish Jesuit Thadeusz Krusinski, an eyewitness to the fall of Isfahan in 1722, had seen the Afghans as barbarians who might be civilized by becoming acquainted with Persia’s superior culture, Malcolm saw in Nader Shah a volcanic force that had rejuvenated that same culture precisely by ridding it of Afghan primitivism. Malcolm saw Nader the way Edward Gibbon had seen Attila the Hun: as a great warrior and disciplinarian who had cleansed the land by liberating his people from the yoke of barbarians.
Full of admiration for Nader’s military prowess, Malcolm in a rather self-serving manner painted a redeeming portrait of the eighteenth-century empire builder, based on his anticipation of the unfolding of his own empire, that of the British. It is telling in this context that Malcolm did not dwell on the savagery that accompanied Nader’s subjugation of northern India and his sack of Delhi, thinking it greatly exaggerated. The bloodletting of the last few years of the warrior’s life he ascribed to creeping insanity.
Malcolm’s assessment would essentially offer the template for the later nationalist Iranian portrayal of Nader Shah. Of course, for this to have an impact on Iranian image making, Malcolm’s landmark book, A History of Persia (1815) first had to be translated into Persian.
This might have happened as early as the 1840s were it not for Naser al-Din Shah’s grand vizier and chief counselor Mirza Taqi Khan, better known as Amir Kabir who, wary of Malcolm’s less than flattering verdict on the Qajar dynasty, is said to have cautioned his master that “for Persians reading such a book is fatally poisonous.”
That does not seem to have deterred the monarch himself, for the shah apparently had A History of Persia read to him before going to sleep. At any rate, the acquaintance among the wider Iranian public with Malcolm’s take on Nader and Iranian history at large would have to wait until the 1870s, when a Persian translation of his book was undertaken.
Yet the work that resulted did not come out in Iran but in British-controlled Bombay and in the context of the new type of print culture that had developed in India under British auspices. Over time, this translation would become exceedingly popular.
Nader Shah in Modern Iranian Historiography
The fall of the Qajars in the 1920s and the rise of Reza Khan, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, inaugurated a new phase in the dialectical process of historiography with regard to Nader Shah. British foreign secretary Victor Mallet in 1925 insisted that Nader Shah was Reza Khan’s “great hero,” adding that he would not be surprised if the new ruler would model his career on that of Nader. The Iranian press at the time depicted the new ruler accordingly, as a national savior ready to rebuild the country and drive out the foreign intruders.
Just as the early Qajar historians had exorcised the previous regimes, including that of Nader, so the historians who came of age in the 1920s and 1930s followed the line of the new regime by decrying the stagnation and especially the loss of land their country had suffered because of the military weakness of the Qajars, which inevitably entailed a reevaluation of the last ruler who had stood for a strong and independent Iran—Nader Shah.
In the 1930s, as Reza Shah consolidated his power, military history and the single strong leader came to the fore to help create a usable past for a state increasingly built on authoritarian foundations. For historians writing in the reign of Reza Shah and his centralizing tendencies, Nader’s military career acquired a heightened significance for having reunified the nation—just like Iran’s current ruler.
In modern times, Nader has remained controversial in Iran. To some, he was just an uncultured tribal chieftain who delivered the coup de grace to the magnificent Safavid state. In modern Iran, where the great man, the one who keeps order and who can bring salvation by effecting the kind of change that no one else is willing to take responsibility for, continues to loom large, Nader Shah remains a hero.
“For many Iranians today, Nader’s military successes are justification in themselves and more than outweigh any brutalities that accompanied him.” Yet Nader remains an awkward fit for those who adhere to the dominant paradigm in modern Iranian history writing with its tendency to espouse a primordial nationalism that preaches an unbroken civilizational link between the Achaemenids and the Islamic Republic.
For some he remains the warrior who restored Iran’s pride by driving out the foreigners who had occupied the country, the Afghans, the Ottomans, and the Russians. Yet the deeply ingrained notion that Iranian civilization is one of “givers” is hard to reconcile with the sheer brutality and the outright imperialism culminating in Nader’s Indian campaign, which consequently, à la Malcolm, has to be presented as an aberration in an otherwise brilliant career.
Nader thus becomes the figure whose genius could have halted and even reversed the decline that had set in with the Afghan onslaught and the fall of the Safavids. In this scenario, after uniting Iran Nader could have done a lot to rebuild a great nation if he only he had cared about the welfare of the Iranian people. Instead, he lost his mind when he decided to invade India, and even the dividend of that campaign, a huge amount of treasure, was wasted.
A related yet slightly different interpretation connects Nader to the feeble awareness eighteenth-century Iranians evinced about the global changes and the sinister designs of foreigners on their country at the time. Nader, in this scenario, was too busy making war and thus did not take advantage of Western scientific and technological achievements and skills other than to seek European assistance in building a Persian-Gulf fleet—something the Safavids had never done.
For all his military brilliance, he also had no eye for the imperialist schemes of the Europeans. Indeed, to some, he even facilitated their imperialist project by offering the English East India Company reduced customs rates and seeking their assistance in building naval capacity. Even his Indian expedition benefited the British. By bringing home fabulous wealth from his Delhi campaign he acted as Trojan horse, increasing their business opportunities, and by opening up and weakening India he enabled the English to expand their long-term influence and domination in the subcontinent.
https://www.ias.edu/ideas/2018/matthee-nader-shah
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Further reading:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nader_Shah
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaigns_of_Nader_Shah
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nader_Shah%27s_invasion_of_the_Mughal_Empire
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/20-1739
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/nader_shah_of_iran_invades_delhi.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_621397394
https://www.docdroid.net/p9hXcQI/o-toyrkmenos-nanter-sakhis-toy-iran-katalamvanei-to-delkhi-docx
“Life will give you whatever experience is most helpful for the evolution of your consciousness. How do you know this is the experience you need? Because this is the experience you are having at the moment.” - Eckhart Tolle
Cosmic Sun Pyramid Talon Abraxas
Σμικρογραφίες Χειρογράφων του Χαφτ Πεϋκάρ: ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ και οι Επτά Ομορφιές (Πριγκίπισσες)
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ενώπιον των απεικονίσεων των επτά πριγκιπισσών
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Ρωμιάς πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα ανοικτό καφέ.
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Ινδής πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα μαύρο.
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Βέρβερης πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα τυρκουάζ .
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Βέρβερης πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα τυρκουάζ (από άλλο χειρόγραφο)
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της πριγκίπισσας της Χωρασμίας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα πράσινο.
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Τουρανής πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα κίτρινο.
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Ιρανής πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα λευκό.
Ο Μπαχράμ Γκουρ ακούει την αφήγηση της Ρωσσίδας (ή Σλαύας) πριγκίπισσας που είναι ντυμένη σε χρώμα κόκκινο .
Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες της Τουρκίας: ενάντια σε Ερντογάν, Ισλαμιστές, Κουρμάντζι (‘Κούρδους’) και όλους τους Δυτικούς
Turkey's Zaza Qizilbash: against Erdogan, the Islamists, the Kurmanji (the so-called Kurds), and all the Westerners
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 27 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019.
Αναπαράγοντας τμήματα σχετικών ομιλιών μου και στοιχεία από συζητήσεις μας, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ένα καλά κρυμμένο, απροσέγγιστο από δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες, και συνεπώς άγνωστο, εντελώς αστάθμητο παράγοντα της Τουρκίας και του ισλαμικού κόσμου: τους Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες. Προσθέτει μάλιστα βίντεο, φωτογραφίες και χρήσιμη, επιστημονική (αλλά σε ορισμένα σημεία ιδιαίτερα μεροληπτική) βιβλιογραφία για το θέμα αυτό, το οποίο θα απασχολήσει ιδιαίτερα τον κόσμο λίαν προσεχώς.
----------------------
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/27/ζαζά-κιζιλμπάσηδες-της-τουρκίας-ενάν/ ==================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Σε πολλά κείμενά μου έχω αναφερθεί στην σημερινή Τουρκία κι έχω τονίσει πόσο τεράστια άγνοια της εκεί πραγματικότητας χαρακτηρίζει τους ψευτο-επιστήμονες της Ελλάδας, τους τιποτένιους κι αμόρφωτους ψευτο-καθηγητές, τους τάχα γεωπολιτικούς αναλυτές, τους ΚΥΠατζήδες, και τους δημοσιογράφους.
Αυτοί οι εγκληματίες θέλουν κατακρεούργηση χωρίς δίκη από τα πλήθη των εξαπατηθέντων και κοροϊδευμένων επί δεκαετίες Ελλήνων. Εξαιτίας τους ο μέσος Έλληνας δεν έχει ιδέα για το τι ακριβώς συμβαίνει στην Τουρκία και το τι είναι ενδεχόμενο να συμβεί από την εκεί σύγκρουση πολλών αντιθέτων κι αντιπάλων κοινοτήτων και ομάδων που επιμένουν να δείχνουν προσήλωση στην εθνική, θρησκευτική και γλωσσική ταυτότητά τους.
Τα σχέδια καταστροφής της Τουρκίας από τις εχθρικές προς αυτήν δυτικές χώρες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ισραήλ, ΗΠΑ) εκλαμβάνονται από τους αμόρφωτους Έλληνες ψευτο-πανεπιστημιακούς, δημοσιογράφους και πολιτικούς ως εφικτά κι αυτή η ηλίθια αντίληψη οφείλεται τόσο στην εθελοδουλεία του ελληνικού κατεστημένου προς την Δύση όσο και στην παντελή άγνοια που έχουν όλοι τους για την Τουρκία.
Έχω ήδη τονίσει ότι δεν υπάρχουν Κούρδοι κι ότι δυτικοί διπλωμάτες, οριενταλιστές και στρατιωτικοί παράγοντες έχουν παρασκευάσει στα χαρτιά ένα ψευτο-έθνος το οποίο δεν είναι ένα αλλά αποτελείται από πολλά διαφορετικά έθνη με διαφορετικές θρησκείες και γλώσσες που, αν όλα τους υποχρεωθούν να μπουν μέσα στα σύνορα ενός κράτους, θα κατασφαχθούν μεταξύ τους για το ποιος θα κυριαρχήσει.
“Κουρδιστάν” είναι το ισοδύναμο του να πει κάποιος “Ευρώπη” και να βάλει μέσα στο νεόκοπο αυτό κράτος Ρώσσους, Τούρκους, Ουκρανούς, Έλληνες, Ιταλούς, Πολωνούς, Γερμανούς, Γάλλους, Άγγλους και πολλούς άλλους, και να τους αφήσει να …. κυβερνηθούν.
Απλώς θα σκοτωθούν.
Αλεβίδες Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν τον θρησκευτικό χορό των Αλεβίδων Σεμά σε μια πλατεία στο Αντίγιαμαν.
Στην Τουρκία δεν υπάρχουν “Κούρδοι” πολύ απλά γιατί Κούρδοι δεν υπάρχουν πουθενά.
Αν συγκεκριμένα αναφερθεί κάποιος στις σημερινές εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικές ενότητες της Τουρκίας, θα διακρίνει:
1- Τούρκους Σουνίτες
2- Τούρκους Αλεβίδες
3- Ζαζά – οι οποίοι είναι Αλεβίδες (: Σιίτες)
4- Κουρμάντζι (αυτοί μόνον είναι οι ‘Κούρδοι’) οι οποίοι είναι Σουνίτες (τα Κουρμάντζι είναι τόσο διαφορετικά από τα Ζαζάκι όσο τα ισπανικά από τα τουρκμενικά)
5- Αραμαίοι Χριστιανοί
6- Αραμαίοι Μουσουλμάνοι αραβόφωνοι
7- Γιαζίντι – οι οποίοι μιλούν Κουρμάντζι αλλά δεν δέχονται να έχουν καμμιά σχέση με τους Σουνίτες Κουρμάντζι, και
8- μικρότερα έθνη (Αρμένιοι, Έλληνες) ή έθνη που έχουν αφομοιωθεί μέσα στους Τούρκους, όπως σε μεγάλο βαθμό οι Λαζοί.
Οι Αλεβίδες Ζαζά αντιδρούν στην επιχειρούμενη από τις δυτικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες ‘κουρμαντζο-ποίηση’ (ή ‘κουρδοποίηση’) και απορρίπτουν και την όποια συνεργασία με τους Κουρμάντζι.
Παράλληλα, απορρίπτουν την πολιτική των ισλαμιστικών κυβερνήσεων της Τουρκίας, συμμετέχουν ενεργά μέσα στα κόμματα της κεμαλικής αντιπολίτευσης, και έχουν συνδεθεί πολύ έντονα με τους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες.
Μέσα στους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά το μυστικό κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων αναβιώνει την θρησκευτική πίστη και οργάνωση του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων, έτσι τραβώντας αμετάκλητα τους Αλεβίδες Ζαζά μακριά από τους Κουρμάντζι, τον Ερντογάν και τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες των δυτικών χωρών.
Δείτε το βίντεο για να καταλάβετε πως έχουν τα πράγματα στην σημερινή Τουρκία.
Περισσότερα θα βρείτε στο εισαγωγικό σημείωμα (σε ρωσσικά, αγγλικά κι ελληνικά) και σε ένα άρθρο για τους Ζαζά, οι οποίοι στην γλώσσα τους ονομάζονται Ντιμλί.
Ο όροι ‘Αλεβί’ (: Αλεβίδες) και ‘Κούρδοι’ δηλώνουν τα εξής:
‘Αλεβί’ (δηλαδή Σιίτες της Τουρκίας) είναι εθνικά είτε Τούρκοι, είτε Ζαζά.
‘Κούρδοι’ σημαίνει Κουρμάντζι. Όλοι οι Κουρμάντζι είναι Σουνίτες.
Η αντιπαράθεση Αλεβίδων και Σουνιτών δεν συνεπάγεται εμπλοκή όλων των πληθυσμών: οι Σουνίτες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι είναι θρησκευτικά αδιάφοροι.
Αντίθετα, οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Τούρκοι και οι Αλεβίδες κεμαλιστές Ζαζά δείχνουν ένα μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον για την θρησκεία και τις παραδόσεις τους.
Έτσι, στην σημερινή Τουρκία, διαμορφώνονται πέντε μεγάλα εθνο-γλωσσο-θρησκευτικο-πολιτικά σύνολα:
1. Κεμαλιστές, χωρίς θρησκευτικά ενδιαφέροντα – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες
2. Αλεβίδες – Τούρκοι και Ζαζά, αμφότεροι φιλο-κεμαλιστές
3. Σουνίτες Ισλαμιστές – κυρίως Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και αρκετοί Κουρμάντζι που αρνούνται την ‘κουρδική’ τους ταυτότητα, και υποστηρίζουν τον Ερντογάν και μια ισλαμική σουνιτική Τουρκία
4. Σουνίτες Παντουρανιστές – μόνον Τούρκοι με άλλους από αυτούς να τείνουν προς τον κεμαλισμό και άλλους να τείνουν προς τον ισλαμισμό. Δεν υπάρχουν Αλεβίδες Τούρκοι Παντουρανιστές.
5. Κουρμάντζι αντι-ισλαμιστές και αντι-κεμαλιστές
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют религиозный алевитский танец Семах на публике: Адыяман, Юго-Восточная Турция
https://www.ok.ru/video/1518627523181
Περισσότερα:
Это скорее вопрос исторической иронии – видеть людей, которые изображены на больших рекламных щитах в здании за площадью, где Кызылбаши Зазаки танцуют семах, религиозный танец в Адиямане, ЮВ Турции! Смотрите эту часть: 10:22 – 10:31
Справа налево вы можете увидеть:
1- Али: первый имам и четвертый халиф ислама, центральная персона шиитов
2- Хаджи Бекташ: 13 в. Исламский философ, мистик, основатель ордена Бекташи
3- Кемаль Ататюрк
4- Государственный флаг Турции
5- реклама организации или мероприятия, и
6- Сейид Риза (в Зазаки: Pîr Sey Riza): родился в Тунджели (ранее известный как Дерсим) в 1863 году, он был приговорен к смертной казни и повешен в Элазиге в 1937 году. Он был религиозным лидером Бекташи в Заза и начал восстание против Кемала Ататюрка.
Это посмертное сосуществование Кемала Ататюрка и Сейида Ризы на рекламном щите, созданном Зазаки Кызылбаши, несколько иронично. На самом деле, после смерти Ататюрка, все Зазаки приняли светское государство, которое он установил; раньше они голосовали в основном за левоцентристские политические партии. Они предпочитали современное светское общество, а не религиозное суннитское государство.
И они ближе к алевским туркам, чем к суннитским Керманджи («курды»). Таким образом, Зазаки бросают вызов Эрдогану, исламистам, западным спецслужбам и дипломатам, которые таким образом не смогут сфабриковать так называемый «Курдистан». Больше:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Али_ибн_Абу_Талиб
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Хаджи_Бекташ
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Бекташи
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Дерсимская_резня
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious Alevi dance, in public: Adiyaman, SE Turkey
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240310
Περισσότερα:
It is rather a matter of historical irony to notice those depicted on the big billboards in the building behind the square where Qizilbash Zaza dance the Semah, a religious dance in Adiyaman, SE Turkey! Watch this part: 10:22 – 10:31
From the right to the left, you can see:
1- Ali: first imam and fourth caliph of Islam, central person for the Shiites
2- Haji Bektash: 13th c. Islamic philosopher, mystic, founder of the Bektashi Order
3- Kemal Ataturk
4- The national flag of Turkey
5- The advertisement of an organization or event, and
6- Seyid Riza (in Zazaki: Pîr Sey Riza): born in Tunceli (previously known as Dersim) in 1863, he was condemned to death and hanged in Elazig in 1937. He was a Bektashi religious leader of the Zazas and started the rebellion against Kemal Ataturk.
This posthumous coexistence of Kemal Ataturk and Seyid Riza on a billboard set up by Zaza Qizilbash is somewhat ironical. As a matter of fact, after Ataturk’s death, Zazas accepted the secular state that he had established; they used to vote mainly for center-left political parties. They preferred the modern secular society instead of a religious Sunni state. And they are closer to Alevi Turks than to Sunni Kermanji (: ‘Kurds’), thus defying altogether Erdogan, the Islamists, and the Western secret services and diplomats who will thus fail to fabricate a so-called ‘Kurdistan’.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Ζαζά Κιζιλμπάσηδες χορεύουν δημόσια Σεμά (Semah – Θρησκευτικό Χορό): Αντίγιαμαν (Adıyaman), Ανατολική Τουρκία
Περισσότερα:
Όλη η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας βρίσκεται στο 10:22 – 10:31 του μικρού αυτού αποσπάσματος από ένα χορό που μπορεί να διαρκέσει πάνω από μια ώρα.
Στην δημόσια εκδήλωση αυτή, κρέμασαν μάλιστα οι Ζαζά Αλεβίδες Κιζιλμπάσηδες μεγάλα πόστερς στα κτήρια απέναντι από την πλατεία του Αντίγιαμαν της νοτιοανατολικής Τουρκίας όπου χόρευαν τον παραδοσιακό, θρησκευτικό χορό Σαμάα (Σεμά στα τουρκικά). Τα πόστερς αυτά είναι η ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας γιατί φέρνουν μαζί και κάνουν να συνυπάρχουν τα εξής ιστορικά πρόσωπα (από τα δεξιά προς τα αριστερά όπως βλέπουμε):
1- Αλί (601-661: Αλί Ιμπν Αμπί Τάλεμπ), ξάδερφος και γαμπρός του Μωάμεθ, πρώτος ιμάμης και τέταρτος χαλίφης, κεντρικό πρόσωπο της πίστης όλων των Σιιτών του Ιράν, των Αλεβιτών της Συρίας και των Αλεβίδων της Τουρκίας. Εννοείται ότι κάθε δημόσια απεικόνιση του Αλί είναι μια θρησκευτική πράξη που παλιότερα απαγορευόταν στο κοσμικό – λαϊκό (secular – laic) κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ. Στο κάτω μέρος της αφίσας βλέπετε γραμμένο Hz. Ali, δηλαδή Hazrat Ali που η πιο κοντινή απόδοση στα ελληνικά είναι ‘Ιερός Αλί’. Αρχικά, η λέξη, προφερμένη χαντράτ στα αραβικά (και έπειτα χαζράτ σε φαρσί, τουρκικά και ουρντού) σήμαινε ‘παρουσία’ και σε περίπτωση θείας παρουσίας ‘επιφάνεια’. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadrat
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prophets_and_messengers_in_Islam
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali
2- Με ιδαίτερο καπέλλο εμφανίζεται ο Χατζή Μπεκτάς (1209-1271), ιδρυτής του θρησκευτικού τάγματος των Μπεκτασήδων στους οποίους ανήκαν Τούρκοι Αλεβίδες.
Οι Μπεκτασήδες κι οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν τα πιο σημαντικά θρησκευτικά τάγματα στην Οθωμανικη Αυτοκρατορία, αλλά από ένα σημείο και μετά οι Μπεκτασήδες καταδιώχθηκαν.
Οι Μπεκτασήδες δεν ταυτίζονται με τους Κιζιλμπάσηδες,οι οποίοι ήταν ένα στρατιωτικό τάγμα, και συχνά μεσολαβούσαν στον Οθωμανό Σουλτάνο υπέρ των Κιζιλμπάσηδων.
Οι Μεβλεβήδες ήταν Τούρκοι Σουνίτες και το τάγμα τους ιδρύθηκε από τον Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί (1207-1273).
Αμφότεροι, Χατζή Μπεκτάς και Τζελαλεντίν Ρουμί, προέρχονται από την ίδια μακρινή από την Ανατολία περιοχή: το σημερινό βορειοανατολικό Ιράν και βόρειο Αφγανιστάν.
Ο θρησκευτικός χορός των Μεβλεβήδων Δερβίσηδων (σεμά) απέκτησε μεγαλύτερη φήμη αλλά και οι Μπεκτασήδες αφοσιώνονταν στον θρησκευτικό χορό με σκοπό την ενεργοποίηση της σύνδεσης σώματος και ψυχής και την υπέρβαση. Υπάρχουν διάφοροι τύποι σεμά.
Όλα τα τάγματα είχαν καταργηθεί επί Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ και κανένας δεν μπορούσε δημόσια να δείξει μια φωτογραφία, πόσο μάλλον να αναρτήσει μια αφίσα, του Χατζή Μπεκτάς. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haji_Bektash_Veli
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Μπεκτασήδες
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bektashi_Order
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sama_(Sufism)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhikr
3- Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ
4- Τουρκική σημαία
5- Αφίσα μιας πολιτιστικής-θρησκευτικής εκδήλωσης, και
6- Σεγίτ Ρεζά (Seyit Rıza, στα ζαζάκι: Pîr Sey Riza / γεννημένος στο Τούντζελι, πρώην Ντέρσιμ, το 1863, καταδικάστηκε και κρεμάστηκε στο Ελάζιγ το 1937) ο οποίος ως μπεκτασής θρησκευτικός αρχηγός των Ζαζά οργάνωσε την εξέγερση κατά του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ το 1937-1938 .
Η εξέγερση εκείνη ψευδώς παρουσιάζεται από τα εχθρικά προς την Τουρκία κράτη της Δύσης (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΗΠΑ, Ισραήλ) ως τάχα ‘κουρδική’ σε μια άθλια φαλκίδευση της Ιστορίας.
Στην πραγματικότητα ήταν μια αντι-κουρδική, αντ-εθνική, θρησκευτική εξέγερση εναντίον του κοσμικού – λαϊκού κράτους του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ.
Κανένας Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδος) δεν είχε συμμετάσχει κι η εξέγερση καταπνίγηκε στο αίμα. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dersim_rebellion
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seyid_Riza
Είναι λοιπόν ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας να παρουσιάζονται δίπλα – δίπλα ο Ατατούρκ και ο Σεγίτ Ρεζά, έστω κι αν οι δύο ηγέτες είχαν συναντηθεί και συνομιλήσει.
Ωστόσο, οι αφίσες αυτές αντανακλούν και την πραγματική κατάσταση της σημερινής Τουρκίας την οποία τα ελληνικά, δυτικο-ευρωπαϊκά και βορειο-αμερικανικά ΜΜΕ αλλοιώνουν και παραποιούν οικτρά με σκοπό να κάνουν τις ευρύτερες μάζες να έχουν ολότελα στρεβλή εικόνα της κατάστασης. Αυτή έχει περίπου ως εξής:
Οι Ζαζά στην Τουρκία βαθμιαία αποδέχθηκαν το κοσμικό – λαϊκό κράτος του Κεμάλ Ατατούρκ στις δεκαετίες 1950 -1980. Αυτό συνέβη επειδή το κράτος αυτό αντιστοιχούσε περισσότερο στον τρόπο ζωής και στις παραδόσεις τους από όσο ένα θρησκευτικό σουνιτικό κράτος.
Οι Ζαζά συμμετείχαν ενεργά στην τουρκική πολιτική ζωή της Τουρκίας και ανήκαν σε κεντροαριστερά κόμματα. Σ’ αυτό συμπαρέσυραν και τους Κουρμάντζι (: Κούρδους) που μένουν σε ακόμη πιο νοτιοανατολικές περιοχές.
Η θρησκευτική όμως διαφορά των Ζαζά (που είναι Αλεβίδες) από τους Κουρμάντζι (που είναι Σουνίτες στην πλειοψηφία τους) έφερε τους πρώτους πιο κοντά στους Τούρκους Αλεβίδες. Το κίνημα των Κιζιλμπάσηδων εκμεταλλεύθηκε την πολιτική των τουρκικών κυβερνήσεων των τελευταίων 15 ετών και προξένησε ανάμεσα σε Τούρκους και τους Ζαζά της Κεντρικής κι Ανατολικής Τουρκίας μια αναβίωση του μπεκτασικού τάγματος.
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Διαβάστε:
Dimlī
Dimlī (or Zāzā), the indigenous name of an Iranian people living mainly in eastern Anatolia, in the Dersim region (present-day Tunceli) between Erzincan in the north and the Muratsu (Morādsū, Arm. Aracani) in the south, the far western part of historical Upper Armenia (Barjr Haykʿ).
They are also found in Bingöl, Muş, and the province of Bitlis, as well as around Diyarbekir (Dīārbakr), Siverek, and Sivas (for details, see Lerch, p. xxi; Haykuni, p. 84; Andranik, pp. 111-16; Hadank, pp. 8-9; Erevanian, pp. 1-20; Halajian, 1973, pp. 9-100; Gasparian, p. 195; Bruinessen, 1978, p. 30). About 300,000 Dimlīs live in western Europe, mainly in Germany. Some of them are political refugees. The total population of Dimlīs at present is unknown, but it can be estimated at 3-4 million.
The people call themselves Dimlī or Dīmla, apparently derived from Deylam (Andranik, p. 161 n. 1; Hadank, pp. 2, 11-12; Minorsky, 1932, p. 17; idem, 1965, p. 159 n. 21), as appears from Armenian delmik, dlmik, and the like (Yuzbashian, pp. 146-51), which must be derived from *dēlmīk “Deylamite.” The Deylamite origin of the Dimlīs is also indicated by the linguistic position of Dimlī (see below).
Among their neighbors the Dimlī are known mainly as Zāzā, literally “stutterer,” a pejorative perhaps owing to the relative abundance of sibilants and affricates in their language (Hadank, p. 1; MacKenzie, p. 164; cf. zāzˊā “dumb” in Arm. dialects of the Vaspurakan area).
Armenians also call them Delmik, Dlmik, Dmlik (see below), Zaza (Alevi) Kʿrder, Čʿarkʿəčʿikʿ(Halajian, Dersimi azgagrakan nyutʿer [DAN], passim; Mkrtčʿian, pp. 54-55), and Dužik or Dužik Kʿrder, the last after the name of a mountain in Dersim (Spiegel, II, p. 65).
The Armenian term Kʿrder, literally “Kurds,” in this context denotes social status or mode of life, rather than nationality. Even those Armenian authors who use the term Kʿrder explicitly distinguish the Dimlī from the ethnic Kurds (Halajian, DAN, p. 242; for similar use of the term in the Middle Ages, see Minorsky, 1943, p. 75). In Turkish the Dimlī are known as Dersimli and Qezelbāš (i.e., Shiʿite).
The appearance of the Dimlī in the areas they now inhabit seems to have been connected, as their name suggests, with waves of migration of Deylamites ii from the highlands of Gīlān during the 10th-12th centuries. Unlike the Kurds, the Dimlīs are mainly sedentary cultivators, though animal husbandry occupies a considerable place in their economic activities. They are especially renowned as horticulturists.
Dimlī society is tribal, a sociopolitical, territorial, and economic unit organized according to genuine or putative patrilineage and kinship, with a characteristic internal structure. It encompasses forty-five subtribes, each divided into smaller units. The most prominent are Ābāsān, Āḡāǰān, Ālān, Bāmāsūr(ān), Baḵtīār(lī), Dǖīk, Davrēš-Gulābān, Davrēš-Jamālān, Hay-darān(lī), Hasanān(lī), Korēšān, Mamikī, and Yūsufān.
The names of some small subtribes consist of patronymics combined with the Turkish word uşak (servant), for example, Ā(r)slānušāḡī, Ābāsušāḡī, Farhādušāḡī, Šāmušāḡī, Tōpūzušāḡī, and Ḵōčušāḡī (Spiegel, I, p. 758; Andranik, pp. 156-57; Molyneux-Seel, p. 68; Dersimi, pp. 18-19, 24-28). The chiefs of the most important subtribes, called seyīds (sayyeds), are both religious and secular clan leaders and thus exercise considerable influence upon the tribesmen.
Religion
As the names Alevi (ʿAlawī) and Qezelbāš imply, most Dimlīs are Shiʿites, often considered extremist, though some are Sunnis. The religious beliefs of the majority, in common with those of most Shiʿite extremist groups, are characterized by great variety.
They venerate ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭāleb as the most important incarnation of God, but they also profess an admixture of indigenous primitive and some Christian beliefs. Within this framework the cult practice of the Dimlī inhabitants of each individual region displays specific features, reflecting the absence of a centralized religious institution, like those in Christianity and Islam, that might standardize cult practice and dogma.
God is known as Hū/ŭmāy, Hōmā, and Haq (Adontz, pp. 11-12; Tēr Minasian, p. 22; Asatrian, 1991, p. 10; idem and Gevorgian, p. 502).
The Dimlīs themselves call their religion by the Turkish term yōl-ušāḡī “followers of the [true] path” (Molyneux-Seel, p. 64), a designation with mystical overtones. The influence of folk Sufism on Dimlī religious beliefs is so thoroughly blended with indigenous elements as to permit no definite identification.
It may be reflected, however, in the hierarchy of the priesthood, the structure of the community, and the cult of Xizir (Ḵāżer, Ḵeżr) Īlyās; in the last, however, elements of the Armenian Surb Sargis (Saint Sergius) are also recognizable. The feast of Ḵizir, considered an incarnation of ʿAlī/God, coincides with ʿAli-bayrami (the feast of ʿAlī), also known as Aḡa-bayrami (God’s feast) among the Qezelbāš of the Mākū region, as well as with the Armenian feast of Surb Sargis (Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 503 n. 25; Müller, pp. 29-30; see also Abeghian, pp. 95-97).
It is usually celebrated in February. Christian elements are assimilated to Shiʿite conceptions (as in the example of Xizir) or have been adopted directly from the Armenian population of Dersim, for example, the rites of communion, baptism, and worship at Christian shrines and churches (e.g., the Sūrb Kārāpēt monastery, Hālvōrī vānk in the Dǖīkbābā mountains, and Dēr Ōvā [Arm. Tēr Ohan, Saint John] monastery near Sēlpūs/zdāḡ).
There are also perceptible remnants of “nature worship,” including worship of mountains (e.g., Mūnzūrdāḡ, Dǖīkbābā, Sēlpūs/z, Sēl), rocks, springs (e.g., Kānīyē Hazratē Xizirī“the spring of Ḵeżr” on the slopes of Dǖīkbābā and Kānīyē ānmāhūtyan “the spring of immortality” at the foot of Sēlpūs), trees (mainly oaks), and animals (snakes, rabbits, etc.). The cult of the snake, considered a holy creature, is most distinctive.
It has been symbolized by a stick called čūē haqī (God’s stick), the top of which is carved in the form of a snake’s head. It is preserved in a green cloth bag suspended from a wooden pillar (ērkyan) in the sanctuary of the village of Kiştim near Dersim. The stick is believed to be a piece of the rod of Moses and the bag a copy of the one carried by St. John the Baptist (Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Molyneux-Seel, p. 67).
The čūē haqī is used in cult ceremonies on the feast of Xizir Īlyās, which is celebrated after a three-day fast, during which, according to some reports (Mkrtčʿian, p. 51), even cattle and other livestock are not fed. On this day thousands of pilgrims gather in the village to gaze upon the holy staff (ēvlīyā keštīmī “the saint of Kiştim”; for details, see Dersimi, pp. 97-98; Halajian, DAN, pp. 475-80; Haykuni, p. 133; Erevanian, p. 79; Müller, pp. 27-28; Asatrian and Gevorgian, p. 508).
One noteworthy trait of Dimlī religious rituals is the equal participation of women, which has often served as an excuse for accusing them of ritual promiscuity and calling them by derogatory names (e.g., čirāḡ-kušān, čirāḡ-sōndurān, mūm-sōndurān, ḵurōs-kušān “candle extinguishers”) suggesting participation in orgies (e.g., Fontanier, p. 168; Mkrtčʿian, p. 51).
The Dimlīs’ profound hatred of the Turks, in contrast to their mild and friendly attitude toward Armenians, may partly reflect the fact that they, like the Ahl-e Ḥaqq and Yazīdīs, rigorously deny that they are Muslims and stress their claim to follow a distinct religion (Bruinessen, 1991, p. 12; Molyneux-Seel, p. 64).
Antagonism to the Turks has also acquired a clear nationalistic character, which is currently being expressed in the powerful upsurge of a Dimlī separatist movement in Turkey (Taławarian, p. 79; Asatrian, 1992a, pp. 104-05; idem, 1992b, pp. 8-9; idem, 1993, p. 7).
Beside special public places for performing their religious ceremonies (tekke), the Dimlīs, like the Yazīdīs, also worship in private houses, including those of their religious leaders (Taławarian, p. 64; Müller, p. 228; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 105). They are mostly monogamous, though, according to some authors, polygamy, limited to no more than four wives, is also exercised. Divorce is strictly forbidden.
Dimlīs do not practice circumcision (Trowbridge, p. 348; Müller, p. 25; Asatrian, 1992a, p. 106; Mkrtčʿian, p. 55).
Four clans (Āḡāǰān, Bāmāsūrān, Kurēšān, and Davrēš-Jamālān) are the traditional custodians of Dimlī religious doctrine. Religious offices are hereditary. The highest, that of pīrī-pīrān (cf. Pers. pīr-e pīrān, elder of elders) may also be conferred by ordination within the hereditary line.
Successively lower levels are pīr, seyīd, dede, muršīd, and rayvar (cf. Pers. rahbar). Such terms as “mulla” and ulem (Ar. and Pers. ʿālem) are never used in non-Sunni Dimlī religious affairs. The pīrī-pīrān is the theocratic head of the community. His wife (ana) enjoys almost equal rights in managing family affairs (Halajian, DAN, pp. 464-65).
Dedes and seyīds, who never shave or have their hair cut, perform wedding and funeral rites (Haykuni, p. 86). Rayvars, the lowest class of clergy, have the social status of ordinary laymen (ṭālebs). They are not paid for their services, which include visiting members of the congregation, performing daily religious rites, and ensuring that the religious and ethical norms of the community are observed.
They can punish the guilty but are not allowed to show clemency. Only the pīrī-pīrān, upon the application of the supreme council (jamāʿat), a mixed secular and clerical body, may forgive sins. The nonreligious affairs of the rayvars are attended to by their families or lay volunteers (Halajian, pp. 463 ff.). A curious social aspect of the Dimlī community is the institution of moṣāḥeb (perhaps “holy brotherhood”).
Similar institutions, called birē āxiratē and xūškā āxiratē (brotherhood and sisterhood of the next world), and šarṭ-e eqrār exist also among the Yazīdīs and Ahl-e Ḥaqq respectively (Asatrian, 1985; idem and Gevorgian, p. 507).
Language
Dimlī (Zāzā) belongs to the Northwest Iranian language group (Windfuhr). It is known from several dialects, Sīvērēk, Kōsā, Čabāḵčūr, Kiḡī, Bujāq, Ōvāǰīḡ, and others, which, however, do not differ greatly.
Phonology
The Dimlī phonological system is the same in all dialects, with only slight variations. The vowel system consists of eight phonemes and two diphthongs (Cabolov), which are transcribed variously in the recorded texts (Chart 1).
The long vowel phonemes have no significant allophones, whereas the range of allophones of the short vowels and diphthongs is quite wide:/a/:[a, i, ē/ĕ]; /i/:[ī/ĭ, a, e]; /u/: [o, ü], etc.; /au/: [au, aū, ou, eu]; /ai/: [ai, ēi, aī], etc.
The Dimlī consonant phonemes are shown in Chart 2. The affricates c, j, and cʿ and the aspirated series pʿ, tʿ-, kʿ are found mainly in northern dialects (Erzincan, Dersim). Armenian influence is the most likely explanation of the existence of these phonemes, which are not otherwise found in modern West-Iranian languages (Vahman and Asatrian, p. 268). The /čá/ represents a mediopalatal surd affricate (= -tš-, Arm. č, Kurmānjī čˊ), which is apparently common to all Dimlī dialects.
Historically Dimili j corresponds to Middle Iranian ǰ, while čá, c, and cʿ all continue Middle Iranian č; for instance, jau “barley” (< *MIr. *ǰau), c/cʿim “eye” (< *čehm < *čašm), and cʿilā “lamp, candle” (< *čirāḡ); cīcag “flower” < *čīčag, cf. Turk. çiçek, etc.).
The opposition between a rolled ṟ and a simple flap r is found also in Kurmānjī. The marginal phonemes /ʿ/ and /ḥ/ occur in some dialects under the influence of Kurmānjī Kurdish.
In certain dialects older š is commonly represented by s, for example, sit or šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šift), gōs or gōš “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), hū/ŭsk “dry” (cf. Pers. ḵošk, Kurdish hišk), mask(a) “churning bag” (cf. OPers. maškā-, NPer. mašk); sim- “drink” (probably from MIr. *šām- from older *čyāma-, cf. NPers. ā-šām-, Khotanese tsām- “to digest”); and sōn- or šōn- “flow” (possibly from *xšaudna-). Conversely š also replaces original s, for example, šīr “garlic” (cf. NPers., Kurdish sīr).
There is also worth mentioning the initial s- in sol(a), “salt,” which is probably also from š- (cf. Parth. šwryn “salt[y],” NPers. šūr); one, however, cannot exclude the possibility of its original character (cf. Mid. Pers. sōr, Baḵtīārī, sūr, Balūčī sōr, Brahui sōr; see Henning, 1947, p. 55). Of more uncertain interpretation is ša “black,” whose š may be from *sy (cf. Sogd. šʾw but Parth. syʾw, NPers sīāh), and ṟāšt or ṟāst “right” (cf. Parth. rʾšt but NPers. rāst, Kurdish ṟāst).
A similar situation is seen in the language of those Armenians of Dersim who belong to the so-called Mirakʿian tribe, in which Armenian š has become s, for instance, sun “dog” < šun and us “late” < uš. In this dialect Armenian ǰ, č, čʿ have become j, c, cʿ (e.g., jur “water” < ǰur, cut “chicken” < čut, and cʿor “dry” < čʿor).
In the dialect of northern Dersim the voiceless and voiced stops k-, g- are sometimes palatalized in initial position, for instance, čē or kē, kaya “house, home” (cf. NPers. kada, Ṭālešī ka), čanā, čayna, čēnakʿ or kʿaynakʿ “girl, maiden” (cf. Av. kainiiā-, Mid. Pers. kanīg), and ǰī “excrement” (from MIr. *gūh, cf. Pers. goh, Kurdish gū).
Morphology
Nouns and pronouns
Two grammatical genders are clearly distinguished in substantives, adjectives, pronouns, and verbal forms. The nominative singular masculine is unmarked; the feminine usually takes the ending short unstressed -i. The plural endings are -(ā)n, -ī, and -ē for both genders. There are two cases, direct and oblique, which are distinguished in the singular: masculine -ī/-Ø, feminine -ē/-i/-Ø, but not in the plural. The eżāfa is masculine singular -ē/ĕ/, -ō/, -dē/, -di/, -dō and feminine singular -(y)ā/ă, -dā/ă(y). The plural form for both genders is usually -ē, as in nē pʿōstālē min “these my shoes.”
The two cases are distinguished in the personal pronouns, as well (Table 32). In addition, the third person pronouns have a possessive form derived from Old Iranian *haca “from” plus the oblique form of the pronoun.
To be compared with the possessive forms are Kurdish žē, Aftarī ǰūn, Tākistānī ǰā, ǰanā, Ṭālešī čay, čavōn, Semnāni masc. žo, fem. žin, and the like.
Verbs
The verbal system is based on two stems, present and past, which correspond to the older present stem and past (passive) participle. The present tense is formed from the present stem plus the formant -an-/ -(i)n- derived from the Old Iranian present participle in *ant(a)- (cf. Pers. -anda) for instance, barm-an- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-).
If the stem ends in r this is assimilated to the following n: kar- but kan-an- “do,” *yar- but yan-n- “come.” The present stem without -an- occurs in the subjunctive (aorist) and imperative, for instance, karō “may he be.” Some verbs take the preverb bi- in the subjunctive and imperative, for instance, bērī “come!” The imperfect is made from the present stem plus the suffix -ā/ănī or -inī without personal endings, for example, ti āgayrā-ynī “you were walking.”
The endings of the present tense (gender marked only in the singular) are shown in Chart 3. The endings of the past tense are regular. Occasionally the feminine third-person singular of intransitive verbs takes the feminine ending -i (masc. -Ø). The past tense of the transitive verbs takes the so-called “(split) ergative” construction, in which the (logical) direct object is in the direct case and the agent in the oblique case, for example, tʿō az ašt-ā(n) “you have left me,” literally, “by-you I left-am” (cf. Kurmānjī ta az kuštim “you have killed me”).
A secondary (regular) conjugation is formed by affixing -ā- to the present stem, past stem -āy-, for example, ṟāmā “he ran away.”
The passive of transitive verbs is expressed either by periphrastic constructions or by a secondary conjugation (as in Gūrānī and Mokrī Kurdish) formed with the passive morpheme -ya-: present stem in -(y)ēn-, past stem in -(i)yā-. This passive is conjugated as an intransitive verb and is used only when the agent is not expressed or is unknown.
Both the infinitive and the active (present!) participle are formed from the past stem. The infinitive ends in -ʿī/ĭš from Middle Iranian -išn (only exceptionally used with past stems) and the participle in -ōγ, -ōx, probably borrowed from the Armenian suffix for the noun of agent -oł/-oγ, as intervocalic k does not become x or γ in Dimlī (cf. Asatrian, 1987, p. 160).
Examples or the infinitive: āmāyīš “to come” (cf. Mid. Pers. āmadišn), kardī/ĭš “to do,” ṟāmāyīš “to run away,” ṟōtiš “to sell,” wandī/ĭš “to read,” wātiš “to say.” Examples of the present participle: ṟāmāyōx “runner,” ṟōtōx “seller, vendor,” kardōγ “doer, maker,” wandōγ “reader.”
A characteristic feature of Dimlī is the use of postposition -rī, -rā to form the ablative, as in harzanī-ri “from Harzand” (cf. Kurdish where -rā expresses the instrumental).
Linguistic position of Dimlī
After their migration in the Middle Ages, for almost a millennium the Dimlīs had no direct contact with their closest linguistic relatives. Nevertheless, their language has preserved numerous isoglosses with the dialects of the southern Caspian region, and its place in the Caspian dialect group of Northwest Iranian is clear.
The Caspian dialects comprise Ṭālešī, Harzan(d)ī, Gūrānī, Gīlakī, Māzandarānī, and some dialects in Tātī-speaking areas and in the area around Semnān. Historically the Caspian dialects belong to the “Northwest Iranian group of languages” and are related to Parthian (see Windfuhr). The isoglosses are of historical phonetic, morphological, and lexical order.
The typically North Iranian and Northwest Iranian phonetic features found in Dimlī include the developments of Indo-European *ḱ and (Indo-Iranian) *ts to *s, *ḱw to *sp, *ǵ(h) to *z, *dw- to b- and the preservation of *θr from Indo-European *tr. Examples of *s from Indo-European *ḱ and Indo-Iranian *ts include saṟa “year” (cf. Parth. srd, Pers. sāl), pas (cf. Av. pasu-), dis or dus “kind, form” (cf. Mid. Pers. dēs), māsī “fish” (cf. Skt. matsya-, Av. masiia-, Pers. māhī).
Examples of *-sp- from Indo-European *ḱw include aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-, cf. OPers. asa-bāra, Pers. savār, Kurdish siyār), āspiǰ/ža “louse” (cf. Av. *spiš-, Pers. šepeš). Examples of *z from Indo-European *ǵ(h) include zāmā “son-in-law” (cf. Ṭālešī zāmā, Kurdish zawā, Pers. dāmād), zān- “know” (cf. Av. zanā-, Pers. dān-), zaṟn “gold” (cf. Av. zaraniia-, Pers. zarr); az “I” (cf. Av. azəm), dēs and dēz “wall” (cf. Av. daēza-), barz “high” (cf. Av. bərəzaṇt-, Pers. boland).
Examples of b- from Old Iranian *dw- include bar “door” (Parth. br, but Pers. dar), bīn “other, this” (cf. Parth. byd, but Mid. Pers. did, Pers. dīgar).
Old Iranian *θr further became *hr, which in initial position acquired a supporting vowel in the modern languages, as in hī/ĭra/ē/i “three” (cf. Parth. hry, Av. θrāiiō, versus Pers. se < *çaiiah), but between vowels became r, for instance, mār(i) “mother” (cf. Av. māθrō, gen. of mātar-), āwrā/ă (cf. Av. apuθrā- < *ā-puθra-, but Kurdish āvis, Pers. ābestan < *āpuçā-).
Other typical early Northwest Iranian phonetic features include: Preservation in initial position of Old Iranian *č and *ǰ (as ǰ or j [dz]), which in other positions became ǰ and ž or z, respectively, for example, *č: či “what” (cf. Pers. če), čarx “wheel”; pōnj or pōnǰ “five” (cf. Pers. panj), ṟōǰ “day” (cf. Av. raocah-, Pers. rūz), vāǰ- “say” (cf. Parth. wāž-), (a)ǰēr “downward, below” (cf. Kurdish žēr, Pers. zīr); (a)ǰōr “upward, above” (cf. Kurdish žōr, Mid. Pers. azabar); lōǰina “flue, aperture” (cf. Mid. Pers. rōzan); ǰana or ǰiina “woman, wife” (cf. Av. jaini-, Kurdish žin, Pers. zan), daž/z “ache, pain” (from OIr. *daǰi-?).
Dimlī gōn(i) “blood” corresponds exactly to Parthian gwxn, the relation of which to Old Iranian *wahuni- (Gūrānī winī, wun, Pers. ḵūn = Kurdish, all from *xwaun-, a transformation of OIr. *wahuni-) is uncertain.
The phonetic isoglosses of Dimlī in modern times overlap to varying degree with those of the Caspian dialects, Kurdish, Persian, the Central dialects, and the like (see Henning, 1954, pp. 174-76; Windfuhr).
The most characteristic are the following. Initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in Gūrānī, for example Old Iranian initial *x- became h- or was lost, as in har “donkey” (Av. xara-, Gūrānī, Lorī har, versus Kurdish kʿar, Pers. ḵar, etc.), yānī “spring, well” for *hānī (Mid. Pers. and Parth. xānīg, Gūrānī hāna, versus Kurdish kānī). Initial *xw- became w-, as in the Kandūlāyī dialect of Gūrānī, for example, wala “ash” (versus Kurdish xwalī “soil”), wā/ă(y) “sister” (versus Pers. ḵᵛāhar), war- “eat” (versus Pers. ḵordan).
Initial *fr- became *hr-, which either received a supporting vowel, as in harā “wide, far” (versus Pers. farāḵ), or became ṟ-, as in ṟōtiš “sell” (also in the Central dialects, versus Pers. forūḵt)
Survey of typical phonetic developments
Dimlī has preserved the Middle Iranian maǰhūl vowels ō, ē (cf. gōs/š “ear,” bō(y) “smell,” gēs “hair,” etc.). The corresponding diphthongs are secondary, however; au is from older *-aw-, *-ap-, *-ab-, *-ag-, or *-af-, whereas ai is the result of phonetic combinatory changes.
The Old Iranian voiceless stops *p, *t, *k remained in initial position or became the apirates pʿ, tʿ, kʿ; *t and *k also remained after s and š, but became d and g after r. Examples of *p include pas “lamb, ram” (see above) and pʿīza “belly” (cf. Av. *pāzah- “chest,” Parth. pʾzʾh “in front”). Examples of *t include t’au “fever” (cf. Pers. tab), t’ars “fear” (Cf. Pers. tars), kʿārd(i) “knife” (cf. Pers. kārd), pʿōrd “bridge” (also pʿird influenced by Kurdish; cf. Kormānjī pʿir, Southern Kurdish pird; Pers. pol); ā/ăstik, ā/ăsta “bone” (cf. Av. ast-); ā/ăstāra “star” (cf. Pers. setāra).
Examples of *k include kʿār “work” (cf. Pers. kār); čē, kaya “home”(see above); kū/ŭtik “dog” (cf. Sogd. ʾkwty /əkuti/, Oss. kuj, Kurdish kūčˊ/čik, etc.), hū/ŭs/šk “dry” (see above), varg “wolf” (cf. Av. vəhrka-, Pers. gorg); exceptionally k remained in hāk “egg” (Fārs dialects hāg, Ḵūrī xeik).
Between vowels *p became -u-/-w-, and *t became y or was lost. Examples of *p include āu “water” (cf. Pers. āb); āwrā/ă “pregnant” (see above); šau “night” (cf. Pers. šab); ārya, āyra “mill” (from OIr. *ār-θry-? cf. Kurdish āš, NPers. ās-yāb< *āç-); kawtiš “fall down” (cf. Mid. Pers. kaft).
Examples of *t include čē, kaya “house” (from *kata-, see above) and wā(y) “wind” (cf. NPers. bād). Exceptionally we find d, as in ǰidā “separated, different” (cf. Kurdish ǰihē, Pers. jodā). Note the secondary -t- in the group sr > str in astiri, ī/ĭštrī “horn,” as in Kurdish strī, from Old Iranian *srū-.
The Old Iranian voiced stops *b and *d are preserved only in initial position, *g in initial position and in the group *rg. The group *rd became ṟ. Between vowels the voiced stops were mostly lost. On the palatalization of g to ǰ, see above. Examples of *b- include bō(y) “smell” (cf. Pers. bū), biz/ža “goat” (cf. Pers. boz), b(i)raw(i) “eyelash” (< *bruwa-; cf. Pers. abrū), aspār “horseman” (OIr. *aspa-bāra-). Examples of *d include darg “long” (cf. Av. darəγa-, Pers. dīr), pāī “foot” (cf. Av. pāδ-, Pers. pā), saṟa (see above), var(a) or val(a) “neck” (but NPers. galū, Baḵtīārī gyēl, Māzandarāni and Gīlakī gē/ĕl); zaṟa “heart” (cf. Av. zərəδaiia-, but Gūrānī zil, Pers. del), gara or gaṟa “complaint” (but Pers. gela, Kurdish gilī), kʿōl(i) “hornless (goat)” (from OIr. *kṛdu-?).
It should be noted that Dimlī words with -i- before r/l, as in ādir “fire,” mil “neck,” vil “flower,” are likely to be loanwords from other Iranian dialects (cf. mol and vel in Fārs dialects). Examples of *g- include gōs/š “ear” (cf. Pers. gūš), gā(w) “cow” (cf. Pers. gāv), but ǰī or gī “excrement” (see above); darg “long” (see above); ṟau “swift” (cf. Av. *raγu-).
The Old Iranian spirants, *f, *θ, *x, developed variously. The *f was lost in the cluster *-ft- in s/šit “milk” (cf. Parth. šyft). On *fr, see above. The group *-θn- became -sn- in ārāsna, ārisna “elbow” (cf. Avestan araθni-, but OPers. arašni-, Pers. araš). Similarly *x was lost in the cluster *xš-, as in šau “night” (see above), but remained in words such as čarx (from Persian?). On initial *x- and *xw- , ee above.
On Old Iranian *s and *z, as well as the interchange of s- and š, see above. The Old Iranian groups *-st-, * -sn-, and *-sr- are preserved (on *sp, see above), as in ā/ăsnāwi “swimming” (versus Pers. šenā); hars(i) “tear” (cf. Av. asru-, Pers. ašk from *asruka-), askaft “cave” (from *skā/ăfta-, versus Pers. šekāft). Old Iranian *š remained in Dimlī, as opposed to Kurdish, where intervocalic š regularly became h. Example include goš or gōs “ear” (Kurdish guh), šaš “six” (= Pers.), pāšna “heel” (= Pers., but Kurdish pa(h)nī), pānušna, ṟōš/s(a)yā “light, illumination” (cf. Pers. rowšanāʾī, but Kurdish ṟō(h)nāyī), tayšan “thirsty” (cf. Pers. tešna, but Kurdish tʿī(h)n).
Old Iranian *y- became ǰ-, as in Persian, but *w became v (rather than b- or g-, as in Kurdish, Persian, etc.). Examples of *y include ǰau or jau “barley” (cf. Av. yauua-, Pers. ǰou, Kurdish ǰa, but Gūrānī yaw, yaya), ǰidā (see above). Examples of *w include vazd (cf. Av. vazdah-, but Kurdish baz), vayšān or vaysān “hungry” (but Kurdish birčī, Pers. gošna for gorosna), vāris “rain” (but Pers. bāreš), vā(y) (see above), vayva “bride” (cf. Kurdish būk, Judeo-Pers. bayōg), varg “wolf” (see above), vinī “lose, waste” (cf. Mid. Pers. wanī), vāz- “run” (cf. Pers. vazīdan “to blow” of the wind), vā/ăš/s “grass” (cf. Parth. wʾš, Av. vāstra-? “fodder”). Where b- occurs instead of v- it may be assumed to be a borrowing from Kurdish or Persian, for instance, bar “stone” (cf. Kurdish, Lorī bard) and gumān “doubt, surmise” and guna “sin” from New Persian via Kurdish.
Old Iranian *m was preserved in all positions in Dimlī but not in Kurdish, where it became v between vowels; examples include maḡwā/ă “fruit” (cf. Pers. mīva), dām(i) “trap” (Pers. dām, but Kurdish dāw), āmōr “counting” (cf. Pers. āmār), ām(i)nān “summer” (cf. Mid. Pers. hāmīn, but Kurdish hāvīn), (h)arma(y) “shoulder, forearm” (cf. Av. arəma-), mīr “dough” (cf. Pers./Ar. ḵamīr, but Kurdish havīr).
Στο Μορφωτικό Κέντρο αυτό μπορείτε να πάρετε μαθήματα θρησκευτικού χορού Σεμά στο Αντίγιαμαν.
Morphological isoglosses
The most important morphological isoglosses which link Dimlī with the Caspian dialects are the pronominal possessive forms from *hača plus the pronoun and the formation of the present indicative from the old present participle in *-ant(a)-. The past stem of the secondary conjugation ends in -ā from *-ād, as in Parthian. Exclusive to Dimlī are the infinitive ending -ī/ĭš from *-išn and the ablative use of postposition -rī/ā (Asatrian, 1990, p. 162; idem, 1992c, p. 26).
Lexical isoglosses
These isoglosses include Old Iranian *arma- “forearm” (Dimlī (h)arma(y), Ṭālešī ām, cf. Oss. ā/ărm, versus *bāzu- in Pers. bāzū, etc.); Middle Persian āyišm “moon” (Dimlī ā/ăš/smā/ă, āsmi, Tatī ušmā, Ṭālesī ovšim, Harzanī öšma); Dimlī baurān “dove” (Oss. bälon “domestic dove”; cf. Lithuanian balañdis “dove”); Old Iranian *bram- “weep, cry” (Parth. bram-, Dimlī barm-, Māzandarānī barm-, Harzanī beram “weeping,” Ṭālešī bāme, Tātī berām, Gīlakī barmā, Aftarī burme; cf. in the Central dialects Nāʾīnī biremba; versus Pers. gerya, etc.).
Old Iranian *kanya- “woman, girl” (Dimlī kʿaynakʿ, čanā, Harzanī kīna, Ṭālešī kīna, Tatī kīna, Galīnqaya kina, čina, versus Pers. ḵāna; marginal lexeme in Pers. kanīz and Kurdish kinik); Old Iranian *kata- “home, house” (Dimlī kaya, čē, Ṭālešī ka, Gūrānī ka, Tatī kā, Galīnqaya kar, Harzanī kar, čār, Aftarī kiye; cf. in the Central dialects Ḵūnsārī kī(y)a, Nāʾīnī kiya; marginal lexeme in Pers. kade and Kurdish kadīkirin “to domesticate (animals)”); Old Iranian *ragu- “quick, swift” (Parth. raγ, Dimlī ṟau, Harzanī rav, Ṭālešī ra, Tatī rav, Semnānī rayk, cf. Oss. räw, rog “light,” versus Pers. zūd); Old Iranian *uz-ayara- “yesterday” (Av. uzaiiara- “afternoon,” Dimlī vīžēr(ī), vīžēr, Gūrānī uzera, Harzanī, Tātī zīr, Tākistānī, Ṭālešī azīra, Aftarī yezze, versus Pers. dī-rūz); Old Iranian *waxš- “burn” (Parth. wxšyndg “blazing,” Dimlī vaš or viš-, Harzanī vaš-, Ṭālešī vaš-, Tatī vaš-, versus *sauc- in Pers. sūḵtan, etc.); Old Iranian and common Northwest Middle Iranian *xšwipta- “milk” (Av. xšuuipta-, Parth. šift, Dimlī š/sit, Gūrānī šit, šifta, Ṭālešī šit, Harzanī, Aftarī šet, Tātī še(r)t, versus Pers., Kurdish šīr < *xšīra-); Old Iranian *upa-sar(a)daka- “spring(time)” (Mid. Pers. ābsālān, Dimlī ūsāṟ(ō), vazārī, Ṭālešī āvāsōr, Harzanī āvāsōr, classical Pers. ābsālān); Avestan vazdah- “fat” (Dimlī vazd “fat, oil”; cf. Kurdish baz); and Parthian wāš “fodder” (Dimlī vā/ăš/s, Ṭālešī, Māzandarānī vāš, Aftarī vāšt, Semnānī voš, versus Parthian gwyʾw, Pers., Kurdish giyāh, gīhā).
Also to be noted is Dimlī ṟīz, ṟēs “rice” (*wrī/ĭzna-; cf. Sogd. ryz-, versus Pers., Kurdish, etc., berenǰ < *wrī/ĭnza-). Relatives of the negative particle Dimlī činyō/ā “no, not” are found in Harzanī čini(ya) and Āẕarī čī/ĭnī/ĭ.
Words found only in Dimlī include angāz, hangāž “plough handle” (< *han-gāza- < *gāza- “take, accept” found in Sogd. ptγʾz-, Khotanese pajāys-, etc.; it cannot be from Armenian; see Vahman and Asatrian, p. 272); āz “generation, offspring” (Man. Mid. Pers. āzn(ān), Arm. lw. < Parth. azn “people, generation,” azniw “noble”); āz(i) “branch” (Mid.Pers. azg, Arm. loanword from Parthian azg “race, kind, nation”); ask(i) “goat” (Avestan aza-, Mid. Pers. az(ag); different from Kurdish āsk “deer” from *āsuka-, cf. Mid. Pers. āhūg, Pers. āhū); gauš “weak, coward, greedy” and gaušakay “weakness, cowardice” (possibly related to Sogd. γβs- “to be fatigued”); haw(i) or hiw(i) “laughter,” hawāyīšʾ present stem hwī/ĭn- “to laugh” (cf. Oss. xūdln); kay “play, game” (Mid. Pers kadag “game, joke,” Sogd. kʾtʾk-, Arm. lw. < Parth. katak “joke”; cf. Jowšaqānī koy “game”); sīr-, in present stem sīn(a)n- “I love” (< OIr. *srīra-; cf. Av. srīra- “beautiful,” Sogd. šyr’kk “good,” Parth. šīr-gāmag “friend”; probably not from Arm. sēr, sir- “love”; see Asatrian, 1987, pp. 166-67); and vistiš and fīnāyīš (or finā-) “to throw,” fīnyāyīš “to be thrown” (Mid. Pers. wistan “to shoot,” present stem from *wid-na-) with ṟā-vistiš “to spread, lay, put” (Galīnqaya fest-, fesn- “to throw, spread”), cf. Lorī bistan “to put down, to cast a foal” (before time).
Dimlī words without clear Iranian etymologies include diǰn(i) or dižn(i) “rain” (< OIr. *danǰa-? cf. IE *dhengṷo-); for “rain” vāris, vārān and Turkish yāḡmūr are also used in Dimlī.
Of the numerous borrowings from Armenian (exceeding perhaps those from Kurdish or even Turkish) the following may be mentioned: aks/cʾīg “woman, girl,” āvilīk “broom,” bōč, pōč “tail,” būǰūr “small,” gāb “Rheum L.,” hārs “bride,” hēsān “whetstone,” čirtʿān “waterpipe,” gōǰā/ăg(i) “button,” gōm(a) “cattle shed,” hāst “hard, rigid,” hāgōs(i) “furrow,” hīm “root, base,” hēǰ “cross” (Arm. xačʿ), hōllik “hut, shack,” hūrā/ăkʿ “hatchet, ax,” ǰāγ/x(i) “wire mesh,” kʿa/irōn “beam, girder,” kāl “thrashing floor,” kālān(i) “scabbard, sheath,” kʿalandī “scythe,” kiray “lime,” kirya, kirē “Sunday,” kiṟīk “neck,” kōra/ēk “a kind of lentil,” kʿušna/i “rye,” ōzōr “branch,” pāč “pod, grain,” pʿanǰār “vegetable,” pʿūrt “wool,” sāvār “pearl barley, spelt,” sēmiga “threshold,” sūnk/g “mushroom,” xēγ(ō), xīntʿ “mad, insane,” xōr “deep,” xōnj, xōz “pig,” zīl(ik) “sprout.”
Literature in Dimlī
The earliest surviving literary works in the Dimlī language are two poems with identical titles, Mawlūd (Genesis), dating from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The earlier, consisting of 756 eleven-syllable verses, is by Malā Ahmedē Ḵāsī, the other by ʿOṯmān Efendī, mufti of Siverek. There is also a minstrel tradition going back to the medieval period; a number of Dimlī bards have composed both in their mother tongue and in Turkish, for example, Daymī, Dāvūt Solārī, Pīr Solṭān, ʿAlī-Akbar Čīčak, Yāvūz Tōp, Arif Sāḡ, Sulaymān Yildiz, and Rahmī Sāltok (Zilfi, p. 6).
Nevertheless, Dimlī has attained genuine literary status only in recent decades, owing to the activities of a number of writers, poets, and political leaders (e.g., Eulbekir Pamukçu, Ališan Karsan, Hesen Dewran, Zilfi, Malmisanic, K. Astare, Reme Bir, Hesen Uşen, Heyder, Usḵan), who now live abroad, mainly in western Europe. At present numerous newspapers, magazines, and bulletins are being published in Dimlī (e.g., Piya [formerly Ayre], Raştiye, Ware, Raya Zazaistani), and the number is increasing.
Την βιβλιογραφία και παραπομπές θα βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dimli
Επιπλέον:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gurani
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/alawi-the-nesba
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