Persia - Blog Posts
oh wow i was literally UNAWARE my results came back 2-3 days ago and I was not aware of it
curiously i decided to go check my dna to see if it came back and it DID i just never knew
coincidentally i mentioned that my great grandfather from my mom's side was a jewish man from germany and apparently they picked it up???? my 4-5-6-7-to 12 generations were jewish. but more jews from poland, belarus, Ukrainian, Lithuania, romania, Moldova and hungary. I KNEW i was jewish but then that would mean I have to convert to be considered jewish. it came from both grandparents both maternal and paternal so thats good
crazy realisation, COINCIDENTALLY on shabbat (on Saterday it was still shabbat) i got my results and seeing the jewish was shocking
and most of my dna came from my dad because he was african. he even had capr Verde walking there like theres so much of it and i just found it all shocking. bro then a huge block of British and irish popped up in there, and its ofc connected since i was BORN in britain. ties w scotland. then I got ALL scandinavian dna fully, danish swedish finnish iceland and norwegian was there on MY TEST. like do u know how INSANE that is?
and European, I got italian, greek, Spanish & Portuguese, Bulgarian, romanian, Moldovan, and a few more.
then I had unassigned. my mom is arab ofc as u guys know but this time more uncovered. she had iraqi Azerbaijani Turkish Iran on her side including Georgia yemen and a strong NORTH AFRICAN jews on the side. she also said yemeni ties and Egyptian.
suprisingly, chinese showed up on my test, viet, thai khmer indonesian and myanmar, malaysian, Japanese & more. then Russian as well.
but then. I got south asian dna from my MOM because where she is from has a strong south asian population, so I got bhutanese (from bhutan), indian, pakistani, sri lankan, Nepali, and 3 more. EVEN KAZAHSTAN LMFAOOOO
and lastly, just thought my mom was just the country she was and my dad was from the caribbean and that was it. no. few more popped up. im apparently barbadian, trinidad, descendant of the cayman islands afro population, AFRO LATINA (afro cuban??? that was shocked me more), and tbh it was fun to know everything but I was just so shocked.
it made me laugh how I stopped checking my dna and then randomly, decided to check it again and it came on jewish passover JUST to be suprised w jewish ancestry from mh ancestors on shabbat (shabbat is Friday evening to saturday evening but its passover so it may be a clash??? so yeah don't attack me.)
im just super happy rn because now I can continue learning about new traditions cultures more food to try more countries to visit, music etc
thank god im multiracial and im thankful EVERYDAY im mixed
life is so good right now
been dying to know the sides of my moms family but I know too much of my moms side and still want to know more, so we agreed to the 23andme kit and now we r waiting for the results which takes 5-6 weeks
but once of my uncles, are updating us about digging our family tree and right now, he is saying there is too many mixes in my dads family
bro said that. MY DADS side. has senegalese. swiss. italian. spanish. sweden.
thats the most recent we found and my dad sadly died so I couldnt get to ask him anything.
but being italian and spanish is shocking because he did make me visit his spanish side. my mom said EVERY time she is in that mfing house she IS ALWAYS seeing a flag that has red white and green. she didnt know what that was. but like. ITS THE WAY I WAS THINKING ABOUT VISITING SWITZERLAND AND WANTED TO LIVE THERE in the FUTURE and then boom, a gene has been found.
i love being mixed
Gilan, Iran || Photos: mostafa_asadbeigi
Desert Silhouettes - Sistani & Baluchestan
How the international community treated the Islamic Republic of Iran
Η διεθνής αντιμετώπιση της ισλαμικής Περσίας, του Κοσμά Μεγαλομμάτη: Εποπτεία 119, Ιανουάριος 1987, σελ. 38-48
How the international community treated the Islamic Republic of Iran, by Cosmas Megalommatis: Epopteia (‘Overview’) 119, January 1987, p. 38-48
Как международное сообщество относилось к Исламской Республике Иран, (автор:) Кузьма Мегаломматис: Эпоптея («Обзор») 119, январь 1987 г., стр. 38-48
================
Κατεβάστε το άρθρο σε PDF:
Η Πολιτική Ζωή στην Ισλαμική Περσία, του Κοσμά Μεγαλομμάτη-1987
Η Πολιτική Ζωή στην Ισλαμική Περσία, του Κοσμά Μεγαλομμάτη: Εποπτεία 119, Ιανουάριος 1987, σελ. 19-28
Political Life in Islamic Iran, by Cosmas Megalommatis: Epopteia (‘Overview’) 119, January 1987, p. 19-28
Политическая жизнь в исламском Иране, (автор:) Кузьма Мегаломматис: Эпоптея («Обзор») 119, январь 1987 г., с. 19-28
——————————–
Συνήθεις αναγνώστες μου θα παραξενευθούν επειδή χρησιμοποιώ τον όρο ‘Περσία’ αντί ‘Ιράν’ στο συγκεκριμένο άρθρο, καθώς και σε πολλά άλλα άρθρα, εγκυκλοπαιδικά λήμματα, επιστημονικ΄ά άρθρα, και βιβλία δημοσιευμένα στην δεκαετία του 1980 και στις αρχές του 1990. Αυτό οφείλεται στο γεγονός ότι ο όρος αυτός είναι περισσότερο γνωστός και αγαπητός στο ελληνόφωνο αναγνωστικό κοινό, ενώ ο όρος ‘Ιράν’ ακούγεται μάλλον ξενικός. Τότε έγραφα για να πληροφορήσω και να κατατοπίσω σχετικά με θέματα ιστορικού, πνευματικού, θρησκευτικού και πολιτιστικού ενδιαφέροντος σχετιζόμενα με το Ιράν, καθώς και για υποθέσεις επιμελώς αποκρυμμένες σε όλο τον δυτικό κόσμο, όπως επίσης και για δημιουργήσω συμπάθεια προς το Ιράν εναντίον του οποίου στρέφονταν η Δυτική Ευρώπη, το σοβιετικό μπλοκ, οι ΗΠΑ, άλλες δυτικές χώρες, και τα τρισάθλια σκουπίδια των εθελόδουλων κυβερνητών του ανύπαρκτου και ανυπόστατου “αραβικού” κόσμου. Βεβαίως και τότε γνώριζα πολύ καλά ότι ο εξεπίτηδες προτιμώμενος από την μεροληπτική, αποικιοκρατική, δυτική βιβλιογραφία όρος ‘Περσία’ είναι ολότελα λαθεμένος, επειδή το Φαρς (Περσία) αποτελεί μόνον ένα μικρό τμήμα του ιστορικού Ιράν.
Several of my readers may be astounded because I use the term ‘Persia’ instead of ‘Iran’ in this article, as well as in many other articles, entries to encyclopedias, scholarly articles and books published in the 1980s and the early 1990s. This is due to the fact that this term is better known and preferred by the Greek-speaking readership, while the term ‘Iran’ sounds rather foreign to them. At the time, I was writing in order to inform and enlighten about historical, spiritual, religious and cultural topics pertaining to Iran, as well as about matters carefully hidden throughout the Western world, and in order to generate sympathy for Iran against which Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, the USA, other Western countries, and the wretched, docile and useless rulers of the non-existent “Arab” world had formed an alliance. Of course, even then, I was fully aware of the fact that the term ‘Persia’, which is intentionally supported by the biased colonial Western scholarship, is wrong; this is so because Fars (Persia) is only a small part of historical Iran.
Некоторые из моих читателей могут быть удивлены тем, что в этой статье, как и во многих других статьях, записях в энциклопедиях, научных статьях и книгах, изданных в 1980-х и начале 1990-х годов, я использую термин «Персия» вместо «Иран». Это связано с тем, что этот термин более известен и предпочитается грекоязычной читательской аудиторией, а термин «Иран» звучит для них довольно чуждо. В то время я писал, чтобы информировать и просвещать по историческим, духовным, религиозным и культурным темам, касающимся Ирана, а также по вопросам, тщательно скрываемым во всем западном мире, и чтобы вызвать симпатию к Ирану, против которой Западная Европа Советский блок, США, другие западные страны и жалкие, послушные и бесполезные правители несуществующего «арабского» мира образовали союз. Конечно, уже тогда я полностью осознавал тот факт, что термин «Персия», намеренно поддерживаемый предвзятой колониальной западной наукой, неверен; это так, потому что Фарс (Персия) — лишь малая часть исторического Ирана.
-----------------
----------------------
Κατεβάστε το άρθρο σε PDF:
Cosmas Megalommatis, World Politics in the 5th century: the Perso-Roman relations
Κοσμάς Μεγαλομμάτης, World Politics τον 5ο αιώνα: οι περσορωμαϊκές σχέσεις – περιοδικό Διαβάζω, 180, 9 Δεκεμβρίου 1987, σελ. 107-110
Cosmas Megalommatis, World Politics in the 5th century: the Perso-Roman relations – Diavazo magazine, 180, December 9, 1987, pp. 107-110
Кузьма Мегаломматис, Мировая политика в V веке: персидско-римские отношения – журнал Диавазо, 180, 9 декабря 1987 г., стр. 107-110.
======================
Скачать PDF-файл: / PDF-Datei herunterladen: / Télécharger le fichier PDF : / PDF dosyasını indirin: / :PDF قم بتنزيل ملف / Download PDF file: / : یک فایل دانلود کنید / Κατεβάστε το PDF:
Itinerary in Imam's Persia - by Cosmas Megalommatis
Οδοιπορικό στην Περσία του Ιμάμη – του Μουχάμαντ Σαμσαντίν Μεγαλομμάτη
Το άρθρο αυτό δημοσιεύθηκε για πρώτη φορά στο περιοδικό Ανεξήγητο (Μάρτης 1986, σελ. 116-127). Για πρώτη φορά μεταφέρθηκε στο Ιντερνέτ από το σήμερα πλέον απενεργοποιημένο σάιτ technova: http://www.technova.gr/technova/index.php/2012-06-21-03-15-38/afieroma/1927-odoiporiko-stin-persia-tou-imam την Τετάρτη 19 Αυγούστου 2015. Ο φίλος κ. Νίκος Μπαϋρακτάρης αντέγραψε το κείμενο και με άφθονο φωτογραφικό, το οποίο συνέλεξε από το Ιντερνέτ, το ανέβασε ως βίντεο (σε δύο τμήματα) στο σήμερα απενεργοποιημένο ΥΤ κανάλι του. Η μουσική υπόκρουση ήταν δικής μου επιλογής. Χάρη στο υλικό που είχε ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης ετοιμάσει, ανέβασα το άρθρο σε δύο μορφές (σε Word doc η πρώτη και σε PowerPoint η δεύτερη) εδώ:
και
Τα βίντεο, τα οποία ετοίμασε ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης, μπορείτε να βρείτε εδώ:’
{Μουσική / Music accompaniment: Classical music from Iran – Great masters of the setar – Hossein Alizadeh (حسین علیزاده) 00:00 Mahtab 16:17 Avaz-e Abouata Masnavi} και
{Μουσική / Music accompaniment: Shahram Nazeri – Mystified (Sufi Music of Iran) 00:00 – Jewel of Love 10:09 – Desire}
Μπορείτε επίσης να τα βρείτε αντιστοίχως και εδώ:
Путеводитель по Ирану Имама / Itinerary in Imam’s Persia / Οδοιπορικό στην Περσία του Ιμάμη – του Μ. Σ. Μεγαλομμάτη https://ok.ru/video/333170084440
και
Путеводитель по Ирану Имама II / Itinerary in Imam’s Persia II / Οδοιπορικό στην Περσία του Ιμάμη II – του Μ. Σ. Μεγαλομμάτη https://ok.ru/video/333172181592
Σε αυτή την ηλεκτρονική αναδημοσίευση παρουσιάζονται για πρώτη φορά online οι ίδιες οι σελίδες του περιοδικού, αν και ασπρόμαυρες.
============
Κατεβάστε το άρθρο σε PDF:
HISTORY OF ACHAEMENID IRAN
Tentative diagram of the 40-hour seminar
(in 80 parts of 30 minutes)
Prof. Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Tuesday, 27 December 2022
--------------------------
To watch the videos, click here:
https://www.patreon.com/posts/history-of-iran-76436584
To hear the audio, click here:
-------------------------------------------
1 A - Achaemenid beginnings I A
Introduction; Iranian Achaemenid historiography; Problems of historiography continuity; Iranian posterior historiography; foreign historiography
1 B - Achaemenid beginnings I B
Western Orientalist historiography; early sources of Iranian History; Prehistory in the Iranian plateau and Mesopotamia
2 A - Achaemenid beginnings II A
Brief Diagram of the History of the Mesopotamian kingdoms and Empires down to Shalmaneser III (859-824 BCE) – with focus on relations with Zagros Mountains and the Iranian plateau
2 B - Achaemenid beginnings II B
The Neo-Assyrian Empire from Shalmaneser III (859-824 BCE) to Sargon of Assyria (722-705 BCE) – with focus on relations with Zagros Mountains and the Iranian plateau
3 A - Achaemenid beginnings III A
From Sennacherib (705-681 BCE) to Assurbanipal (669-625 BCE) to the end of Assyria (609 BCE) – with focus on relations with Zagros Mountains and the Iranian plateau
3 B - Achaemenid beginnings III B
The long shadow of the Mesopotamian Heritage: Assyria, Babylonia, Elam/Anshan, Kassites, Guti, Akkad, and Sumer / Religious conflicts of empires – Monotheism & Polytheism
4 A - Achaemenid beginnings IV A
The Sargonid dynasty and the Divine, Universal Empire – the Translatio Imperii
4 B - Achaemenid beginnings IV B
Assyrian Spirituality, Monotheism & Eschatology; the imperial concepts of Holy Land (vs. barbaric periphery) and Chosen People (vs. barbarians)
5 A - Achaemenid beginnings V A
The Medes from Deioces to Cyaxares & Astyages
The early Achaemenids (Achaemenes & the Teispids)
5 B - Achaemenid beginnings V B
- Why the 'Medes' and why the 'Persians'?
What enabled these nations to form empires?
6 A - Zoroaster A
Shamanism-Tengrism; the life of Zoroaster; Avesta and Zoroastrianism
6 B - Zoroaster B
Mithraism vs. Zoroastrianism; the historical stages of Zoroaster's preaching and religion
7 A - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) I A
The end of Assyria, Nabonid Babylonia, and the Medes
7 B - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) I B
The Nabonidus Chronicle
8 A - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) II A
Cyrus' battles against the Medes
8 B - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) II B
Cyrus' battles against the Lydians
9 Α - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) III A
The Battle of Opis: the facts
9 Β - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) III B
Why Babylon fell without resistance
10 A - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) IV A
Cyrus Cylinder: text discovery and analysis
10 B - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) IV B
Cyrus Cylinder: historical continuity in Esagila
11 A - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) V A
Cyrus' Empire as continuation of the Neo-Assyrian Empire
11 B - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) V B
Cyrus' Empire and the dangers for Egypt
12 A - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) VI A
Death of Cyrus; Tomb at Pasargad
12 B - Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II) VI B
Posterity and worldwide importance of Cyrus the Great
13 A - Cambyses I A
Conquest of Egypt and Cush (Ethiopia: Sudan)
13 B - Cambyses I B
Iran as successor of Assyria in Egypt, and the grave implications of the Iranian conquest of Egypt
14 A - Cambyses II A
Cambyses' adamant monotheism, his clash with the Memphitic polytheists, and the falsehood diffused against him (from Egypt to Greece)
14 B - Cambyses II B
The reasons for the assassination of Cambyses
15 A - Darius the Great I A
The Mithraic Magi, Gaumata, and the usurpation of the Achaemenid throne
15 B - Darius the Great I B
Darius' ascension to the throne
16 A - Darius the Great II A
The Behistun inscription
16 B - Darius the Great II B
The Iranian Empire according to the Behistun inscription
17 A - Darius the Great III A
Military campaign in Egypt & the Suez Canal
17 B - Darius the Great III B
Babylonian revolt, campaign in the Indus Valley
18 A - Darius the Great IV A
Darius' Scythian and Balkan campaigns; Herodotus' fake stories
18 B - Darius the Great IV B
Anti-Iranian priests of Memphis and Egyptian rebels turning Greek traitors against the Oracle at Delphi, Ancient Greece's holiest shrine
19 A - Darius the Great V A
Administration of the Empire; economy & coinage
19 B - Darius the Great V B
World trade across lands, deserts and seas
20 A - Darius the Great VI A
Rejection of the Modern European fallacy of 'Classic' era and Classicism
20 B - Darius the Great VI B
Darius the Great as the end of the Ancient World and the beginning of the Late Antiquity (522 BCE – 622 CE)
21 A - Achaemenids, Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, and the Magi A
Avesta and the establishment of the ideal empire
21 B - Achaemenids, Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, and the Magi B
The ceaseless, internal strife that brought down the Xšāça (: Empire)
22 A - The Empire-Garden, Embodiment of the Paradise A
The inalienable Sargonid-Achaemenid continuity as the link between Cosmogony, Cosmology and Eschatology
22 B - The Empire-Garden, Embodiment of the Paradise B
The Garden, the Holy Tree, and the Empire
23 A - Xerxes the Great I A
Xerxes' rule; his upbringing and personality
23 B - Xerxes the Great I B
Xerxes' rule; his imperial education
24 A - Xerxes the Great II A
Imperial governance and military campaigns
24 B - Xerxes the Great II B
The Anti-Iranian complex of inferiority of the 'Greek' barbarians (the so-called 'Greco-Persian wars')
25 A - Parsa (Persepolis) A
The most magnificent capital of the pre-Islamic world
25 B - Parsa (Persepolis) B
Naqsh-e Rustam: the Achaemenid necropolis: the sanctity of the mountain; the Achaemenid-Sassanid continuity of cultural integrity and national identity
26 A - Iran & the Periphery A
Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, Tibet and China Hind (India), Bengal, Deccan and Yemen
26 B - Iran & the Periphery B
Sudan, Carthage and Rome
27 A - The Anti-Iranian rancor of the Egyptian Memphitic priests A
The real cause of the so-called 'Greco-Persian wars', and the use of the Greeks that the Egyptian Memphitic priests made
27 B - The Anti-Iranian rancor of the Egyptian Memphitic priests B
Battle of the Eurymedon River; Egypt and the Wars of the Delian League
28 A - Civilized Empire & Barbarian Republic A
The incomparable superiority of Iran opposite the chaotic periphery: the Divine Empire
28 B - Civilized Empire & Barbarian Republic B
Why the 'Greeks' and the Romans were unable to form a proper empire
29 A - Artaxerxes I (465-424 BCE) A
Revolt in Egypt; the 'Greeks' and their shame: they ran to Persepolis as suppliants
29 B - Artaxerxes I (465-424 BCE) B
Aramaeans and Jews in the Achaemenid Court
30 A - Interregnum (424-403 BCE) A
Xerxes II, Sogdianus, and Darius II
30 B - Interregnum (424-403 BCE) B
The Elephantine papyri and ostraca; Aramaeans, Jews, Phoenicians and Ionians
31 A - Artaxerxes II (405-359 BCE) & Artaxerxes III (359-338 BCE) A
Revolts instigated by the Memphitic priests of Egypt and the Mithraic subversion of the Empire
31 B - Artaxerxes II (405-359 BCE) & Artaxerxes III (359-338 BCE) B
Artaxerxes II's capitulation to the Magi and the unbalancing of the Empire / Cyrus the Younger
32 A - Artaxerxes IV & Darius III A
The decomposition of the Empire
32 B - Artaxerxes IV & Darius III B
Legendary historiography
33 A - Alexander's Invasion of Iran A
The military campaigns
33 B - Alexander's Invasion of Iran B
Alexander's voluntary Iranization/Orientalization
34 A - Alexander: absolute rejection of Ancient Greece A
The re-organization of Iran; the Oriental manners of Alexander, and his death
34 B - Alexander: absolute rejection of Ancient Greece B
The split of the Empire; the Epigones and the rise of the Orientalistic (not Hellenistic) world
35 A - Achaemenid Iran – Army A
Military History
35 B - Achaemenid Iran – Army B
Achaemenid empire, Sassanid militarism & Islamic Iranian epics and legends
36 A - Achaemenid Iran & East-West / North-South Trade A
The development of the trade between Egypt, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Iran, Turan (Central Asia), Indus Valley, Deccan, Yemen, East Africa & China
36 B - Achaemenid Iran & East-West / North-South Trade B
East-West / North-South Trade and the increased importance of Mesopotamia and Egypt
37 A - Achaemenid Iran: Languages and scripts A
Old Achaemenid, Aramaic, Sabaean and the formation of other writing systems
37 B - Achaemenid Iran: Languages and scripts B
Aramaic as an international language
38 A - Achaemenid Iran: Religions A
Rise of a multicultural and multi-religious world
38 B - Achaemenid Iran: Religions B
Collapse of traditional religions; rise of religious syncretism
39 A - Achaemenid Iran: Art and Architecture A
Major archaeological sites of Achaemenid Iran
39 B - Achaemenid Iran: Art and Architecture B
The radiation of Iranian Art
40 A - Achaemenid Iran: Historical Importance A
The role of Iran in the interconnection between Asia and Africa
40 B - Achaemenid Iran: Historical Importance B
The role of Iran in the interconnection between Asia and Europe
--------------------------------------
Download the diagram here:
Mithraism and Zoroastrianism in Northwestern Sassanid Iran
Μιθραϊσμός και Ζωροαστρισμός στη Βορειοδυτική Σασανιδική Περσία, in: Βυζαντινός Δόμος 4 (1990), p. 13-52 Митраизм и зороастризм в Северо-Западном Сасанидском Иране, в: Byzantinos Domos 4 (1990), p. 13-52 Zoroastrismus und Mithraismus im nordwestlichen Iran während der Sassanidenzeit, in: Byzantinos Domos 4 (1990), p. 13-52 Kuzeybatı Sasani İran'ında Mitraizm ve Zerdüştlük, bilimsel süreli Byzantinos Domos'ta 4 (1990), p. 13-52 Domos Byzantinos آیین میترا و زرتشت در شمال غربی ایران در دوره ساسانیان : در مجله علمی ( در صفحه 13 - 52 ) ,1990 (4) Mithraïsme et zoroastrisme dans le nord-ouest de l'Iran sassanide, dans le Byzantinos Domos 4 (1990), p. 13-52 الميثرائية والزرادشتية في شمال غرب إيران خلال العصر الساساني : في المجلة العلمية (1990) 4 على الصفحة 13 - 52 ,Domos Byzantinos في المجلة العلمية Mithraism and Zoroastrianism in Northwestern Sassanid Iran, in: Byzantinos Domos 4 (1990), p. 13-52
------------------------
--------------
Download the article in PDF:
![Μιθραϊσμός και Ζωροαστρισμός στη Βορειοδυτική Σασανιδική Περσία - [PDF Document]](https://64.media.tumblr.com/c51c682b5071a922ce93b3f6a64e73f4/343eb72f2b179cdb-7f/s1280x1920/1bbef1c67fd45bb9e351306e8002b7986549c05d.jpg)
Ισπαχάν: η Αυτοκρατορική Πρωτεύουσα των Σαφεβιδών (:των Σούφι Σάχηδων) που είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος
Esfahan: the Imperial Capital of Safavid dynasty (: the Sufi Shahs) which is already "Half the World"
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 22α Ιουνίου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει τμήμα ομιλίας μου στην Νουρ-σουλτάν (πρώην Αστανά) του Καζακστάν τον Δεκέμβριο του 2018 με θέμα τις μεγάλες αυτοκρατορικές πρωτεύουσες της Ασίας και της Αφρικής, καθώς και την εμφανή κατωτερότητα και αθλιότητα των δυτικο-ευρωπαϊκών πρωτευουσών αποικιοκρατικών χωρών.
--------------------------------
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/06/22/ισπαχάν-η-αυτοκρατορική-πρωτεύουσα-τ/ ===============
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Όπως και στην περίπτωση της Σαμαρκάνδης, δεν υπάρχει καμμιά ευρωπαϊκή πόλη πλην της Σταμπούλ που να μπορεί να αντιπαραβληθεί με το Εσφαχάν σε αυτοκρατορικό μεγαλείο.
Μαζί με τις προαναφερμένες δύο πρωτεύουσες, καθώς και την Σαχ Τζαχάν Αμπάντ (το λεγόμενο Παλαιό Δελχί), πρωτεύουσα των Μογγόλων αυτοκρατόρων (Γκορκανιάν) της Ινδίας, και το Πεκίνο, το Εσφαχάν είναι μία από τις πέντε μεγαλύτερες και πιο εντυπωσιακές αυτοκρατορικές πόλεις και τις πέντε πιο σημαντικές πρωτεύουσες του Παγκόσμιου Πολιτισμού και της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας των τελευταίων δύο χιλιετιών.
Οι Ιρανοί το λένε πιο λακωνικά κι έχουν δίκιο: το Εσφαχάν είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος. Όλη η υπόλοιπη επιφάνεια της γης είναι το υπόλοιπο μισό του κόσμου.
—————————————————-
Το Τζαμί του Σάχη, Εσφαχάν
Το Τζαμί του Σεΐχη Λουτφολλάχ, Εσφαχάν
Ανακτορικό Περίπτερο Αλί Καπού, Εσφαχάν
Ανάκτορο των Σαράντα Κιόνων (Τσεέλ Σοτούν), Εσφαχάν
Ανάκτορο των Οκτώ Παραδείσων (Χαστ Μπεχέστ), Εσφαχάν
——————————————————————-
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Исфахан: имперская столица сефевидов (суфийской династии Ирана) – половина мира
https://www.ok.ru/video/1416652720749
Isfahan: the Imperial Capital of the Safavid (: Sufi) Dynasty of Iran is Half of the World
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240217
Ισπαχάν: η Πρωτεύουσα των Σαφεβιδών (της Δυναστείας των Σούφι) είναι ο Μισός Κόσμος
Περισσότερα:
Στα περσικά (φαρσί) λένε “Εσφαχάν νασφ-ε Τζαχάν”, δηλαδή ότι το Ισπαχάν είναι ο μισός κόσμος. Γνωστή ως Ασπάδανα στα αρχαία ελληνικά, το Ισπαχάν ήταν μια μικρή πόλη στα αχαιαμενιδικά (550-330), αρσακιδικά (250 π.Χ. – 224 μ.Χ.) και στα σασανιδικά (224-651) χρόνια. Όταν με την ισλαμική κατάκτηση (636-642-651), το Ισπαχάν έγινε πρωτεύουσα της χαλιφατικής επαρχίας Τζεμπάλ (: βουνά) που περιλάμβανε την οροσειρά του Ζάγρου και το δυτικό ιρανικό οροπέδιο, άρχισε μία ανέλιξη που κορυφώθηκε στα σαφεβιδικά (1501-1736) χρόνια.
Το Εσφαχάν, όπως λέγεται στα περσικά, είναι μια από τις πιο εντυπωσιακές αυτοκρατορικές πρωτεύουσες του κόσμου. Επίκεντρο της σαφεβιδικής πρωτεύουσας ήταν η τεράστια πλατεία Νακς-ε Τζαχάν (εικόνα του κόσμου), όπου από το αυτοκρατορικό περίπτερο Αλί Καπού ο σάχης παρακολουθούσε τους αγώνες πόλο που λάμβαναν χώρα. Εκεί βρίσκονται και δυο από τα ωραιότερα τζαμιά του κόσμου: το Τζαμί του Σεΐχη Λουτφολάχ και το Τζαμί του Σάχη (σήμερα: ‘ταμί του ιμάμη’).
Για τους Ιρανούς από τα πρώιμα αχαιμενιδικά χρόνια ‘κήπος’ σήμαινε ‘παράδεισος’ κι όλοι οι σάχηδες των προϊσλαμικών και των ισλαμικών χρόνων οργάνωσαν εντυπωσιακούς κήπους κι έκτισαν ανάκτορα μέσα σε κήπους με λίμνες. Το ανάκτορο Τσεέλ Σοτούν (των σαράντα κιόνων) και το ανάκτορο Χαστ Μπεχέστ (των οκτώ παραδείσων) είναι τα πιο εντυπωσιακά από όσα σώζονται.
Περισσότερα: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isfahan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naqsh-e_Jahan_Square
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%80l%C4%AB_Q%C4%81p%C5%AB
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chehel_Sotoun
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasht_Behesht
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Lotfollah_Mosque
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shah_Mosque
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safavid_dynasty
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Исфахан
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ισφαχάν
————————————————–
Διαβάστε:
Isfahan (اصفهان), ancient province and old city in central Iran (Middle Pers. “Spahān,” New Pers. “Eṣfahān”). Isfahan city has served as one of the most important urban centers on the Iranian Plateau since ancient times and has gained, over centuries of urbanization, many significant monuments; a number of Isfahan’s monuments have been designated by UNESCO as world heritage sites. Isfahan city, the capital of Isfahan Province, is located about 420 km south of Tehran, and is Persia’s third largest city (after Tehran and Mashad) with a population of over 1.4 million in 2004.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan
Isfahan v. Local Historiography
Isfahan is exceptional in the number and variety of works of local historiography; no other Persian city has attracted nearly as many such works. These works were written predominantly in two periods: the pre-Mongol (and in particular the pre-Saljuq) period and the 19th century; works written in the 20th century will not be dealt with extensively here. Works of local historiography about Isfahan can be classified into two distinct literary genres: the biographical dictionary and the adab-oriented local history.
Biographical dictionaries. Biographical dictionaries of local perspective were written for a large number of Persian cities in the pre-Mongol period, but only a fraction of them are extant in either the original Arabic or Persian renderings. Two biographical dictionaries about scholars from Isfahan, both written in Arabic, have come down to us. The earlier of these two, the Ṭabaqāt al-moḥaddeṯin be-Eṣfahān wa’l-wāredin ʿalayhā, by Abu’l-Šayḵ ʿAbd-Allāh b. Moḥammad (274-369/887-979), was probably written in the 350s/960s, since the latest dates mentioned do not relate to events far beyond 350 (ed. Baluši, IV, p. 230, dated 353).
The mention of dates as late as that seems to be exceptional, so they could have been added during the final stages of the process of completing the work. The second work of this genre is Ḏekr akbār Eṣfahān by the Hadith transmitter and historian Abu Noʿaym Eṣfahāni (q.v.; d. 430/1038). The latest dates in this work suggest that it was completed in the 410s/1020s.
Abu’l-Šayḵ was not necessarily the first author from Isfahan to write a biographical dictionary about the scholars who lived in, or had come to, his hometown. Among the many sources he quotes, the Hanbalite scholar Ebn Manda (d. 301/913-14) is the most prominent. On the basis of this and other later sources, it is almost certain that Ebn Manda wrote such a work. It seems that it was still known in the immediate pre-Mongol period, since the author of an analogous work on the scholars of Qazvin was apparently able to use it then (Rāfeʿi, I, p. 2).
Moreover, Abu’l-Šayḵ frequently mentions men who wrote their mašyaḵa (list of teachers with whom they studied Hadith and other Islamic sciences); thus, it would be reasonable to assume that he used a number of these in preparing his work. The transition from writing down one’s own mašyaḵa to compiling a book on the “categories” or “generations” of scholars is likely to have been a relatively smooth one.
Undoubtedly, Abu’l-Šayḵ was, in turn, one of the most important, perhaps even the single most important, source for Abu Noʿaym, who referred to him as Abu Moḥammad b. Ḥayyān. Except for a very few, all the scholars included in Abu’l-Šayḵ’s work are also mentioned by Abu Noʿaym. Abu Noʿaym did not, however, merely write a continuation (ḏayl) to Abu’l-Šayḵ’s work; rather, he used most of his material in a slightly abridged or otherwise adapted form; thus, any changes that Abu Noʿaym introduced into the text of his source can be taken to be intentional.
Other sources of comparable character were identified first by Sven Dedering in the introduction to his edition of Abu Noʿaym’s work, and have recently been discussed more comprehensively by Nur-Allāh Kasāʾi in the introduction to his Persian translation of the work. Kasāʾi also provides a detailed comparison between the respective works of Abu’l-Šayḵ and Abu Noʿaym. It is also worth mentioning that an important source for Abu Noʿaym was the (apparently lost) Ketāb Eṣfahān by Ḥamza Eṣfahāni (see below).
These two biographical dictionaries are similar in scope, but they offer a number of differences in form: Abu’l-Šayḵ arranged his entries according to the principle of ṭabaqāt (categories), whereas Abu Noʿaym adhered to alphabetical order (except for the Companions of the Prophet), using the ṭabaqāt principle only within larger groups made up of men who bore very common given names such as Aḥmad (I, pp. 77 ff.).
Both works start with an introductory chapter, that of the earlier work being much more concise. Abu Noʿaym places a perceptible stress on the good qualities of the Persians and their merits in contributing to the spread of Islam and the maintenance of its purity.
For instance, half of the section on the Companions of the Prophet is devoted to Salmān Fār(e)si (q.v.), and the stories about the Arab conquest of Isfahan provide unfavorable details about how the invaders proceeded. Both works link the early history of Isfahan back to the prophetic cycle of history by claiming that the people of Isfahan were the only ones who did not support Nimrod in his rebellion against God, but supported Abraham instead (Abu’l-Šayḵ, 1989, I, p. 150; 1987-92, I, p. 28, Abu Noʿaym, I, pp. 48 ff.).
The biographical parts of both of these works shed some light on institutions of learning and their development. The earlier work describes teaching activity taking place mainly in mosques and in private homes, whereas the later one refers to specialized institutions unknown to the earlier source, such as a “House of learning and transmission,” (bayt al-ʿlm wa’l-rewāya) mentioned in relation to someone who died in 363/973, as well as a “House of Hadith and transmission” (baytal-ḥadiṯ wa’l-rewāya )(ed. Dedering, I, pp. 156, 221).
Other matters for which contemporary scholars have found it useful to resort to using local biographical dictionaries in general, and in particular those written about Isfahan, include the office of the judge (Halm) and the spread of law schools (Melchert; Tsafrir). Scholars have also offered, on the basis of such sources, reconstructions of the rise of Sufism to a respected movement that managed to attract even some of the more prominent religious scholars (Paul, 2000a, using methods developed by Chabbi).
Both books discuss in their introductions the pleasant landscape and climate of Isfahan and its surroundings in a very similar way, thus apparently laying the foundation for further developments of the genre that treats local history and geography as closely related subjects.
Adab-oriented local historiography. Works of local historiography written in the pre-Mongol period mostly belong to the genre of biographical dictionaries. The only extant work of this genre about Isfahan is Māfarruḵi’s Maḥāsen Eṣfahān in Arabic, which was written probably some time between 464/1072 and 484/1092 (Bulliet), when Isfahan had become the capital of the Great Saljuq empire.
Māfarruḵi includes quotes from Ketāb Eṣfahān, the lost work of Ḥamza Eṣfahāni; thus it seems that in Isfahan there was something like a tradition of writing local history in both genres. It is, however, impossible to venture a reconstruction of Ḥamza’s work based on the rather short references in Abu Noʿaym and Māfarruḵi, but it seems likely that it had a part similar to a biographical dictionary (including not only scholars, but also men of letters) and another one on antiquities (Paul, 2000b).
Another such work on “the glories of Isfahan” (fi mafāḵer Eṣfahān) may have existed in the form of ʿAli b. Ḥamza b. ʿOmāra’s Qalāʾed al šaraf, which is mentioned by Mā-farruḵi (p. 27) and Yāqut (V. pp. 200 f.) but seems to be lost. Nevertheless, it is probable that there was a tradition of writing adab-oriented local histories of Isfahan as well as biographical dictionaries of scholars.
Māfarruḵi’s work was translated into Persian in the 14th century by Ḥosayn b. Moḥammad b. Abi’l-Reżā Āvi, who rearranged it by dividing the text into eight chapters and added further material in several places, in many cases poetry, as well as praise of the Il-khanid vizier who governed Isfahan in his time. Māfarruḵi’s work is a pleasantly arranged assortment of stories, including some about storytelling itself. It was written from the vantage point of the secretarial class that focuses on the rules of good governance, which are sometimes linked to the pre-Islamic past.
This is history as a means of conveying contemporary messages; the rules are set first in a distant past, and later cases are used to illustrate that they are still valid. In its historical parts, the text certainly does not aim to recount history “as it really happened,” but tells stories of a historical nature as exempla to illustrate general rules that mostly pertain to good governance. Since these rules are grounded in a common cultural code shared by the author and his audience (and, in fact, later generations as well), the work is permeated with the values that were characteristic of the author’s time and social background. This work’s overall message is that experience (tajreba) has shown time and again that successful rulers are those who heed the advice of secretaries, viziers, and even the ordinary public. It is irrelevant that some of the stories told to convey this point of view may be fictitious.
Works written in the later 19th century; No local history of Isfahan seems to have been written under the Safavids or in the period immediately following their downfall. Local historiography resumed only in the second half of the 19th century, particularly as a response to Nāṣer-al-Din Shah’s project for a general description of the regions of Persia called Merʾāt al-boldān. Thus geography, in particular historical geography, is the focus of interest in some of these works, which are a source of information about city quarters and even about individual buildings.
One of the works written for Nāṣer-al-Din Shah was Neṣf al-jahān fi taʿrif al-Eṣfahān (in classical Arabic, the name of the city did not bear the definite article) by Moḥammad-Mahdi b. Moḥammad-Reżā Eṣfahāni. The earliest extant manuscript of this work is dated 1287/1870, but additions and revisions were made, apparently, until 1303/1885. It continued the tradition of adab-oriented historiography from the earlier periods in that it also presented a mix of history and geography, as indeed would have been what the king wanted.
The historical part takes up almost half of the text, highlighting two periods. In the section dealing with early history (pp. 139-69), the author tried to link his understanding of the results of modern (Western) scholarship (archeology and research on cuneiform texts) to the Persian (Šāh-nāma) tradition. After the legendary kings of Persia and Babylon, most of ancient and medieval history is given short shrift; but the author still manages to quote Māfarruḵi a couple of times and refers to Jean Chardin (q.v.) and Engelbert Kaempfer as witnesses to the prosperity of the country under the Safavids (pp. 178-79).
The second period focuses on the conquest of Persia by the Afghans and the ensuing period of upheaval, which he pursues as far as the reign of Fatḥ-ʿAli Shah Qājār (q.v.; pp. 180 ff.). In this part, he frequently refers to European writers, among whom Sir John Malcolm’s History of Persia (1829) holds a prominent place (the references to Chardin and Kaempfer are probably also taken from here). Whenever the author has to decide whether the chronicle written by Mirzā Mahdi Khan Estrābādi (certainly the Tāriḵ-e nāderi is intended) or the English work is more reliable, he opts for the latter work.
Ḥājj Mirzā Ḥasan Khan Jāberi Anṣāri (1870-1957) wrote a history of Isfahan, which is called Tāriḵ-e Eṣfahān in the latest edition. (An earlier version, shorn of the third volume, which is a collection of biographies, is known as Tāriḵ-e Eṣfahān wa-Ray wa hama-ye jahān; the first version, called Tāriḵ-e neṣf-e jahān wa hama-ye jahān, was published in lithograph edition in Isfahan in 1914.) This is also a combination of both geography and history, and it seems particularly valuable for its detailed description of the Zāyandarud river and the system through which its waters were distributed (Lambton).
In a section consisting of biographies, dates as late as 1350/1931 are given, thus reaching far into the 20th century. The author was one of the main proponents of the constitutional movement in Isfahan, and so his perspective is also partisan. He was well informed about questions of governance and administration, since he held posts in the provincial administration under Masʿud Mirzā Ẓell-al-Solṭān for long periods, so it is not surprising that his main categoried are ʿemārat (flourishing parts) and virāni/ḵarābi (ruinous state).
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan-v-local-historiography
Isfahan vii. Safavid Period
Isfahan came under Safavid rule in 1503 following Shah Esmāʿil’s defeat of Solṭān Morād, the Āq Qoyunlu (q.v.) ruler of Erāq-e ʿAjam, near Hamadān. No contemporary source describes the conquest of the city in any detail, but we do know that it was accompanied by great brutality. In retaliation for the killing of many Shiʿite inhabitants under the Āq Qoyunlu, Shah Esmāʿil caused a bloodbath among the city’s Sunnites. The Portuguese traveler, Tenreiro, visiting Isfahan in 1524, reports seeing mounds of dirt with bones sticking out that were reportedly the remains of 5,000 people killed by the Safavids (Tenreiro, pp. 20-21).
Following the conquest, Esmāʿil appointed Dormeš Khan Šāmlu governor. Mirzā Šāh-Ḥosayn, originally a builder (bannā, meʿmār) in Isfahan, at that point started his political career by serving Dormeš Khan as vizier of the dāruḡa (“mayor”; see below and CITIES ii) of the city. He was later promoted to the post of wakil (royal deputy, the highest subject of the king) of Shah Esmāʿil, and was so influential that his enemies finally assassinated him in 1523 (Rumlu, pp. 231-32). In fact, his case is not an exception. Beginning with the reign of Shah Esmāʿil, Isfahani families occupied high positions in the Safavid administration, and at least one Safavid grand vizier, Mirzā Salmān Jāberi, appointed by Moḥammad Ḵodābanda in 1578, hailed from an Isfahani family.
Isfahan continued to be a focus of Shah Esmāʿil even as he set out to conquer other parts of the Iranian plateau. Stopping at the city from time to time, he is said to have been keen to restore the city to its pre-Mongol significance and in this regard paid particular attention to the role and function of its squares. In 1509 he ordered the enlargement of the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān (Royal Square) to accommodate the playing of polo, qabāq-bāzi, and other games and forms of entertainment. He used the Old Meydān (Meydān-e kohna) as the place of execution of rebels. The building of Hārun-e Welāyat, the mausoleum of a saint, at the southern end of the Old Meydān, was completed by Mirzā Šāh-Ḥosayn in 1512 (Ḵᵛāndamir, IV, p. 500; Quiring-Zoche, p. 64).
Shah Ṭahmāsb (r. 1524-76), who was born in a suburb of Isfahan in 1514, added several other buildings, mostly mosques, to the city. He incorporated Isfahan into the royal domain in 1534, and the city’s status as crown land (ḵāṣṣa) remained largely unchanged until the end of the Safavid period (Röhrborn, p. 118). The only exception is the reign of Moḥammad Ḵodābanda (1577-87), who offered Isfahan as a revenue assignment (teyul) to Ḥamza Mirzā, one of his sons and his heir.
The de-facto ruler of Isfahan, however, became his plenipotentiary (ṣāḥeb-e eḵtiār), Farhād Khan (q.v.), who did much to secure the city from the Arašlu tribe, who had taken control of the environs and were moving into the city as well. Once in power, Farhād Beg built himself a fortified residence alongside the Bāḡ-e Naqš-e Jahān (Royal Garden) and designed a new garden around it, destroying the bāḡ itself and moving its trees in the process (Afuštaʾi Naṭanzi, pp. 339-40).
During the reign of Shah Ṭahmāsb, the city twice experienced wartime disorder. The first time was during the civil war between two Qezelbāš tribal leaders, Čoḡā Solṭān Takkalu and Ḥosayn Khan Šāmlu, in 937/1530. The latter attacked Čoḡā Solṭān in a suburb of Isfahan, and Čoḡā Solṭān took refuge in the royal tent located near his camp. Ḥosayn Khan managed to kill Čoḡā Solṭān but ultimately was defeated by Takkalu reinforcements. He retreated to Isfahan and then fled to Fārs. It seems that the city itself was not thrown into disarray during this conflict (Rumlu, pp. 308-10).
The revolt of Alqās Mirzā (q.v.), Ṭahmāsb’s brother, in 1548-49 represents the second period of disorder for Isfahan. After ravaging Hamadān, Ray, and Qom, Alqās Mirzā’s troops, supported by the Ottoman Sultan Solayman, came close to Isfahan. He believed that the citizens would open the city’s gate without fighting, because no substantial Safavid force was around. Instead, the people of Isfahan, led by Šāh Taqi-al-Din Moḥammad Mir-e Mirān, a community leader (naqib), and his brother Mir Ḡiāṯ-al-Din Moḥammad, shut the city gates and put up strong resistance, strengthened in their determination by the fact that the shah had sent his own harem to Isfahan (Navidi, p. 101).
Alqās, finding it difficult to subdue Isfahan, gave up on his attempt to take the city and left for Shiraz (Rumlu, p. 434). The event became certainly the turning point of Alqās Mirzā’s revolt, which ended with his arrest and confinement in Qahqaha castle the following year (Rumlu, pp. 437-38). Although Isfahan made a great contribution to Ṭahmāsb’s cause through its fierce resistance, it does not seem to have received any royal favors in return. We only know of an order by Ṭahmāsb to abolish various taxes imposed on guilds in 1563 (Honarfar, pp. 88-90). This may simply have been part of the exemption from the tax on commerce (tamḡā), which Ṭahmāsb offered throughout the kingdom in 972/1564. The measure was apparently taken after the oracle of Ṣāḥeb-al-Amir appeared in the ruler’s dream (Qāżi Aḥmad, p. 449).
After Ḥamza Mirzā’s death in 1586, Isfahan fell to his brother, Abu Ṭāleb Mirzā. Farhād Khan lost his post and was incarcerated. Ḡolām (slave) forces loyal to him revolted, however, and managed to take hold of the city fortress with their own hostages. Long negotiations with representatives of Shah Ḵodābanda, who had meanwhile arrived in Isfahan, led to the release of the hostages but not the freeing of Farhād Khan. The ḡolāms only surrendered after royalist forces threatened to bombard the citadel.
The structure was destroyed after the rebels had left it. Shortly thereafter Moḥammad Ḵodābanda died, and Isfahan opened up its gates to the forces of the new ruler, Shah ʿAbbās I, who proceeded to grant the city and its environs to his wakil, Moršedqoli Khan, as a teyul. As city mayor he appointed Yuli Beg. The latter set out to restore the Tabarak fortress but also showed signs of autonomy. The decision of Shah ʿAbbās to visit Isfahan in 1590 led to a confrontation, with Yuli Beg retreating into the fortress with his troops.
Ultimately the shah reconciled himself with Yuli Beg, although the post of senior governor (ḥākem) went to ʿAli Beg Ostājlu (Afuštaʾi Naṭanzi, pp. 33-35, 233-38; Quiring-Zoche, pp. 80-89). Shortly thereafter, in early 1590, Isfahan was made crown land again, with the post of vizier going to Mirzā Mo-ḥammad Nišāpuri (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, fol. 39b).
Isfahan as the Safavid Capital
The idea of turning Isfahan into a new capital must have come to Shah ʿAbbās shortly after his accession in 1587, for the first mention of designs for the new Isfahan occurs under 998/1588 in the Afżal al-tawāriḵ (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, fol. 38v). At that early date some changes were made, among them the beginnings of the ʿĀli Qāpu palace (q.v.), but an overall new design did not come to fruition, possibly because of opposition.
The choice of Isfahan as the new administrative and cultural center was based in part on the availability of water—in the form of the Zāyandarud—but was clearly politically motivated as well. The city was located deep into the interior and thus far less exposed to the Ottoman threat than Tabriz and even Qazvin had been. It was also well positioned vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf, and thus played a pivotal role in Shah ʿAbbās’s territorial and commercial designs in that direction, which he initiated shortly after Isfahan had become the new capital (Mazzaoui).
Both Eskandar Beg Torkamān and Mollā Jalāl Monajjem tell us that the royal household moved to Isfahan and that Shah ʿAbbās proclaimed the city his capital (maqarr-e dawlat) in 1006/1597-98, giving orders for the erection of “magnificent” buildings (Eskandar Beg, tr. Savory, pp. 724; Mollā Jalāl, p. 161). Most scholars in fact consider this year as the time of transfer of the Safavid capital from Qazvin to Isfahan.
Stephen Blake’s new interpretation, which attaches crucial importance to the mentioning of the older design, is convincingly refuted by Babaie (see Blake, and the review by Babaie, pp. 478-82; for the various phases of the new design, see also Haneda, 1990). It is true that, from 1590 onward, Isfahan was often called dār al-salṭana in the sources, but we have to realize that it was not the capital in the modern sense of the word. As had always been the case among rulers of nomadic background and as would be true until the 19th century in Persia, the capital really was where the ruler happened to be.
The Dutch noted how, in the later 17th century, Isfahan’s population would swell by some 60,000 whenever the shah returned to the city. Tabriz and Qazvin were still referred to as dār al-salṭana as well, after the “transfer” of the capital, and Shah ʿAbbās stayed in Isfahan less than two months a year on average throughout his reign, less than the three months he spent in Māzandarān as of 1619.
Shah Ṣafi was absent from Isfahan for a full five years between 1631 and 1636. Still, Isfahan played a central role from the inception of Safavid rule, with members of its prominent families heavily represented in key bureaucratic positions as early as Shah Esmāʿil I’s administration (Quiring-Zoche, pp. 252-52).
That the city grew in importance throughout the 1590s is suggested by the fact that Shah ʿAbbās made the trip to and from Qazvin at least eighteen times in this period and visited Isfahan every year between 1590 and 1603 (Melville, p. 200). After it became the capital, all coronation ceremonies were held in Isfahan. The city in the course of time also gained more of a central focus as later shahs lost their appetite for campaigning. Shah ʿAbbās II was the last Safavid monarch who spent considerable time on the battlefield, as well as in the royal residence in Māzandarān.
Especially the last two rulers, Solaymān and Solṭān-Ḥosayn, rarely left the confines of their palace, and Solṭān-Ḥosayn often resided at Faraḥābād, the pleasure garden built outside Isfahan (although between 1717 and 1721 the shah was absent from Isfahan, spending time in Kāšān and Qazvin and returning to the capital just a year before the fall of the capital to the Afghans; Floor, 1998, pp. 31, 36). In sum, it may be said that Isfahan gradually acquired the status of capital (Quiring-Zoche, p. 105).
Isfahan’s newly acquired status found expression in the construction of a new governmental and commercial center southwest of the existing one, in a shift in that direction that had begun under the Saljuqs (Gaube and Wirth, pp. 47, 54). A new royal square, the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān, measuring 524 x 158 m, formed the fulcrum of this development. The model for the meydān seems to have been the meydān of the old city, although it has been suggested that the meydān of Kermān, laid out by Ganj-ʿAli Khan in the late 16th century, served as a model as well (Galdieri, 1974, p. 385; Gaube and Wirth, p. 55).
The outline of the meydān and the adjacent Qay-ṣariya bazaar was begun in 1001—a one-year tax relief was granted for the purpose—and the Čahār Bāḡ as well as the Shaikh Loṭf-Allāh mosque were designed in 1002 (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, foll. 61v, 74). In the year 1012/1603, the shops, the caravansaries, the bathhouses, and the coffeehouses around the meydān were completed (Jonā-bādi, pp. 759-60). The same year saw the first proposal to connect the waters of the Zāyandarud with those of the Kuhrang river.
This scheme came up again in 102930/161619-20 and in the 1680s, but would only be executed in the 19th century (Mollā Jalāl, p. 244; Eskandar Beg, pp. 1170-71, 1180 see i[2], above). The Masjed-e Šāh, anchoring the southern end of the square, was begun in 1020/1611. The mosque complex was virtually completed by the end of Shah ʿAbbās I’s reign, although additions and repairs continued to be made until 1078/1667 (Blake, p. 140).
Following the completion of the royal square, the Qayṣariya bazaar, with its entry gate at the north end of the square, gradually developed into a huge covered marketplace (for its development, see Gaube and Wirth, pp. 31 ff.; Blake, pp. 101 ff.). Henceforth this part of the city would be its preeminent commercial center, even if the old center continued to play an important role in social life (see x, below).
In later years more building activity took place, mostly involving palaces. A new royal palace took shape in the Naqš-e jahān garden, adjacent to the new meydān, which had been a garden retreat for Shah Esmāʿil I. The palace grew out a series of mansions, principally one owned by Farhād Khan (q.v.), but the exact stages of its construction remain unclear (Eskandar Beg, II, p. 780; tr., II, p. 977; discussion in Blake, pp. 58 ff.).
The same is true of the building of the ʿĀli Qāpu, the five-storey audience hall overlooking the meydān, which was begun under Shah ʿAbbās but not used until the reign of Shah Ṣafi (Galdi-eri, 1979). The Ṭālār-e Ṭawila, the Āyena-Ḵāna, and the Čehel Sotun (Forty columns), too, date from this period; they were all built in the period 1635-47, under the auspices and patronage of Moḥammad Sāru Taqi (Floor, 2002; Babaie, 1994, pp. 128-29; idem, 2002, pp. 23-24).
The Čehel Sotun was constructed in 1056/1646 or 1057/1647. It was rebuilt after it burned down in 1706, and the structure as it exists today dates from that time (Blake, pp. 66-69). The Pol-e Ḵᵛāju was erected under Shah ʿAbbās II as well (see x, below).
The wall that had surrounded Isfahan for centuries and that had always marked the boundary between the inner city and the suburbs continued to exist, but by the early 17th century it had lost its significance as a defense mechanism and thus was allowed to become dilapidated (Gaube and Wirth, p. 33; Haneda, 1996, pp. 370-72).
The old city anyhow was unable to accommodate ʿAbbās I’s designs for a new capital, and much of the new development took place beyond the perimeter of the wall. Southwest of the new royal palace and the area around the square, new quarters such as ʿAbbāsābād and Ḵᵛāju were developed in the western and southern suburb. Craftsmen and merchants from all over the country were urged to come to settle in Isfahan.
Most notably, the shah resettled craftsmen from newly conquered Tabriz to ʿAbbāsābād and had Armenian merchants from Julfa settle in New Julfa (Pers. Jolfā; see JULFA), which was specially built for them at the southern bank of the Zāyandarud. In the middle of these new quarters ran the long and straight avenue of Čahārbāḡ from a gate of the old city to the Hazār Jarib garden situated at the southern hill. Beautiful gardens were built at both sides of the avenue.
With its canals and their abundant water, the greenery of its parks, its wide and straight streets and its spacious layout, the urban plan of the new city suited the elite, government officials and the rich, who came to settle down there from outside of Isfahan. Thus, the character of the new city differed substantially from that of the old city, which maintained the character of a traditional Persian city with its winding streets, small houses, and little public greenery, and where most Isfahanis continued to live.
The building activities continued until nearly the end of the Safavid rule in the 18th century. Various shahs also built pleasure gardens across the Zāyandarud. Thus Shah ʿAbbās I had ʿAbbāsābād (Hazār Jarib) constructed as an extension of the Čahārbāḡ ʿAbbās II created Saʿādatābād in 1070/1659; and Shah Solṭān-Ḥosayn had Faraḥābād laid out in 1697, making further additions and embellishments in 1711 and again in the period 1714-17 (Ḵātunā-bādi, pp. 562-63; NA, VOC 1856, 15 April 1714, fol. 714; Darhuhaniyan, p. 146; VOC 1870, 9 March 1715, foll. 614-15; VOC 1870, 25 November 1714, fol. 495; VOC 1848, 13 April 1715, fol. 2280v; VOC 1897, 3 December 1716, fol. 247; Honarfar, pp. 722-25; Blake, pp. 74-81).
The Madrasa-ye Maryam Begom was built and turned into waqf (endowment) property by Maryam Begom, Shah Solṭān-Ḥosayn’s great aunt, in 1703 (Honarfar, pp. 662-67). The Madrasa-ye Čahārbāḡ, the blue, lofty dome of which can be seen from anywhere in Isfahan, was also built under the reign of Solṭān-Ḥosayn, begun in 1704-05 and finished in 1706-07 (Ḵātunābādi, p. 556; Herdeg). Isfahan and its buildings are always associated with the name of Shah ʿAbbās I. In reality, however, they are the cooperative work of many people, royal, religious, military and civil, throughout the Safavid period (see x, below).
Various Western observers claimed that 17th-century Isfahan was the largest city in all of Safavid Persia (Schillinger, p. 228). According to Jean Chardin (q.v.), Isfahan had 162 mosques, 48 madrasas, 1,802 caravansaries, 273 public baths, and 12 cemeteries within its walls (for an overview of the city’s caravansaries, see Vademecum of Caravanserais in Isfahan). The exact number of its population is not known, but clearly grew over time, especially after the city gained the status of capital.
Don Juan of Persia for the 1590s estimated 80,000 households and 360,000 inhabitants (Don Juan, p. 39). Thomas Herbert (q.v.), visiting in 1627-29, calculated 70,000 households and a total of 200,000 people (Herbert, p. 126). Adam Olearius in 1637 gives a figure of 500,000 inhabitants (Olearius, p. 553).
Chardin confirms this by suggesting that in the late 17th century the population of Isfahan was almost as numerous as that of London, then the biggest city in Europe with an estimated population of 500,000. Three-quarters of the population may have lived within the city walls, and one-quarter outside of them (Blake, p. 38). This would have made late Safavid Isfahan one of the biggest cities in the world, besides London, Istanbul, Šāhjahānābād (Delhi), Beijing, and Edo (Tokyo).
Administration
The post of ḥākem as the local governor of Isfahan goes back to the period before the Safavids. In the 16th century, the ḥākem was often an individual of high rank in the larger administration. Thus two of the ḥokkām were also preceptors of rulers, Durmiš Khan for Sām Mirzā, and Mohammad Khan for the young Moḥammad Ḵodā-banda. In the early reign of Shah ʿAbbās I, Farhād Khan served as ḥākem (Quiring-Zoche, p. 138). Another one of Isfahan’s principal administrators was the dāruḡa. In the 16th century the dāruḡa may have been appointed by the ḥākem, but later on it was the shah who appointed him, something that is reflected in the rather frequent mention of the position in the Persian chronicles.
In the European sources, the dāruḡa is often equated with the post of mayor (Chardin, X, p. 28; Fryer, III, p. 23; Kaempfer, p. 110). The jurisdiction is not always clear, but it seems that, as a rule, the dāruḡa was not in charge of fiscal matters. Initially the function may have had a military aspect, but, as it evolved in the 17th century, the dāruḡa mostly dealt with issues of law and public security (Fryer, III, p. 23; Minorsky, pp. 82, 149; Floor, 2001, p. 118). The association of the function of dāruḡa with crown domain (Floor, 2001, pp. 116-17) is not fully borne out by the evidence. Already in the 15th century we hear of a dāruḡa in Isfahan (Quiring-Zoche, pp. 130, 134).
In the Safavid period we have Mirzā Jān Beg, who was appointed dāruḡa in 1530-31, three or four years before the conversion of Isfahan to crown land (Haneda, p. 80). The appointment of Georgians to the post also goes back further than 1620, for Bižan Beg Gorji acceded to the post in 998/1590 and Kostandil (Constantine), the son of the Georgian King Alexander II, was appointed dāruḡa in 1602-03 (Ḵuzāni Eṣfahāni, foll. 40b, 148; Maeda, pp. 261-62). Still, several non-Georgians were appointed in later years, for instance, Tahtā Khan Beg and Bektāš Beg Ostājlu, and only in 1620 did the post become the prerogative of a son of the governor of Georgia, in an arrangement made by Shah ʿAbbās (Della Valle, II, p. 176; Chardin, X, p. 29; Kaempfer, pp. 110-11).
From that moment until the end of Safavid rule, the dāruḡa was always a Georgian. From the moment Isfahan turned into crown domain, a vizier was appointed as well (Quiring-Zoche, p. 145). Typically a ḡolām, this official was assigned to the divān-e ḵāṣṣa (office of the crown lands) and as such charged with the fiscal administration of the town. The vizier also had a judicial function in that, once a week, he had petitions read to him from people with grievances (Pacifique de Provins, p. 393).
However, the position was fluid. Thus in 1046/1636 the post of vizier was combined with that of the wazir-e mawqufāt (minister of property endowments) in the person of Moḥammad-ʿAli Beg Eṣfahāni, but the two were divided again two years later, when Mirzā Taqi Dawlatābādi became vizier and Mir Ṣafi-al-Din Mo-ḥammad was appointed wazir-e mawqufāt (Eskandar Beg, 1938, p. 296).
The kalāntar was another city official. He may have taken over from the raʾis in the 16th century as a representative of the local population, as part of a development whereby local notables made room for centrally appointed bureaucratic officials, who were often outsiders. He should not be confused with the Armenian kalāntar of New Jolfā. Although appointed by the shah, he was chosen in consultation with the people and served as an intermediary between them and the authorities.
One of his tasks was to defend the populace against tyranny, including the tyranny of unscrupulous vendors, examine their complaints and the grievances of merchants. He also acted as a mediator with the guilds, and appointed the heads of city wards, the kadḵodās. Collecting rent and taxes appears to have been among his responsibilities as well (Minorsky, p. 82; Rafiʿā, p. 73; Thevenot, p. 103; Fryer, III, p. 24; Sanson, p. 29; Quiring-Zoche, pp. 162-67; Aubin, p. 37; Floor, 2000, p. 46).
A Multi-lingual, Multi-ethnic City
In the course of Shah ʿAbbās I’s reign Isfahan developed into a lively, cosmopolitan city, home to Muslims, Armenians, Georgians, and Jews, Indians, as well as representatives of European religious orders and agents of trading companies. The center of town, the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān, was frequently the scene of popular games such as polo and qabāq-andāzi, an archery game; and there ram fighting, bull fighting, wolf baiting, and other forms of entertainment were performed (examples in Della Valle, I, pp. 709-10, 713-14; Chick, p. 184; Fi-gueroa, II, pp. 58 f.; Gaudereau, pp. 71-72).
Following a military victory, on holidays, and on the occasion of visits by important foreign envoys, the Meydān and the bazaar were illuminated and performances of jugglers and rope dancers staged (Jonābādi, pp. 805, 829-31; Della Valle, I, pp. 821, 829; II, pp. 7-8, 36; Chardin, IX, pp. 329-30). People mingled in the coffeehouses that flanked the square, lined the Čahār-bāḡ, and were also spread around various other neighborhoods, or sought oblivion in the many establishments concentrated around the Old Meydān that served an opium drink called kuknār (Matthee, 2005, p. 108). Seventeenth-century Isfahan was also home to reportedly 12,000 prostitutes, who occupied the porticos around the Meydān-e Naqš-e Jahān and also served their clientele in an area between the Madrasa-ye Ṣafaviya and the Fatḥ-Allāh mosque (Matthee, 2000).
By the middle of the 17th century, most people in Isfahan had become Shiʿite Muslim as a result of Safavid Shiʿite propaganda policy. They occupied without doubt the most important part of the urban society. There were two kinds of Shiʿite Muslims: Persian speakers and Turkic speakers.
People living in the old city of Isfahan were mostly Persian-speaking. Government officials and their servants, merchants, artisans and their apprentices, professors and students, all spoke Persian. Business and preaching were usually done in Persian. Persian was without doubt the most popular language in the city.
Turkic-speaking people were mainly found at the royal court. Even in the 17th century, when the influence of the turcophone Qezelbāš had diminished considerably, people at the court continued to speak in Turkic. In the 16th century, the wives and mothers of the king had usually been of Turkish origin. Therefore it is not surprising that people spoke Turkic there in and around the royal palace. However, in the 17th century, as most women in the harem were of Georgian origin, they still retained the habit of speaking in Turkic.
In the city itself, the use of Turkic must have been very limited. However, in caravansaries visited by people from Azerbaijan, for example, the common language was Turkic. Members of Turkish tribes coming to the city for commerce would have spoken Turkic as well. Thus, Turkic would have been the second popular language. It was, however, only a colloquial language and never was used as a literary language.
Isfahan was home to many Armenians as well. The city’s Armenians became concentrated in Jolfā as part of a resettlement under Shah ʿAbbās II. Jolfā had an estimated 20,000 inhabitants in the mid-17th century, a number that may have gone up to 30,000 by the end of the century (Herzig, p. 81). These spoke Armenian and for the most part belonged to the Armenian Orthodox church. Most of them were merchants engaged in the trade of Persian silk and precious metals. They had their own networks with compatriots in Europe and India. In their dealings with other merchants in Isfahan they must have spoken Persian.
Further, many of the city’s inhabitants were of Georgian, Circassian, and Daghistani descent. Engelbert Kaempfer, who was in Persia in 1684-85, estimated their number at 20,000 (Kaempfer, p. 204). Following an agreement between Shah ʿAbbās I and Taimuraz Khan, Georgia’s last independent ruler, whereby the latter submitted to Safavid rule in exchange for being allowed to rule as the region’s wāli and for having his son serve as dāruḡa of Isfahan in perpetuity, a Georgian prince converted to Islam served as governor (Chardin, X, p. 29; Kaempfer, pp. 110-11).
He was accompanied by a certain number of soldiers, and they spoke in Georgian among themselves. There must also have been some Georgian Orthodox Christians. The royal court had a great number of Georgian ḡolāms as well as Georgian women. Although they spoke Persian or Turkic, their mother tongue was Georgian.
Isfahan was home to a large Indian community as well. Their presence was particularly important from the commercial point of view. There were two kinds of Indians, Muslim and Hindu. Indians formed a large ethnic community in Isfahan, and their numbers is given as between ten and fifteen thousand (Tavernier, I, pp. 421-22; Thevenot, p. 217). Merchants were engaged in the trade of various Indian goods, such as textiles, indigo (a dyestuff, q.v.), sugar, and tobacco.
Hindu moneylenders had a good business, because Islamic law prohibits Muslims from lending money for interest. The moneylending business was almost an Indian monopoly. They spoke various languages, including Urdu (q.v. at iranica.com), Hindi, and Gujarati (q.v.). Insofar as commerce in Isfahan was concerned though, they certainly spoke in Persian. Hindus often served European companies as interpreters and as brokers (Dale, pp. 70 ff.).
Besides these large groups, there were small communities of Persian-speaking Zoroastrians and Jews. Catholics and Protestants, monks, merchants, and court artisans, were present in small numbers, too. Most of them came from Europe and returned there after several years. There were, however, several monks like Raphael du Mans of the Capuchin order, who lived in Isfahan almost fifty years and died there.
Social divisions were expressed in the distinction between the elite and the common people, but also found expression in traditional rivalries in the old city, where two groups, the Ḥaydari and Neʿmati (q.v.), representing the two quarters of the old city, Dardašt and Jubāra, periodically engaged in communal fighting (Chardin, VII, pp. 289-93; Perry, pp. 107-18).
Isfahan in Crisis
Isfahan’s population is said to have grown by one-fifth or even one-fourth between 1645 and 1665 (Richard, ed., II, p. 262). But thereafter, conditions grew worse for the city as part of an overall deterioration in political management and economic wellbeing in Safavid territory in the second half of the 17th century. In 1662, the city was struck by famine, causing people to assemble in front of the dawlat-ḵāna demanding measures against hoarding (Waḥid Qazvini, p. 307). In 1668-69, famine struck again.
Its main cause was a drought, but hoarding by bakers and grain merchants exacerbated the misery of Isfahan’s residents, and the situation got even worse when, following Shah Solaymān’s coronation, the court and its huge entourage returned to the city before adequate provisioning measures were taken (Chardin, IX, p. 571; X, pp. 2-4; NA, VOC 1266, 8 November 1668, foll. 155, 923v, 941; IOR, G/36/105, 14 August 1668, fol. 36). In the latter part of the 1670s the high cost of living and growing deprivation caused a bread riot in the city, with people pelting political officials with rocks. From early 1678 until mid-1679 in Isfahan alone, more than 70,000 people are said to have died from a terrible famine. In 1678 the common people of the city rose in revolt against inflation and famine (Matthee, 1999, p. 177).
In the second half of the 17th century, the position of religious minorities in the city also worsened. Clerically inspired campaigns put pressure on Jews to convert to Islam; the authorities took various measures to curb wine-drinking and vices associated with coffeehouses, and several decrees were issued restricting the activities of Armenian merchants and Catholic missionaries (Moreen; Matthee, 2006a, pp. 84-94; idem, 2006b). The local Armenian population was made more vulnerable to political and religious pressure by internal splits in the community between Catholics and Schismatics (Ghougassian, passim; Baghdiantz-McCabe, passim).
A new crisis hit Isfahan at the beginning of the 18th century as part of a deepening malaise that affected all of Persia. In 1713 the Isfahan region was made unsafe by Baḵtiāri and Lor brigands, so that no caravans could leave or enter the city unless accompanied by large contingent of soldiers (NA, VOC 1856, 9 October 1713, foll. 494-95). Too years later, famine struck again. Exacerbated by a grain monopoly by harem eunuchs and high-ranking clerics, this crisis pushed bread prices in the city so high that it caused people to riot on 20 February 1715. Cursing the shah and his ministers, the rioters threw rocks at the ʿĀli Qāpu and damaged the gate of the royal kitchen. They also assailed the residence of chief cleric Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Majlesi.
The shah (Solṭān-Ḥosayn) thereupon dismissed the current city dāruḡa, Qurčišāh Beg, who combined his function with that of supervisor of the city’s victuals (moḥtaseb), and appointed Emāmqoli Khan Zangana, the amirāḵor-bāši and a son of grand vizier Šāhqoli Khan, in his stead. The monarch also had officials dispatched to the residence of Mir Moḥammad-Bāqer to order him to offer a large volume of grain on the royal square. This did not quell the unrest, however.
On 16 June 1715 the people forced the shah, who intended to leave Isfahan, to stay in the city, and the next day they crowded together in front of the royal palace and threatened to plunder and set fire to it (Floor, pp. 26-27; Matthee, 2004, pp. 187-88). From that moment until the fall of the city to the Afghans, the post of moḥtaseb was rotated with increasing speed, but to little avail. Food prices remained sky-high, and the misery in the city continued, with theft, burglaries, and murder becoming common (NA, VOC 1897, 14 November 1716, fol. 237; ibid., 3 December 1716, fol. 268). Beggars were said to be ubiquitous in the city and poverty had reached such levels that the poor would quickly strip the flesh of any dead camel, mule, or horse left out on the street (Worm, p. 293).
The Afghans arrived in Golnābād on 8 March 1722 and defeated the Persian army, which, at about 40,000 men and an additional 30,000 infantry troops, was at least twice as large as that of the Afghans. The Georgian contingent, the only one to fight, was decimated. Losing some 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers on the battlefield, the remainder of the Safavid army sought refuge in the city (Lockhart, pp. 130-43; Floor, 1998, p. 87).
Maḥmud Ḡilzāi with his Afghan tribal forces then moved to Faraḥābād, which he took without meeting any resistance. He next seized Julfa, where the inhabitants welcomed him with food and wine and accepted him as their new ruler. After a few days of panic in which the Afghans could have taken Isfahan proper, the inhabitants quickly reinforced the defenses, and a long siege ensued. The city soon ran out of food, and, especially toward the end of the summer, the misery grew to the point at which people first took to eating tree bark, leaves, and dried excrement and eventually resorted to cannibalism.
After a six-month siege, the city fell to Maḥmud on 23 October 1722 (IOR, G/29/15, 20 October 1722, fol. 80; 30 November 1722, fol. 83; diary of the siege in Floor, 1998, pp. 83-176). Isfahan suffered greatly during the assault and the ensuing occupation. It lost a large part of its population, many of its buildings lay in ruins, and its economy was destroyed. The city survived but its revival would take until the 19th century, and it never regained its former importance.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/isfahan-vii-safavid-period
-----------------------------
Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250750290
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/esfahan.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_622448190
https://www.docdroid.net/EP63uxd/ispakhan-i-autokratoriki-proteuoysa-ton-safevidwn-docx
Το Ιράν των Αγιατολάχ: ένα Μασωνικό Παρασκεύασμα - αποκαλύπτει ο Έλληνας Ιρανολόγος καθ. Μουχάμαντ Σαμσαντίν Μεγαλομμάτης
Ayatollahs' Iran: A Freemasonic Fabrication, reveals the Greek Iranologist Prof. Mohammad Samsaddin Megalommatis
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 27η Σεπτεμβρίου 2018.
----------------------------
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2018/09/27/το-ιράν-των-αγιατολάχ-ένα-μασωνικό-παρ/ =============================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Αναδημοσιεύω εδώ ένα εντυπωσιακό άρθρο του Έλληνα ανατολιστή ιστορικού και πολιτικού επιστήμονα, καθ. Μουχάμαντ Σαμσαντίν Μεγαλομμάτη, ο οποίος διαλύει πολλούς μύθους που υπάρχουν στην κοινή γνώμη σχετικά με το Ιράν ως τάχα ‘αντίπαλο’ της δυτικής Νέας Τάξης Πραγμάτων.
Αρχικά δημοσιευμένο το 2007, το ανατρεπτικό άρθρο αναδημοσιεύθηκε σε πολλά ιρανικά πόρταλς της Διασποράς επειδή οι Ιρανοί κατάλαβαν εύκολα το τι έλεγε για την χώρα τους ο εξαίρετος Έλληνας ιρανολόγος, ο οποίος έχει μελετήσει την ιστορία του Ιράν και έχει περιπλανηθεί στην χώρα εκείνη όσο ελάχιστοι άλλοι ειδικοί.
Ayatollahs’ Iran: a Nationalistic Theocracy as Freemasonic Machination
By M. Shamsaddin Megalommatis
Saturday 22 December 2007
http://www.fravahr.org/spip.php?article411
and https://www.academia.edu/24267250/Ayatollahs_Iran_a_Nationalistic_Theocracy_as_Freemasonic_Machination
======================
The current theocratic and utterly unrepresentative regime of Iran was not the choice of the peoples and nations of Iran. The events that triggered the fall of Shah and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini were all machinated by an Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that controls part of the French and the English establishments and through them part of the American establishment.
The danger that the late Shah of Iran represented for their eschatological plans was absolutely tremendous. This does not imply that they intended to help establish a pseudo-Shia theocracy in Iran; simply they were not able to completely control the developments. As a matter of fact, the late Shah intended to modernize, industrialize and westernize Iran in the 70s; one could compare his attempt to that of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, 50 years earlier.
A strong Iran next to a strong Turkey is enough to make the Anglo-French colonial establishments spend years without an easy sleep. Although this would look good for Western geo-political and geo-strategic interests, particularly in containing Tsarist Russia / USSR / Putin’s oligarchy, in real terms of Western Freemasonic conspiracy in the Middle East it is abominable because it would hinder all Freemasonic plans and projects for the Middle East, the area of their primary concern par excellence.
Mossadegh received by Truman
Mossadegh was a Freemason Islamist. His supporters became later the supporters of Khomeyni and founders of the Islamic regime.
It sounds awkward but it is absolutely real: the late Shah of Iran tried with a delay of 17 years (as of 1970) to implement the basic concepts of the Iranian nationalistic policies of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, a great Iranian statesman whom the Freemasonic mass media of the West did their ingenious best to defame and ridicule, while falsely portraying him as … related to the Iranian Communist party!
[In fact, Mohamad Mossadegh was himself a Freemason and an Islamist. His so-called nationalism was no more than an International-Islamism inspired by Freemasonry — Fravahr]
When Madeleine Albright, decades later, admitted that the Eisenhower administration was involved in the Operation Ajax that ended with the Mossadegh’s removal, she did not state any other reason except geopolitical considerations. In fact, these considerations were Freemasonic eschatological approaches to the Middle East, covered by English economic interests, and involved volumes of falsified information produced in order to mislead the gullible and deeply unaware American establishment — through use of pro-English agents who were active in Washington D.C.
The Shah himself must have felt in the early and mid 70s how right Mohammed Mossadegh was. In his last days in Tehran, the Shah must have also remembered his father’s last days in the throne, when in September 1941 the English had forced him to abdicate in favour of his young son, as they could not accept Iran’s neutrality in WW II.
The Freemasonic anti-Iranian conspiracy played on the Iranian peoples’ feelings against the Shah, and involved the return of Ayatollah Khomeini who had spent some months in France. In fact, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge pushed to the political forefront Iranians who had already lived and studied in France where they had become Freemasons, like Mehdi Bazargan, Khomeini’s first Prime Minister, and Abolhassan Banisadr, the first Iranian President.
They were joined in their effort to canalize the Iranian Revolution by Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, who had studied in America, and had travelled with Ayatollah Khomeini from Paris to Tehran on February 1st 1979 to become later Foreign Minister (after Banisadr) and then be arrested and executed (September 1982) as betrayed by President George H. W. Bush. After 1983, Freemasonic influence on Iranian policies has been indirect.
Indirect manipulation involves the mental, spiritual, philosophical, ideological, and therefore political engulfment of the targeted establishment into erroneous perception of the present realities and the future targets of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge within a context that can be rather parallelized with an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Shia Eschatology in contrast with Freemasonic Messianism
Worship of Isis
Freemasonic ritual as on the walls of the Isiac Freemasonic Lodge (Temple of Isis) at Pompeii
The worship of Isis is depicted in this wall-painting from Herculaneum. The high priest stands at the entrance to the temple and looks down on the ceremony beneath him, which is supervised by priests with shaven heads. In the case of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Freemasonic establishment’s arsenal reaches its limits. Drawing from a late Sassanid Zervanism that survived within Shia Islam since the early days of the Islamic conquest of Iran (636: Sassanid defeat at Qadisiyah, 641 Sassanid defeat at Nihavent, 651: arrival of Islamic armies at Merv in Central Asia), Shia Eschatology revolves around the prevalence of Time as determinant element in the Mystic History of the Mankind; this is utterly alien to Western Freemasonic dogmas and doctrines that draw from Late Antiquity’s Gnosticisms, Hermetism, and Messianic Isidism.
With Khomeini’s doctrine based on the termination of the Ghaybah (“Occultation”) of the Shia Islamic Twelfth Imam (the Shia version of the Messiah) by means of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we reach one step closer to what is called in Islam Al Yom al Ahar (“the End of Time”).
Despite the fact that Iran and most of the Islamic World are engulfed in ignorance and confusion due to the academic systems that Freemasonic Europe produced to facilitate the advent of the Freemasonic Messianic, namely the Hellenism, the Orientalism, the Pan-Arabism, and the (Sunni) Islamism, the Shia establishment of Iran, sticking to the completion of the work initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini, have little chance to be misguided and deceived.
Contrarily to the Freemasonic concept of a Horus — Messiah, creation of Isis (as Freemasonry is symbolized within the Freemasonic eschatological doctrine), a Zervan — Twelfth Imam hinges on the absorption of all into a New Aeon with little concern about an Elected People to be saved.
Contrarily to a Horus — Victorious King and Pacifier, the concept of Zervan — Twelfth Imam involves the liberation of every person from the negative energy therein encrusted through various ways; as Zervan Akarana promises a monstrous appearance, yet able to embody the Loftiest of the Divine, the Shia Islamic Twelfth Imam promises no peace and no return for any elected people, but heralds the miraculous transformation of the miserable into luminous sources in the present world (after Al Yom al Ahar) and the Hereafter (Al Yom al Qiyamah).
There is certainly a Manichaean influence on the late Sassanid Zervanism (and through this system on the Shia Islam) but the Western stern rejection of Manichaeism proliferated only confusion and dire practices among the Apostate Freemasons. In fact, the Freemasonic Apostasy is a repetition of an earlier Apostasy that took place in the Late Antiquity, and caused the disastrous descent into the Middle Ages.
Unable to transcend, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge seems set for disastrous developments that will now cover the entire surface of the Earth. Determined to continue an evil process started by Napoleon and sped up by Edmund Allenby, the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge seems today unable to perceive the impending domino effect that will ensue from an attack on Iran. The Apostate Lodge machinated the Anglo-French colonialism in order to create a false and precarious Israel (for Jews, not Israelites), thus exterminate both Jews and Palestinians (after a supposed final peace), and then set up a true Israel able to accommodate the migrating — because of expected ominous natural phenomena — English, Irish, Scots, French, Belgian, Dutch, and Scandinavians (namely the true descendants of the Ten Tribes of Israel). That final Israel that would span between the rivers Euphrates (Assyria) and Nile (Egypt) may simply never come to existence because of the rise of a New Era for the Middle East triggered by an attack on Iran.
The Advent of the End of Time
If Ahmadinejad referred to Mahdi’s advent (which means automatically the End of Time) already in his first speech at the UN (in September 2005), what happened meanwhile that indicates that by now an apocalyptic scenario would follow an American attack on Iran? Why what could happen in March 2006 should not occur in December 2007?
The answer to such a question is at the same time a full response to a great number of eschatological interpretations. The History of the Mankind can also be viewed as a History of missed opportunities. More recently, after 2001, to give an example, the US could have pacified Iraq, if they had the knowledge and the courage to do what it would take. Simply, they were either unaware or misled. Usually, to know how a solution can be found to a historical — political problem, one has to transcend; this mainly means that one has to see the problem in question as a non-problem, or place it within wider frame, or view it through different standpoints, or apply all these methods. Basically, a historical — political problem’s solution involves the non-consideration of a part’s interests.
An answer to the aforementioned question is at the same time a complete rejection of numerous approaches to historical texts of eschatological contents. As a matter of fact, there has always been a vast interpretational literature of the Prophetic books of the Bible, of the Revelation, of the Apocalyptic Hadith, and of the eschatological traditions of various peoples from India to Mexico. With the inception of the web, and the rise of spiritual interest in a post-Communist world, the interpretational interest only multiplied. Specifications and clarifications about the time of the arrival of Mahdi, the Messiah, Jesus as Islamic Prophet, Jesus as Christ of the Christian religion, etc. can be found in great number.
All these approaches emanate from a world plunged into the swamp of Time, a world whereby all people take for granted that Time exists. Yet, the Mankind existed for several thousands of years without shaping the concept of Time. For many great thinkers and wise elders in Sumer, Akkad, Egypt, Assyria and Babylon, Hittite Anatolia, and Biblical Israel, Time simply did not exist. The interaction of Being and Becoming was perceived completely differently, particularly by peoples who used the same word for “day” and “time” (e.g. umu in Assyrian — Babylonian). In a world viewed, perceived, sensed, and experienced diachronically, there is little place for fanaticism and empathy, as all reflect an eternal recapitulation of everything.
In that world, great diachronic (and therefore apocalyptic and eschatological) Epics were compiled for a first and original occasion, and their elements, data, concepts and details were later diffused among later epics, mythical texts and apocalyptic literature. As a matter of fact, there is nothing original that was not already said before Moses. To give an example, it is sheer ignorance for anyone to believe that the concept of the Antichrist goes as back as the Revelation and Daniel.
More than 1500 years before the Revelation, for the Anatolian Hittites the Antichrist (Ullikummi) would rise from the Sea. The author of the Revelation reassessed the same topic, adding only an effort of identification of the Messiah (Tasmisu for the Ancient Hittites — Jesus as Christ for the Christians). More than 2000 years before Isaiah, the concept of the Messiah existed in the Egyptian Heliopolitan Doctrine.
Viewing the present world through the eyes of an Egyptian, Assyrian or Hittite erudite scholar would offer a completely different perspective, and certainly more authoritative as emanating from a diachronic consideration of the Mankind’s and the World’s existence. In most of the cases, this was avoided because of the salacity of Western Orientalists, who instead of serving truth, did promote preconceived ideas either of Freemasonic or Christian Catholic nature. What would destroy pillars of their false faiths had to be covered by silence; this is the “veracity” of the Western universities’ professors.
2007: A Changed World and Iran
In fact, many things have changed over the past 21 months; they are not easily visible to average people and supposed leaders. Even worse, it seems that they are not ostensible to panicked establishments and elites either.
Losing a unique opportunity to be the sole superpower and thus accomplish the wishes of the Founding Fathers, the US will have to become familiar with the reality of a multi-polar world.
If we exclude the nonsensical nuclear mutual destruction, which will be always a possibility, as long as nuclear weapons exist, America’s interests can be hit at any moment. America lost considerably because America allied itself with the only country they should never work together: England.
Discrediting America, exposing the US, while mobilizing others’ forces to contain America and finally avert a long perspective Pax Americana, England convinced the US leadership to pursue the only way that can truly damage the US interests: action against the Moral Principles that the Founding Fathers stipulated so clearly for the then young and promising, Anti-Colonial, nation that would diffuse Freedom, Justice and Democracy to the rest of the world.
The US leadership failed to assess that it would be detrimental to pursue after 1991 immoral practices employed at the times of the Cold War. The policy of double standards (two measures and two weights) would convince all possible adversaries that the US represents a threat, and would mobilize many against America. The enumeration could be very long.
Vice-president Cheney’s trip to Saudi Arabia in November 2006 was certainly taken very seriously by the Iranians — within eschatological context, I mean. The Islamic Messiah will certainly exterminate a cursed, Satanic regime in charge of Haramayn, the two holy cities of Mekka and Madinah.
One would not ask America to believe the Islamic eschatological literature; but one would anticipate America to take it into account, and shape its policy accordingly. The rest is just inane.
Saudi Arabia cannot exist — if Israel is to survive!
It was a pathetic American effort to continue English Colonial policies of division and strife in the Middle East; these policies targeting the existence of the Ottoman Empire and Imperial Iran, if pursued by America, against Turkey and Iran, can guarantee the total disaster of America.
Yet, Prof. Huntington, in a moment of truth, exposed the truth plainly, when he attributed the Islamic Extremism and Terrorism to the lack of a core State for the Muslim world. This was precisely the work of the Anglo-French Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that we already mentioned. America should not be confused with the Anglo-French secondary conflicts, as highlighted by the San Remo arguments between Clemenceau and Lloyd George.
For America’s interests to prevail, for the present state of Israel to survive, for a solution of the quasi-permanent Palestinian problem to be found, America should avoid any direct interference in the affairs of the Muslim World.
Any US attack against Iran would trigger an unexpected and unsuspected reaction that would certainly have a lot to do with Islamic eschatological expectations.
The explosion would immediately bring in other, sizeable, non-Islamic countries that are ready for a severe collapse of the present global economic structures, as their economies are better suited for barter trade. These countries would not necessarily help Iran militarily; they would simply make impossible for America to sustain the cost of a conflict spanning from Yemen and Israel to Afghanistan and Pakistan, at a moment Saudi and Emirati oilfields would not be anymore functional.
America should keep itself outside the Muslim World, and following the instructions of Prof. Huntington, help (with the cooperation of Israel) the rise of a core Muslim country in the Middle East that would eradicate the nefarious colonial deeds of the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge.
This country should be a secular and humanist, democratic country that would be committed to the elimination of Pan-Arabism and Islamic Extremism. To support the rise of a vast Oriental State, America should fervently oppose France and England.
This would redraw the map of the Middle East, but ultimately save the present state Israel, offer peace to the Palestinians, and grant concord to the other Middle Eastern countries. Only a vast Oriental State would have no problem in containing Iran and outmanoeuvring the Ayatollah regime.
Otherwise the Death will hit America — in an irrevocable and precipitated way.
Europe would be affected too; and that Apostate Freemasonic Lodge would be severely persecuted in a new — unrecognizable — Europe ruled by a new Iron Man of the North.
---------------------------------
Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250701066
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/iran_of_the_ayatullahs.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_621631094
https://www.docdroid.net/HEpNSXC/to-iran-ton-aghiatolakh-ena-masoniko-paraskeuasma-docx
The Fake Persianization of the Abbasid Caliphate
By Prof. Muhammet Şemsettin Gözübüyükoğlu
(Muhammad Shamsaddin Megalommatis)
Pre-publication of Part Eight and Chapter XXII of my forthcoming book “Turkey is Iran and Iran is Turkey - 2500 Years of indivisible Turanian - Iranian Civilization distorted and estranged by Anglo-French Orientalists”; Part Eight (The Distorted Term 'Persianate') consists exclusively of Chapter XXII. The book is made of 12 parts and 33 chapters.
----------------------------------------------
With the aforementioned, one can understand that, despite its vast territory and its broad ethnic base (wider than the Umayyads'), the Abbasid Caliphate was a very weak imperial institution that could be challenged practically speaking by any small group of dissidents. Its rise in terms of spiritual-intellectual breakthrough, cultural diversity, academic-scientific knowledge, artistic-architectural creativity, economic wealth, and military strength was conditioned by one critical prerequisite: the caliphs should be able to compose an unprecedented imperial universality out of all these diverse elements that were being incessantly multiplied by the genius of Islam. Quite unfortunately, very few Abbasid caliphs proved able to pass this test. Then, the fact that this state lasted more than 500 years is rather a miracle!
In fact and to use an anachronism, the Abbasid Caliphate only 100 years after its establishment (850) was already the Sick Man of Eurasia! Neither the short-lived Umayyad Caliphate nor the Abbasid Empire that definitely eclipsed its predecessor in every sense were formed like the Roman (Republic and later) Empire, gradually prevailing over neighboring states and progressively expanding territorially over the span of 250 years (from the First Punic War, 264-241 BCE, until the annexation of Egypt, 30 BCE). Quite contrarily, Harun al-Rashid, 150 years after the early Islamic conquests, was ruling over a territory larger than that of the Roman Emperor Trajan, commanding lands between China and India in the East and the Atlantic Ocean in the West.
As regards its immense territory, linguistic multitude, and cultural–spiritual diversity, the Abbasid Caliphate can be compared only to two earlier empires: that of Alexander the Great and that of Darius I the Great. However, Alexander's empire was split to four kingdoms only 20 years after his death, and the Achaemenid Empire of Iran did not last more than 220 years after its establishment. In fact, 100 years after Darius I the Great's death, Iran was in decay. Pretty much like the Achaemenid Empire of Iran, which was not a Zoroastrian state, but a vast empire with many different religions and with Zoroastrianism as its official religion, the Abbasid Caliphate was not an Islamic state; it was a vast empire with many different religions and with Islam as its official religion. Even more strikingly in the case of the Abbasid Caliphate, new dogmas, doctrines, spiritual orders, mystical groups, theological interpretations, apocalyptic eschatological schools, and transcendental concepts were appearing almost like mushrooms. It is a terrible oversight not to take this reality into account.
What happened to the Abbasid Caliphate was however a historical particularity. Few decades after the death of Harun al-Rashid (786-809), who marked the peak of Abbasid power, several parts of the empire started seceding. One must clarify from the beginning that this was a really new type of 'secession', because it also involved approval by the caliph himself. This phenomenon took the appearance of imperial entrustment of an administrative province to a formidable military combatant, who instantly and voluntarily recognized the imperial authority. The name of the Abbasid caliph was mentioned first in the acclamations and wishes made in all sermons given during Friday prayers in all the mosques of the 'seceded' territory; taxes were paid to Baghdad and coordination was effectual, but in reality, the caliph had only nominal power over the 'seceded' province(s). More importantly, the formidable military rulers who bore significant royal titles (emirs, sultans or even caliphs) formed hereditary dynasties and engaged in various wars with local rebels, occasional invaders, foreign belligerents, neighboring secessionist rulers, and new spiritual, mystical or theological adversaries in a way that truly made of their territories fully independent states typified by their own interests and distinct characteristics.
In fact, after the first decades of the 9th c. the Abbasid Caliphate totally ceased to function as a centralized imperial institution and authority. The weakened caliphs did not have sufficient stability in Baghdad and ample military force in the provinces to quench the incessant uprisings and to avert this type of secessions. Even worse, sometimes the caliphs needed the voluntarily offered help of experienced warriors, who came with a well-trained military force to save the caliphate and eliminate its enemies. What occurred then is a situation almost similar to the appanage, a well-attested practice in Christian times' Europe. This term (from Latin adpanare 'to give bread') involves the grant of an estate as a reward for, or in recompense of, services offered or rights claimed. The final result was that the Abbasid caliph ended up as a totally powerless, decorative figure; of all of these secessionist rulers, the Buwayhi (or Buyids) achieved the unthinkable: they made of Baghdad, the capital city of the Abbasid Caliphate, their own … capital! No blood involved; no blackmail used; no threat issued!
This happened in 945; Ahmad ibn Buya, usually known in modern historiography under his regnal name Mu'izz al-Dawla, i.e. 'Fortifier of the State' (and in this case, as 'state' was meant the Caliphate itself), invaded Baghdad and made of the Abbasid capital his own capital too in the name of the caliph. It may sound odd, but it was the impotent caliph Al-Mustakfi who gave Ahmad ibn Buya the aforementioned regnal name. There is more 'paradox' to it; Ahmed ibn Buya had thoughts, ideas and beliefs close to (but not identical with) those of the followers of the descendants of Prophet Muhammad and Ali. And of course, the Abbasid caliph opposed the idea that the title of caliph was rightfully claimed by the family of the Prophet.
Of course, no one named at the time the caliph Al-Mustakfi a 'Sunni' and Ahmad ibn Buya a 'Shia', and today, it would be ridiculous to brand Ahmed ibn Buya a 'Shia' and the impotent caliph Al-Mustakfi a 'Sunni'. Only modern Western Orientalists and 'Sunni' or 'Shia' militants carry out similar distortions, the former due to their malignancy and the latter because of their ignorance and idiocy. It is definitely noteworthy that this divergence did not prevent Ahmed ibn Buya and Al-Mustakfi from finding common ground. It was however a period of very high messianic and eschatological fever, enthusiasm and fascination.
Muhammad ibn al-Askari, son of Hasan al-Askari {846-874; the 11th imam of those among the Muslims who accepted Musa al-Kadhim as the 7th imam (aforementioned section M 4 i)} and of the Eastern Roman princess Narjis ibnat Yashua (i.e. 'daughter of Jesus'), was born in 869 only to enter his Minor Occultation in 874 (one day after his father's passing away) and then his Major Occultation in 941; after that date and down to our times, the followers of this group expect the termination of the Major Occultation and the appearance of the 12th imam (Muhammad ibn al-Askari), an event prophesied to coincide with the End of Times. This means that the followers of this group identify the 12th imam with the Mahdi of Prophet Muhammad's Hadith (oral tradition). Mahdi is the Islamic Messiah, who was prophesied to lead the battle, along with Prophet Jesus (who will also reappear then), against the forces of Evil (under Masih al-Dajjal, the Antichrist, lit. 'the most fake Messiah') and eliminate them once for all. I mention the above only to show that the rise of the Buyids coincided with a time of immense apocalyptic, eschatological and messianic expectations, as people believed that developments would follow within short time (similarly with early Christians at the end of the 1st c. CE and with believers of other religions in different moments).
Of course, when describing the above, one must be watchful not to fall into the traps of modern states' pseudo-historical dogmas, fanatic pseudo-theologians' inconsistent doctrines, and Western Orientalists' intentional fallacies. It is therefore greatly important to take into account two points:
First, the various secessionists, seceding emirs, and revolting warriors were not Iranians or Persians; they were of Iranian (Persian included), Turanian, Berber, Arab and other origin. Secessions did not start in what is known as historical Iran and they were never limited there. During that period, there was never an ethnic divide 'Iranians vs. Arabs', because most of the Iranians sided with some Arabs (notably the Alids, i.e. the descendants of Prophet Muhammad and of Ali), most of the Arabs sided also with the Alids, and more importantly, most of the Arabs were already dispersed among Aramaeans, Yemenites, Iranians, Turanians, Egyptians, Berbers of North Africa, and other nations and, due to this fact, they never consisted in an 'ethnic group' properly speaking within Islam after 750 CE. Last, there was no ethnic dimension attributed to these secessions, revolts, wars or splits.
Fallacious Western Orientalists start their presentation of the fragmentation and collapse of the Abbasid Caliphate with the Samanid dynasty, which was established supposedly in 819; in fact, this is a lie, because at that time, the four sons of (the newly converted to Islam) Asad ibn Saman were rewarded by the governor of Khorasan Asad ibn Abdallah al-Qasri and by the Abbasic caliph al-Ma'mun for their bravery in combatting the Samarqand garrison commander Rafi ibn al-Layth who had revolted. Asad ibn Saman's four sons - Nuh, Ahmad, Yahya, and Ilyas - were then appointed as governors of four important Central Asiatic cities. Their positions were inherited by their respective sons and only after a 'civil' Samanid war (in fact, a family internal conflict), a unified entity emerged in 892 under Ismail Samani and the then weakened caliph was forced to recognize him as the local ruler. Speaking of a Samanid 'dynasty' before 892 is sheer nonsense, whereas calling the emerged state (one should just call it an 'administrative institution') an 'empire' is ridiculous. Even more absurd is to describe the Samanid state as ethnically 'Iranian'. Its population was almost totally Turanian.
However, this was not the first, gradually emerged secessionist entity. At this point, we have to also take into consideration the fact that few marginal Iranian rulers (of the Qarinvand and the Dabuyid dynasties), who controlled parts of the southern shore of Caspian Sea (in the almost inaccessible region of the Elburz (Alborz) range of mountains) already before the demise of the Sassanid Empire (636-651), continued existing under the early caliphs, the Umayyads and the Abbasids, although having tormented relations with them.
As a matter fact, the first rulers, who seceded from the Islamic Caliphate, were the Rustamids, who established their rule in parts of today's Algeria, Tunisia and Libya as early as 761. Even more importantly, they institutionalized the Ibadi theological, jurisprudential school of Islam, which survived down to our days, being unrelated to what is wrongly defined as 'Sunni' and 'Shia'; they were instrumental in diffusing Islam among the Berbers who made the quasi-totality of the populations of Northern and Northwestern Africa. Not quite differently from the Ibadi Rustaminds, the Muhallabids controlled parts of the caliphate's African provinces from 768 to 795; however, they were known for their animosity against the Berbers and their rule was soon terminated.
Also before the Samanids, the Idrisids (claiming descent from Ali, as Idriss I was indeed the great grandchild of Hasan, the 2nd imam) founded their own kingdom (emirate) with first capital at Volubilis (Walili, in today's Northern Morocco) in 788, acting in full opposition to the Abbasids and in synergy with various forces of the anti-Abbasid opposition. Furthermore, the Justanids (followers of Zayd ibn Ali, who are nowadays mistakenly called Zaydi or Zaidi Shia) were established in the almost unreachable province of the southwestern shores of Caspian Sea (in 791). In addition, the Aghlabids formed their state in parts of today's Algeria, Tunisia and Sicily in 800 (when Harun al-Rashid appointed Ibrahim I ibn al-Aghlab as hereditary emir of the Abbasid province of Africa/Ifriqiya) and promoted a theological – jurisprudential particularity, namely an amalgamation of Mu'talizite theology with Hanafi school of Figh.
So, the fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate was not due to Iranians or Persians and did not have any Iranian or Persian character.
Second, there is no 'Shia' character or dimension in the overwhelmingly apocalyptic, eschatological and messianic fever, enthusiasm and fascination of the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th c. It is wrong to imagine that, at those days, the Sunni Muslims did not have a messianic fever and the Shia Muslims did. There were no Sunni and Shia at those days; practically speaking, all the populations of the Caliphate, Muslim or not, were characterized by an apocalyptic fascination. However, this fascination had no ethnic and no religious background; it was general and overwhelming, and it would take an independent study to explore its reasons, which may eventually be related to the complete disappointment from - and the total disgust about - the Islamic Caliphate's methods of rule and administration.
Long before the 12th imam (of today's Twelver Shia) went in Occultation (Minor Occultation in 874 and Major Occultation in 941), and already before Ja'far al Sadiq's eldest son Isma'il ibn Ja'far (of today's Sevener Shia) died (762), Abu Muslim al-Khorasani, a formidable combatant and a gallant general of Iranian origin (possibly Turanian, but surely not a Persian from Fars, because most of the people in Khorasan were Turanians), died in 755; his military action and imperial advice proved to be determinant in overthrowing the Umayyad dynasty and in integrating non-Muslim Manichaeans, Nestorians, Gnostics, Mazdakists, Zervanists, Mazdeists (wrongly described as Zoroastrians), Buddhists and the followers of many new mystical doctrines into the early Abbasid Empire. So, he immediately became a legendary and occult personality for various groups, who claimed that Abu Muslim al-Khorasani had not actually died, but would come back as the prophesied Mahdi. This means clearly that what was later developed as Sevener Shia messianic eschatology and as Twelver Shia apocalyptic occult doctrine were merely some aspects and dimensions of a far more general phenomenon that took place across the Islamic Caliphate during the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th c., involving Muslims, non-Muslims, and followers of mystical orders at the confines of every strict doctrine.
Of course, Abu Muslim al-Khorasani was not the only case of occult literature and messianic eschatological fascination and indoctrination; he was only one. The Khurramites were an 8th c. spiritual, mystical order and rebellious group that accepted a doctrine established by rebellious mystics like the Iranians Sunpadh, Behafarid, and Ustadh Sis and the Turanian Ishaq al-Turk. All of them were Muslims with a strong impact of earlier apocalyptic, messianic and eschatological traditions (Manichaean, Gnostic, Nestorian, Mazdakist, Mazdeist, Zervanist, and other) and all of them performed impressive spiritual exploits and magnificent transcendental acts.
An obscure figure named Hashim al-Muqanna (the 'Veiled'), probably a Turanian, organized the Khurramites into a successful military unit characterized by spiritual discipline; he appeared as the incarnation of God and as spiritual continuity of Prophet Muhammad, Ali and Abu Muslim al-Khorasani. His posthumous fame through the Nizari Isma'ili (Assassins), the Knights Templar, and several Western European Freemasonic orders reached Napoleon, who even wrote an envisioned conversation between himself and the mystical visionary al-Muqanna (named "Le Masque prophète").
More determinant role in the transformation of the Khurramites into a formidable military force and major challenge for the Abbasid armies was Babak Khorramdin (795-838), a Turanian from Azerbaijan, i.e. pre-Islamic Iran's most sacred province, which was the center of monotheistic Zoroastrian doctrine and tradition. In fact, due to his military mastership, the Babakiyah (as the Khurramites were renamed) were practically invincible. Based in their famous and almost inaccessible castle known as Kale-ye Babak (Babak Castle), which is one of Modern Iran's most spectacular monuments (in the mountainous region of Southern Azerbaijan, near Kaleybar), the Babakiyah attacked the armies of the Caliphate and tormented many northern provinces in the Caucasus and Central Asia regions.
Having organized a clandestine network of affiliated groups, they were able to get insightful and be prepared for devastating hits against the forces of the Abbasid caliph. All major historians of Islamic times dedicated long pages to describe their valor, exploits, heroic deeds, doctrinal particularities, and mystical visions. At the end, Babak Khorramdin suffered an excruciating death at the hands of the monstrous soldiers of the cruel, pseudo-Muslim Abbasid caliph; the tortures described by illustrious historians as applied to the master of the Babakiyah order are all strictly prohibited in Islam.
However, Babak Khorramdin's messianic legend survived for centuries; his clandestine organization endured and carried out subversive activities and frontal wars against the Abbasid caliphs across vast territories spanning between the Eastern Roman Empire and China; and the ramifications of the Babakiyah order's mystical doctrine and military practices can be attested later among various Islamic traditions and groups, involving the Isma'ili Assassins and the Qizilbash of the Ottoman – Safavid times.
What is falsely described by Western Orientalists as Persianization of the Abbasid Caliphate is an effort to
i- distort the nature, character and dimensions of the Golden Era of Islamic Civilization,
ii- depict it as a 'Persian' (not even Iranian) cultural by-product,
iii- culturally subordinate numerous Central Asiatic (Turanians), Western Asiatic (Aramaeans, Caucasians, and Eastern Romans), and South Asiatic nations (Dravidians, Malay) to Persians,
iv- erase the extensive Turanization of the entire Eurasia,
v- conceal the majestic role played by the Aramaeans in the formation of the Islamic Civilization
vi- develop and detail the next historical stage of the fallacious Orientalist divide 'Iran vs. Turan' (1037-1501: from the emergence of the Slejuk to the rise of the Safavids),
vii- avert any possible reference to the impact that Manichaeism exerted on the Islamic Civilization,
viii- depict as non-Islamic the peak of Islamic Civilization (and in the process promote Western propaganda related to Islamism, Wahhabism and Islamic Terrorism),
ix- advance a global, racist, Indo-European agenda, and
x- promote a certain number of fake divides and mistaken identifications that would be politically and geopolitically useful.
The underlying concept of this historical falsification is the fallacy that 'Shia Persians' took the upper hand in the Abbasid Caliphate only to be later superseded by – the already Persianized (!?) – Turks, starting with the Seljuk dynasty. For this purpose, there are many fabricated terms, such as Iranian Intermezzo or Iranian Renaissance and Sunni Revival. These fake terms help distort the presentation of
A- the period from the rise of the Samanid dynasty (892) to the arrival of the Seljuk Turks (1037) and the demolition of the Buyid parasites in Baghdad (1055); this period is falsely called 'Iranian Intermezzo', and
B- the period from the rise of the Seljuk (1037-1055) to the rise of the first Sufi dynasty in Iran, i.e. the Safavids, in 1501.
Several determinant historical facts are enough to refute the fallacy of the Persianization of the Caliphate:
i- The presence of Turanians as basic component of the Achaemenid, Arsacid and Sassanid empires refutes the nonsensical distortion as per which 'Turks' (Turanians) appear in Iran only with the arrival of the Seljuk Turks. The same is valid for the early Islamic period until the peak of the Abbasid Caliphate. In all the parts of the unit VI (from A to L), I expanded on this highly concealed topic.
ii- The terms of Turanian – Persian interaction within the wider Iran – Turan were known since the Achaemenid times and they were only repeated across the ages and during the various periods of Islamic History. In the aboce unit VI (part D. Iranian and Turanian nations in Achaemenid Iran), I wrote: "The Persians, among all Iranians and Turanians, had an inclination to poetry, literature, epics, lyricism, arts and symbolism, whereas the Turanians were known for their tendency to martial arts, military discipline and life, asceticism and religious mysticism. The Turanians found it therefore normal to write in Old Achaemenid Iranian in the 1st millennium BCE, in Middle Persian (Parsik) during the 1st millennium CE, and in Arabic and Farsi after the arrival of Islam".
iii- One very well-known fact is comfortably forgotten, when Orientalists, Iranologists and Islamologists study the Early History of Islam between Tigris and Indus. Similarly with the invasion of Alexander the Great, the early Islamic conquest caused an overwhelming destruction of Fars (Persia). The principal Iranian capital Istakhr was totally erased from the surface of the Earth. Alexander the Great's destruction of Persepolis pales in comparison of the Islamic armies' pulverization of Istakhr. This can be easily noticed by any non-specialist traveller who happens to visit the two sites. Whereas other provinces of Iran, notably Atropatene / Adhurbadagan – Azerbaijan (also known as Abakhtar in Sassanid times), were not destroyed at all, Fars was left in ruins already before 651, when the Islamic armies reached Merv in today's Turkmenistan. And Persians were slaughtered to the last, except for those who were lucky enough to flee to the southeast, reach Sistan and Baluchistan (in today's SE Iran and SW Pakistan), and settle there.
iv- This is exactly what happened: Turanians preserved Middle Persian (Parsik) and developed Farsi after the arrival of Islam, because the Persian language had always been their means of cultural-literary expression, pretty much like Turanian (Turkic) was the language of the army. With this I don't mean that all Persian Iranians disappeared with the arrival of Islam; there were Persians living in Mesopotamia, in the Northeast (Khurasan), the Middle Zagros (Khwarawaran), and other southern regions except Fars, but they were few. The bulk of Persian populations lived in Fars and most of them were slaughtered, as they were viewed as the most polytheistic element of the Sassanid Empire.
v- Of course, the terms Iranian Intermezzo and Iranian Renaissance are not wrong if understood properly, i.e. if considered as involving the contribution of Iranians, Turanians and other nations, notably the Aramaeans, in the formation of the Islamic Civilization. Furthermore, these terms must be totally deprived of any religious or denominational connotation.
It is absurd to portray the anti-Caliphate forces, arbitrarily called 'Shia', as the driving force of the Iranian-Turanian-Aramaean Renaissance, because there were also many pro-Caliphate elements that participated in the rise of the Islamic Civilization.
And it is totally wrong to view the Seljuk Turks and other Turanians either as 'Sunni' or as the driving force of an otherwise nonexistent 'Sunni revival' during the following period 1055-1501. As a matter of fact, Turanians were the major force behind the rise of the apocalyptic, messianic, eschatological mysticism of the 8th, 9th and 10th c., which is viciously distorted (by Western Orientalists and today's silly, uneducated and intoxicated 'Sunni' and 'Shia' theologians) as 'Shia doctrine'.
As conclusion one can simply say that, as early as 651, there were not enough Persians left to possibly 'persianize' or 'indo-europeanize' the Islamic Caliphate.
As a matter of fact, the terms 'persianization' and 'persianate' or 'persianate society' were introduced only in the 1970s by Marshall Hodgson, but within a totally diverse context and with a greatly different connotation. In fact, Marshall Hodgson was an erudite scholar and a pioneer intellectual who took a staunch anti-Eurocentric stance and introduced several new terms in an effort to demolish the fake colonial model of historiography. Rejecting the fallacy of Western, colonial, racist Orientalism, in his celebrated "The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization" (3 vols.), Marshall Hodgson tried to offer to the Islamic Civilization something that almost all earlier Western Islamologists and Orientalists worked hard to deprive it of: its universality.
Marshall Hodgson contributed greatly to an improved viewpoint over China's contribution to World History, again rejecting earlier Eurocentric fallacies of demented Western Orientalists and Sinologists. Marshall Hodgson coined the term 'persianate society' in a – very correct – effort to reject and rebut the fallacy of the so-called 'Arab-Islamic' civilization and the deprecatory presentation of Islam as an 'Arab religion' (see above parts 1, 2 and 3 of the unit M. Western Orientalist falsifications of Islamic History: the Arabization of Islam and the Persianization of the Abbasid Caliphate: 1. Identification of Islam with only Hejaz at the times of the Prophet; 2. The fake, Orientalist Arabization of Islam; 3. The systematic dissociation of Islam from the Ancient Oriental History).
But as it usually happens, when evil gangsters are allowed to control Western European and North American universities, libraries, museums, foundations and associated research institutions, the original scope of the new term was removed, the term was decontextualized, and its further use proved to be totally erroneous and in striking opposition to the original use (by Marshall Hodgson).
Then, the decontextualized and distorted term was used for the above mentioned purposes i-x. Many tricks have been used for this purpose, especially false etymology of various names (to present them as of Persian origin) and incongruous linguistics. The foundation of Beit al Hikmah (House of Wisdom) in the first years of Abbasid rule played a tremendous role in the promotion of the academic life, the scientific exploration, and the intellectual advancement across the caliphate. This tendency was mainly based on Aramaean scholars of Tesifun (Ctesiphon), Nusaybin (Nisibis), Urhoy (Edessa of Osrhoene), Antioch, Gundeshapur (the greatest Sassanid library, university, archives and research center, museum and scriptorium), who were variably Muslims, Manichaeans, Gnostics or (Monophysitic or Nestorian) Christians. Iranian, Turanian, Yemenite, Egyptian, Berber and Indian scholars flocked to the House of Wisdom, which was located in Baghdad. The whole movement was supported by great Iranian families that had sooner or later abandoned Mazdeism and accepted Islam, like the Naubakht family (originating from Nemroz, i.e. the Sassanid Empire's southern administrative region) and the Barmak family, which was native to Khorasan.
The name of the Barmak family is evidently of Turanian origin (Parmak) and it was turned to al-Baramikah (البرامكة) in Arabic and Barmakian (برمکیان) in Farsi. However, paranoid Western historians and racist Orientalists attempted to distort this family name enormously in order to depict as … Indian and Buddhist. The ridiculous effort reached the point of even associating the historical name with the Sanskrit word Pramukha; this was suggested by the irrelevant English Indologist Harold Walter Bailey, who tried to indo-europeanize everything he studied in Central and South Asia. This idiotic and racist pseudo-scholar, who was shamelessly venerated in colonial England, forgot that first, Sanskrit was never used in Khorasan; second, it was already a dead language in the 8th c. CE; third, if truly the influential family's name were Pramukha, it would never be vocalized as al-Baramikah in Arabic and as Barmakian in Farsi.
Even more absurd is the Western Orientalists' effort to portray the prestigious Islamic family as having Buddhist affiliations prior to their adhesion to Islam. Nothing proves that the Barmakids were Buddhists and not Mazdeists (the late form of Zoroastrianism that was the official religion of the Sassanid Empire). Plenty of Islamic historical sources describe the pre-Islamic family members of the Barmakids as priestly, which means Mazdeist mobedh. Their homeland was Balkh which was a major Zoroastrian religious center since the Achaemenid times.
The ridiculous association of the Barmakian with the so-called Nawbahar Buddhist monastery (reconstructed as Nava Vihara in Sanskrit) is totally unsubstantiated because such a monastery is delusional and unsubstantiated, as it has never been identified, let alone excavated. Many Islamic sources it describe the Nawbahar temple as a fire place (so, evidently a Mazdeist shrine), and not one colonial Orientalist published a single article to refute these historical sources. Although there are certainly Chinese historical sources testifying to the existence of a Buddhist temple in the wider region of Balkh (Bactra), nothing proves that they refer to the Nawbahar shrine. All the same, if the Barmakian were Buddhists, this only strengthens the argument in favor of the Turanian ancestry of the said family, because the Persians in Khorasan were all followers of the official religion of the Sassanid Empire (Mazdeism) and the only eventual followers of Buddhism in Khorasan and Central Asia were Turanians.
The only correct term to describe the real nature of the Abbasid Caliphate until the arrival of the Seljuk Turks (1055) is 'Turanian – Iranian – Aramaean Renaissance of Islam'. About:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Caliphate#Abbasid_Golden_Age_(775%E2%80%93861)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As-Saffah
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbasid_Revolution
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barmakids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khalid_ibn_Barmak
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_ibn_Khalid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Muslim
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasr_ibn_Sayyar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Harith_ibn_Surayj
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Wisdom
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Nawbakhti
https://iranicaonline.org/articles/nawbakti-family
http://www.orientalstudies.ru/eng/index.php?option=com_publications&Itemid=75&pub=47
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qarinvand_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dabuyid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rustamid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibadi_Islam
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhallabids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aghlabids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justanids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idrisid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samanid_Empire
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tahirid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kara-Khanid_Khanate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habbari_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saffarid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banijurids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulunids
http://alamahabibi.net/English_Articles/The_Al-Ferighun.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sajid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamdanid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uqaylid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatimid_Caliphate
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziyarid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buyid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mu%27izz_al-Dawla
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Mustakfi
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasan_al-Askari
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narjis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hujjat-Allah_al-Mahdi
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occultation_(Islam)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minor_Occultation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_Occultation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marwanids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sallarid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikhshidid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principality_of_Chaghaniyan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhtajids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banu_Ilyas
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghaznavids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rawadid_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qarmatians
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hasanwayhids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrighids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%27munids
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nizari_Ismaili_state
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soomro
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soomra_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seljuq_dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tughril
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Muslim
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunpadh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Behafarid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ustadh_Sis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ishaq_al-Turk
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Muqanna
http://www.bmlisieux.com/archives/bonapart.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khurramites
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babak_Khorramdin
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Babak_Fort
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaleybar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persianization
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persianate_society
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Hodgson
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turco-Persian_tradition
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Persian_culture
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Intermezzo
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunni_Revival
Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ: Σταυρόσχημοι Λαξευτοί Τάφοι των Αχαιμενιδών & Ανάγλυφο του Βαλεριανού, Αιχμάλωτου Ρωμαίου Αυτοκράτορα, Γονατιστού προ του Έφιππου Σαπούρ Α’ (240-270)
Naqsh-e Rustam: Cruciform Carved Tombs of the Achaemenid Dynasty & Relief of the Roman Emperor Valerian Captive and Kneeling before Emperor Shapur I (240-270)
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 19 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019. Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει όψεις της διαχρονικής σημασίας της αχαιμενιδικής νεκρόπολης του Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ, βασιζόμενος σε στοιχεία τα οποία παρέθεσα σε διάλεξή μου στο Καζακστάν (τον Ιανουάριο του 2019) σχετικά με την εσχατολογική σημασία ορισμένων ιερών χώρων του Ιράν.
https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/09/19/ναξ-ε-ρουστάμ-σταυρόσχημοι-λαξευτοί-τ/ ================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Πολύ πιο εντυπωσιακό από την κοντινή (10 χμ) Περσέπολη είναι το απόμακρο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ (نقش رستم / Naqsh-e Rostam / Накше-Рустам, δηλαδή ‘η Εικόνα του Ρουστάμ’, ενός Ιρανού μυθικού ήρωα), ένας κορυφαίος προϊσλαμικός ιρανικός αρχαιολογικός χώρος που τα πελώρια μνημεία του, λαξευτά στον βράχο, ανάγλυφα ή οικοδομημένα αυτοτελώς, καλύπτουν 1200 χρόνια Ιστορίας του Ιράν, από την αρχή των Αχαιμενιδών (Χαχαμανεσιάν / 550-330 π.Χ.) μέχρι το τέλος των Σασανιδών (Σασανιάν / 224-651 μ.Χ.)
Εδώ βρισκόμαστε στα ιερά και τα όσια των Αχαιμενιδών: ο επιβλητικός βράχος λαξεύτηκε επανειλημμένα για να χρησιμεύσει ως αχαιμενιδική νεκρόπολη. Είναι αλήθεια ότι οι Πάρθες, οι οποίοι αποσχίσθηκαν από την Συρία των Σελευκιδών (το μεγαλύτερο κράτος των Επιγόνων) το 250 π.Χ. κι έστησαν την μακροβιώτερη ιρανική προϊσλαμική δυναστεία (τους Αρσακίδες – Ασκανιάν: 250 π.Χ. – 224 μ.Χ.), δεν ένοιωσαν κανένα δεσμό με τον συγκεκριμένο χώρο και δεν ανήγειραν κανένα μνημείο στην περιοχή. Άλλωστε, η Περσέπολη παρέμεινε πάντοτε εγκαταλελειμένη μετά την καταστροφή της από τον Μεγάλο Αλέξανδρο.
Και το Ιστάχρ, η μεγάλη σασανιδική πρωτεύουσα που είναι επίσης κοντά, ήταν μια μικρή πόλη, η οποία απέκτησε ισχύ μόνον μετά την άνοδο των Σασανιδών. Ουσιαστικά, για να αντλήσουν πειστήρια ιρανικής αυθεντικότητας και ζωροαστρικής ορθοδοξίας, οι Σασανίδες απέδωσαν εξαιρετικές τιμές στους σημαντικούς αχαιμενιδικούς χώρους δείχνοντας έτσι ότι επρόκειτο για ένα είδος επανάκαμψης ή παλινόστησης.
Για να επισκεφθεί κάποιος το Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ, το Ιστάχρ και την Περσέπολη σήμερα, πρέπει μάλλον να μείνει στην Σιράζ (شیراز / Shiraz / Шираз) που απέχει περίπου 40 χμ και είναι σήμερα η πέμπτη μεγαλύτερη πόλη του Ιράν και η πρωτεύουσα της επαρχίας Φαρς, δηλαδή της καθαυτό Περσίας. Αυτό είναι μια ακόμη απόδειξη του γεγονότος ότι κάνουν τρομερό λάθος όσοι Έλληνες από άγνοια αποκαλούν το Ιράν ‘Περσία’. Η Περσία είναι μόνον μια επαρχία του Ιράν κι οι Πέρσες είναι ένα μόνον από τα έθνη του Ιράν. Κι έτσι ήταν πάντα – για πάνω από 2500 χρόνια Ιστορίας του Ιράν. Η Σιράζ ήταν η πρωτεύουσα των ισλαμικών δυναστειών των Σαφαριδών και των Βουγιδών (Μπουαϊχί) που αποσπάσθηκαν από το Αβασιδικό Χαλιφάτο της Βαγδάτης στο δεύτερο μισό του 9ου χριστιανικού αιώνα.
Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ (Νουπιστάς/Nupistaš στα Αρχαία Αχαιμενιδικά)
Οι λαξευτοί αχαιμενιδικοί τάφοι στο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ είναι ορατοί από χιλιόμετρα μακριά κι ένας ταξιδιώτης τους επισκέπτεται καλύτερα (με άπλετο φως και χωρίς σκιές) το μεσημέρι, καθώς οι προσόψεις των πελωρίων διαστάσεων λαξευτών τάφων στρέφονται προς τα νότια, καθώς ο τεράστιος βραχώδης λόφος έχει διάταξη από ανατολικά προς δυτικά.
Δεν κάνω μια τυπική αρχαιολογική παρουσίαση για να δώσω τις διαστάσεις με λεπτομέρειες, γι’ αυτό σημειώνω εδώ μόνον ενδεικτικά στοιχεία για τον τάφο του Δαρείου του Μεγάλου: η απόσταση του χαμηλότερου επιπέδου της πρόσοψης του τάφου από το έδαφος μπροστά σ’ αυτό (όπου στέκονται οι επισκέπτες του χώρου) είναι περίπου 15 μ.
Αυτό σημαίνει ότι όλοι οι τάφοι είναι υπερυψωμένοι κι έτσι λαξεύθηκαν και φιλοτεχνήθηκαν. Το ύψος της σταυρόσχημης πρόσοψης είναι 23 μ περίπου και η απόαταση του υψηλότερου επιπέδου της πρόσοψης του τάφου από την κορυφή του βραχώδους λόφου είναι σχεδόν 26 μ.
Η υπεράνω του κεντρικού τμήματος της σταυρόσχημης πρόσοψης πλευρά έχει ύψος περίπου 8.50 μ. Η υποκάτω του κεντρικού τμήματος της σταυρόσχημης πρόσοψης πλευρά έχει ύψος περίπου 6.80 μ. Το πλάτος των πλευρών αυτών είναι το ίδιο, περίπου 10.90 μ. Η λαξευτή αίθουσα του τάφου έχει μήκος (: βάθος μέσα στον βράχο) 18.70 μ, πλάτος 2.10 μ, και ύψος 3.70 μ. Περίπου 350 μ3 βράχου ανεσκάφησαν για να δημιουργηθεί η κοιλότητα η οποία διαμορφώθηκε ως ταφική αίθουσα, χωρισμένη σε τρία τμήματα.
Το Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ είχε κατοικηθεί ως χώρος για τουλάχιστον μια χιλιετία πριν φθάσουν οι Πέρσες στην περιοχή αυτή του Ιράν. Οι πρώτοι κάτοικοι δεν είχαν καμμιά σχέση με Ιρανούς: ήταν Ελαμίτες.
Το Αρχαίο Ελάμ ήταν ένα αρχαίο έθνος και βασίλειο – τμήμα της Ιστορίας της Αρχαίας Μεσοποταμίας και όχι της Ιστορίας του Ιράν.
Οι Ελαμίτες ήταν τόσο αρχαίοι όσο και οι Σουμέριοι και ο πολιτισμός τους τεκμηριώνεται από τα αποκρυπτογραφημένα αρχαία ελαμικά που διακρίνονται σε δύο μεγάλες ιστορικές περιόδους και καλύπτουν την περίοδο από τα τέλη της 4ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας μέχρι το 640 μ.Χ., όταν ο Ασσουρμπανιπάλ της Ασσυρίας εξόντωσε το Ελάμ κι εξολόθρευσε το σύνολο του ελαμικού πληθυσμού.
Κέντρο του Ελάμ ήταν τα Σούσα στην Νότια Υπερτιγριανή, τα οποία οι Αχαιμενιδείς βρήκαν σε ερειπία, ανοικοδόμησαν και κατοίκησαν.
Ήδη στα χρόνια των Αχαιμενιδών τα ελαμικά ήταν μια νεκρή γλώσσα (αντίθετα με τα βαβυλωνιακά) την οποία έμαθαν οι Ιρανοί ιερείς και γραφείς από φιλομάθεια, χάρη στους Βαβυλώνιους δασκάλους τους.
Έτσι, πολλές αχαιμενιδικές αυτοκρατορικές επιγραφές υπήρξαν τρίγλωσσες, σε αρχαία αχαιμενιδικά περσικά (Old Achaemenid), βαβυλωνιακά και ελαμικά (Elamite) – όλα σφηνοειδή.
Στο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ υπάρχουν και ελαμικά ανάγλυφα ήσσονος ωστόσο σημασίας σε σχέση με τα ιρανικά μνημεία.
Σύχρονοι γλωσσολόγοι θεωρούν τους Δραβίδες που κατοικούν το Ντεκάν, δηλαδή το νότιο μισό της ψευτο-χώρας ‘Ινδία’, ως απογόνους των Αρχαίων Ελαμιτών, δεδομένου ότι υπάρχουν εμφανείς γλωσσολογικές ομοιότητες και συνάφεια ανάμεσα στα αρχαία ελαμικά και στις δραβιδικές γλώσσες.
Τέσσερις λαξευτοί τάφοι των Αχαιμενιδών βρίσκονται στο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ με την εξής σειρά από τα αριστερά προς τα δεξιά: ο τάφος του Δαρείου Β’ (423-404 π.Χ.), ο τάφος του Αρταξέρξη Α’ (465-424 π.Χ.), ο τάφος του Δαρείου Α’ του Μεγάλου (522-486 π.Χ.), και του Ξέρξη Α’ (486-465 π.Χ.). Ένας πέμπτος ημιτελής λαξευτός τάφος πιθανολογείται ότι ετοιμαζόταν για τον Δαρείο Γ’ (336-330 π.Χ.).
Δυο σημαντικές επιγραφές σε αρχαία αχαιμενιδικά έχουν αναγραφεί στην πρόσοψη του λαξευτού τάφου του Δαρείου Α’, η πρώτη, περισσότερου ιστορικού, αυτο-βιογραφικού χαρακτήρα, στο άνω τμήμα της πρόσοψης του τάφου (γνωστή ως DNa) και η άλλη, περισσότερο θρησκευτικού και ηθικού χαρακτήρα, στο κάτω τμήμα της πρόσοψης (γνωστή ως DNb).
Επίσης, έχουν φιλοτεχνηθεί ανάγλυφες αναπαραστάσεις στρατιωτών των εθνών που συμπεριλαμβάνονταν στην αχαιμενιδική αυτοκρατορία και φέρουν σύντομες τρίγλωσσες αναφορές που δηλώνουν την ταυτότητα του κάθε αναπαριστώμενου στρατιώτη.
Επίσης στα αχαιμενιδικά χρόνια ανάγεται ένα κυβικού σχήματος κτήριο που ονομάζεται Κααμπά-γιε Ζαρντόστ, δηλαδή το Ιερό του Ζωροάστρη, σε αντιδιαστολή με τον Κααμπά της Μέκκας. Η ονομασία αυτή έχει δοθεί στο κτήριο κατά τα πρώιμα ισλαμικά χρόνια, όταν οι κατακτημένοι από τις ισλαμικές στρατιές Ιρανοί προσπαθούσαν να διατηρήσουν την ιστορική, θρησκευτική και πολιτισμική ταυτότητά τους.
Ωστόσο, μια σασανιδικών χρόνων επιγραφή πάνω στους τοίχους του κτηρίου διασώζει την μέση περσική ονομασία: Μπουν Χανάκ, δηλ. Θεμέλιος Οίκος. Η θρησκευτική λειτουργικότητα του κτηρίου είναι εμφανής, αν και υπήρξαν σύγχρονες επιστημονικές προσπάθειες να το δουν ως χώρο της αυτοκρατορικής στέψης.
Τέσσερις συνολικά επιγραφές σασανιδικών χρόνων έχουν αναγραφεί πάνω στους εξωτερικούς τοίχους του κτηρίου αλλά η πιο σημαντική ιστορικά είναι η περίφημη Επιγραφή του Καρτίρ, κορυφαίου αρχιερέα, ιδρυτή του Μαζδεϊσμού (ως ζωροαστρικής ορθοδοξίας), θεωρητικού της αυτοκρατορικής ιδεολογίας των Σασανιδών, και αυτοκρατορικού κήρυκα του σασανιδικού οικουμενισμού.
Κααμπά-γε Ζαρντόστ – το Ιερό του Ζωροάστρη
Τα μνημεία σασανιδικών χρόνων που σώζονται στο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ είναι κυρίως τεραστίων διαστάσεων ανάγλυφα.
Διακρίνονται κυρίως τα εξής:
Α. Ενθρονισμός και Στέψη του Αρντασίρ Α’ (226-242), ιδρυτή της σασανιδικής δυναστείας
Β. Θρίαμβος του Σαπούρ Α’ (241-272), όπου αναπαρίστανται δύο ηττημένοι Ρωμαίοι αυτοκράτορες, ο Φίλιππος Άραψ (244-249), ο οποίος δεν είχε στρατιωτικά νικηθεί αλλά συνάψει μια ειρήνη με πολύ ταπεινωτικούς για την Ρώμη όρους, και ο Βαλεριανός (253-260), ο οποίος ηττήθηκε κι αιχμαλωτίσθηκε στην Μάχη της Έδεσσας της Οσροηνής (Ουρχόη, σήμερα Ούρφα στην νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία) το 260, είχε επακολούθως ταπεινωτική ζωή κι αργότερα οικτρό θάνατο στο Ιράν.
Γ. Ο Μπαχράμ Β’ (276-293) με τον Καρτίρ και Σασανίδες ευγενείς
Δ. Δύο ανάλυφα του Μπαχράμ Β’ έφιππου
Ε. Ενθρονισμός και Στέψη του Ναρσή (293-303)
ΣΤ. Ανάγλυφο του Χορμούζντ Β’ (303-309) έφιππου
Σχετικά με την ήττα του Βαλεριανού από το Σαπούρ Α’ και σχετικά με την παγκοσμίως κορυφαία μορφή του Καρτίρ θα επανέλθω.
Στην συνέχεια, μπορείτε να περιηγηθείτε στο Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ χάρη σε ένα βίντεο, να διαβάσετε επιλεγμένα άρθρα, και να βρείτε συνδέσμους για περισσότερη έρευνα αναφορικά με την προαναφερμένη θεματολογία.
Ο ηττημένος Βαλεριανός γονατιστός προ του Σαπούρ Α’
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Накше-Ростам: римский император Валериан, стоящий на коленях перед Шапуром I (после поражения у Эдессы в Осрене) 260 г. н.э.
https://www.ok.ru/video/1511021677165
Περισσότερα:
Недалеко от Персеполя находится огромный каменистый холм, который в настоящее время укрывает значительную часть 1200-летнего доисламского исторического и культурного наследия Ирана. Крестообразные и высеченные глубоко в скале императорские гробницы Дария I, Ксеркса I и других ахеменидских шахов. Рядом с ними можно полюбоваться великолепными барельефами Сасанидов, на которых изображены два римских императора, униженных перед Сасанидским шахом Шапуром I. Также можно увидеть другие снимки двора Сасанидов.
00:56 гробница Ксеркса I
01:40 Расследование Нарсеха
01:50 гробница Дария I Великого
02:26 Два барельефа Баграма II верхом на лошади
02:46 Триумф Шапура I с двумя униженными римскими императорами, Филиппом Арабским и (стоящим на коленях) Валерианом
03:02 гробница Артаксеркса I
03:31 Хормузд II верхом на лошади
03:41 гробница Дария IΙ
04:26 Баграм II верхом на лошади
04:43 Кааба-Зардошт (Храм Зороастра)
05:44 Расследование Ардашира I
06:10 Баграм II с дворянами Картиром и Сасанидами
Династии Ахеменидов принадлежат четыре гробницы со скальными рельефами. Они расположены в скалах на существенной высоте над землёй. Одна из гробниц принадлежит царю Дарию I, что установлено по надписям (522—486 до н. э.). Про остальные гробницы предполагают, что в них похоронены цари Ксеркс I (486—465 до н. э.), Артаксеркс I (465—424 до н. э.), и Дарий II (423—404 до н. э.).
Пятая неоконченная гробница, по предположениям, предназначалась царю Артаксерксу III, но более вероятно — царю Дарию III (336—330 до н. э.). Гробницы были заброшены после покорения Персии Александром Македонским.
На территории некрополя расположено квадратное в сечении здание высотой двенадцать метров (большая часть из которых находится ниже современного уровня земли) с единственным внутренним помещением. Народное название этого сооружения — «Куб Заратустры» (Кааб-е Зартошт).
Из научных версий наиболее распространена версия о том, что здание служило зороастрийским святилищем огня. По другой, реже упоминаемой версии, под сооружением может находиться могила Кира Великого. Однако ни одна версия не подтверждена документально.
На «Кубе Заратустры» имеются клинописные надписи, сделанные от лица Картира (одного из первых зороастрийских священников), портрет которого можно увидеть неподалеку в археологической зоне Накше-Раджаб.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Накше-Рустам
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Naqsh-e Rostam: Roman Emperor Valerian kneeling in front of Shapur I (after the defeat at Edessa of Osrhoene) 260 CE
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240307
Περισσότερα:
Not far from Persepolis, there is an enormous rocky hill which shelters today a significant part of 1200 years of Pre-Islamic Iranian Historical and Cultural Heritage. Cruciform and hewn deep in the rock are the imperial tombs of Darius I, Xerxes I, and other Achaemenid shahs.
Next to them, one can admire the magnificent Sassanid bas-reliefs that depict two Roman emperor humiliated in front of the Sassanid Shah Shapur I and other snapshots of the Sassanid court.
00:56 Tomb of Xerxes I
01:40 Investigation of Narseh
01:50 Tomb of Darius I the Great
02:26 Two bas reliefs of Bagram II riding his horse
02:46 Triumph of Shapur I with two humiliated Roman emperors, Philip the Arab and (kneeling) Valerian
03:02 Tomb of Artaxerxes I
03:31 Hormuzd II riding his horse
03:41 Tomb of Darius IΙ
04:26 Bagram II riding his horse
04:43 Kaaba-ye Zardosht (the Shrine of Zoroaster)
05:44 Investigation of Ardashir I
06:10 Bagram II with Kartir and Sassanid noblemen
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ: Ανάγλυφο του Βαλεριανού γονατιστού προ του Σαπούρ Α’ & Σταυρόσχημοι Τάφοι Αχαιμενιδών
Περισσότερα:
Όχι μακριά από την Περσέπολη ένας τεράστιος βράχος αποτελεί σήμερα την παρακαταθήκη 1200 χρόνων προϊσλαμικής πολιτισμικής κληρονομιάς. Οι σταυρόσχημοι λαξευτοί τάφοι του Δαρείου Α’, του Ξέρξη και άλλων Αχαιμενιδών βρίσκονται δίπλα σε μεταγενέστερα σασανιδικά ανάγλυφα που απεικονίζουν την ταπείνωση δυο Ρωμαίων αυτοκρατόρων προ του Σάχη Σαπούρ Α’ και άλλα στιγμιότυπα της σασανιδικής αυλής.
00:56 Τάφος του Ξέρξη Α’
01:40 Ενθρονισμός και Στέψη του Ναρσή (293-303)
01:50 Τάφος του Δαρείου Α’
02:26 Δύο ανάλυφα του Μπαχράμ Β’ έφιππου
02:46 Θρίαμβος του Σαπούρ Α’ με δύο Ρωμαίους αυτοκράτορες, τον Φίλιππο Άραβα και τον Βαλεριανό γονατιστό
03:02 Τάφος του Αρταξέρξη Α’
03:31 Χορμούζντ Β’ έφιππος
03:41 Τάφος του Δαρείου Β’
04:26 Μπαχράμ Β’ έφιππος
04:43 Κααμπά-γιε Ζαρντόστ (το Ιερό του Ζωροάστρη)
05:44 Ενθρονισμός και Στέψη του Αρντασίρ Α’
06:10 Μπαχράμ Β’ με τον Καρτίρ και Σασανίδες ευγενείς
Naqsh-e Rostam (Persian: نقش رستم) is an ancient necropolis located about 12 km northwest of Persepolis, in Fars Province, Iran, with a group of ancient Iranian rock reliefs cut into the cliff, from both the Achaemenid and Sassanid periods. It lies a few hundred meters from Naqsh-e Rajab, with a further four Sassanid rock reliefs, three celebrating kings and one a high priest.
Naqsh-e Rostam is the necropolis of the Achaemenid dynasty (c. 550–330 BC), with four large tombs cut high into the cliff face. These have mainly architectural decoration, but the facades include large panels over the doorways, each very similar in content, with figures of the king being invested by a god, above a zone with rows of smaller figures bearing tribute, with soldiers and officials. The three classes of figures are sharply differentiated in size. The entrance to each tomb is at the center of each cross, which opens onto a small chamber, where the king lay in a sarcophagus.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naqsh-e_Rostam
The Ka’ba-ye Zartosht is 46 metres (151 ft) from the mountain, situated exactly opposite Darius II’s mausoleum. It is rectangular and has only one entrance door. The material of the structure is white limestone. It is about 12 metres (39 ft) high, or 14.12 metres (46.3 ft) if including the triple stairs, and each side of its base is about 7.30 metres (24.0 ft) long. Its entrance door leads to the chamber inside via a thirty-stair stone stairway. The stone pieces are rectangular and are simply placed on top of each other, without the use of mortar; the sizes of the stones varies from 0.48 by 2.10 by 2.90 metres (1 ft 7 in by 6 ft 11 in by 9 ft 6 in) to 0.56 by 1.08 by 1.10 metres (1 ft 10 in by 3 ft 7 in by 3 ft 7 in), and they are connected to each other by dovetail joints.
The structure was built in the Achaemenid era and there is no information of the name of the structure in that era. It was called Bon-Khanak in the Sassanian era; the local name of the structure was Kornaykhaneh or Naggarekhaneh; and the phrase Ka’ba-ye Zartosht has been used for the structure since the fourteenth century, into the contemporary era.
Various views and interpretations have been proposed about the application of the chamber, but none of them could be accepted with certainty: some consider the tower a fire temple and a fireplace, and believe that it was used for igniting and worshiping the holy fire, while another group rejects this view and considers it the mausoleum of one of the Achaemenid shahs or grandees, due to its similarity to the Tomb of Cyrus and some mausoleums of Lycia and Caria.
Some other Iranian scholars believe the stone chamber to be a structure for the safekeeping of royal documents and holy or religious books; however, the chamber of Ka’ba-ye Zartosht is too small for this purpose. Other less noticed theories, such as its being a temple for the goddess Anahita or a solar calendar, have also been mentioned. Three inscriptions have been written in the three languages Sassanian Middle Persian, Arsacid Middle Persian and Greek on the Northern, Southern and Eastern walls of the tower, in the Sassanian era.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ka%27ba-ye_Zartosht
================
Διαβάστε:
Naghshe Rustam
Eras
Naghshe Rustam complex is within a 6-kilometer distance to Persepolis and is located in Haji Abad Mountains. This complex encompasses three eras:
Elamite relics belong to 2000-600 B.C.
Achaemenid relics belong to 330-600 B.C.
Sasanian relics belong to 224-651 A.D.
Mausoleum of Achaemenid Kings
Some of the greatest kings of Achaemenid’s tombs are in Naghshe Rustam. Xerxes (Khashayar Shah) (486 to 445 B.C.), Darius I (522 to 486 B.C.), Ardashir I (465 to 424 B.C.), and Darius II (424 to 405 B.C.) tombs are located in Naghshe Rostam.
The Tombs
The width of each tomb is 19 meters and the length is about 93 meters. The tombs are about 26 meters above the ground level.
Symbolism of the outer space of the tombs
The carving of the king with an arc in the hand is visible on top of the platform. This arc is a symbol of strength. In front of the king, the carving of Ahuramazda is visible. In this carving, two places are visible in which sacred fire is burning. In the right top of the picture, the carving of the moon is visible which shows the world instability.
In the bottom of the platform, the representatives of different nations are holding the kingdom throne. There are also columns; on top of each column, you can see a two-headed cow. Some roaring lions are visible in the bottom of the motifs. The lions are decorated with some lotus. Lotus is a symbol of sincerity and being free of any sin.
Mausoleum Structures
The entrance of each mausoleum is square shaped. These doors were being locked in ancient times. Additionally, Darius Mausoleum has some cuneiform writing. In this writing, Darius is praising Ahuramazda and he mentions his victories. He also speaks of his thoughts. The corridor in Darius Mausoleum has a length of 18.72 meters and a width of 3.70 meters. In this mausoleum, there are nine stone coffins which are dug in a stone row. They belong to the Great Darius, the Queen, and other relatives. Their dimensions are 2.1*1.5*1.5. Each tomb is covered with a big stone.
Kabaye Zartosht (Cube of Zoroaster)
In front of the Naghshe Rustam, in a whole, there is a beautiful cube that they call it the Cube of Zoroaster –who is an Iranian Prophet-. This building is made of big stones. The proficiency and precision used in cuttings and carvings in the black and white stones show the capability of the architectures in Achaemenid Dynasty. On top of the cube, there is a 2.5*2.5 square meters room. There are different beliefs about this room.
Some believe that Avesta (the religious texts of Zoroastrianism) which was written on 12000 cowhides has been stored in this room. Some others believe that this room is the tomb of Bardiya the son of Cyrus who was killed by his brother Cambyses.
Some of the historians believe that the sacred fire was stored in this room. Recently it is said that this room was an observatory. During the Sasanian Empire, some of the important governmental documents were kept. A Sasanian inscription is in three languages. This inscription mainly talks about the historical events in Shapour I in Iran and Rome battles in which the Valerian (Rome Emperor) was defeated and prisoned in Bishapur.
The Excavation of Naghshe Rustam
For the first time, it was excavated by Ernst Herzfeld (German archaeologist and Iranologist) in 1923. Herzfeld excavated the last vestiges of Sasanian towers. After that, this place was analyzed several times from 1936 to 1939. Some important heritage like Persian Inscriptions and some buried stone belonging to Sassanid Era were found. In central Excavations, they reach a building. And in the western parts, the last vestiges of two buildings with muddy bricks were found.
https://apochi.com/attractions/shiraz/naghshe-rustam/
Ο ηττημένος Βαλεριανός γονατιστός προ του Σαπούρ Α’
Naqš-e Rostam
Naqš-e Rostam, a perpendicular cliff wall on the southern nose of the Ḥosayn Kuh in Fārs, about 6 km northwest of Persepolis; the site is unusually rich in Achaemenid and Sasanian monuments, built or hewn out from the rock. The Persian name “Pictures of Rostam” refers to the Sasanian reliefs on the cliff, believed to represent the deeds of Rostam.
Achaemenid Period. The most important architectural remains are the tower called Kaʿba-ye Zardošt (Kaʿba of Zoroaster, Ar. kaʿba “cube, sanctuary”) and four royal tombs with rock cut façades and sepulchral chambers.
(1) The Kaʿba-ye Zardošt is a massive, built square tower, resting on three steps (7.30 x 7.30 x14.12 m) and covered by a flat pyramidal roof (Stronach, 1967, pp. 282-84; 1978, pp. 130-36; Camb. Hist. Iran II, pp. 838-48; Schmidt, pp. 34-49). The only opening is a door. But on all four sides there is a system of blind windows in dark grey limestone, set off by the yellow color of the general structure, between the reinforced corners, and the walls are covered with staggered rectangular depressions. Both systems have no other purpose than to relieve the monotony of the structure. A frieze of dentils forms the upper cornice. A staircase of 30 steps, eight of which are preserved, led to the door (0.87 x 1.75 m) in the upper part of the north wall. Originally, the two leaves of a door opened into an almost square room (3.72 x 3.74 x 5.54 m) without any architectural decoration and no provisions for lighting (Schmidt, p. 37).
There is an analogous, though much more decayed, structure, called Zendān-e Soleymān (lit. prison of Solomon), in Pasargadae (Stronach, 1978, pp. 117-37; 1983, pp. 848-52). Its stone technique does not yet show traces of the toothed chisel (Stronach, 1978, p. 132), and the building can thus be dated to the last years of Cyrus II the Great (r. ca. 558-530 BCE), whereas due to chisel marks the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt can be dated to the early years of Darius I (r. 522-486), around 500 BCE. The Achaemenid structures do not have exact prototypes, but their plan is comparable with those of the earlier Urartian tower temples (Stronach, 1967, pp. 278-88; 1978, pp. 132-34).
On the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt, three exterior sides bear the famous inscription of Shapur I. (r. 241-72 C.E.). The Res gestae divi Saporis (ŠKZ) was added in Greek on the south wall, in Sasanian Pahlawi (Parsik) on the east, and in Parthian (Pahlawik) on the west (Back, pp. 284-371), while the north wall with the entrance has remained empty. Beneath the Parsik version on the east wall, the high priest Kirdīr had his own inscription incised (Sprengling, pp. 37-54; Chaumont, pp. 339-80; Gignoux, pp. 45-48).
Evidently, in Sasanian times the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt—like the tower at Paikuli with the inscription of Narseh (r. 293–302; cf. Humbach and Skjaervø)—served, in addition to other functions, as memorial. Perhaps the two towers in Naqš-e Rostam and Pasargadae already had a similar significance in Achaemenid times, albeit this cannot have been their main function.
In Kirdīr’s inscription the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt is called “bun-xānak.” W. B. Henning proposed the translation “foundation house,” and concluded that the tower was of central religious significance. He suggested that the empty high room was destined “for the safe keeping of the records of the church and even more for the principal copy of the Avesta” (Henning).
Though other translations of “bun-xānak” have been discussed (Gignoux, pp. 28-29 n. 61), it seems the most convincing interpretation that these two towers served as depositories. The lack of any provision for the ventilation of a fire excludes the towers’ use as fire temples (Stronach, 1978, pp. 134-35).
Their staircases were designed “for the solemn ascent and descent of persons who in some manner attended the sacred structure” (Schmidt, p. 41). They indicate that the towers did not serve as royal tombs (Stronach, Camb. Hist. Iran II, p. 849 n. 2), because those have entrance walls that are smoothed beyond their facades, down to the original ground, to make them inaccessible.
N. Frye (1974, p. 386) first expressed the opinion that “the intention was . . . to build a safety box for the paraphernalia of rule in the vicinity of Persepolis as had been done at Pasargadae,” though E. F. Schmidt (p. 44) had dismissed the interpretation of the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt as depository. But Plutarch (46-after 119 C.E.) mentions in Artoxerxes 3 that at Pasargadae one temple belonged “to a warlike goddess, whom one might conjecture to be Athena” (Sancisi-Weerdenburg, p. 148).
At this sanctuary the Achaemenid kings were crowned. During the coronation ceremony the new monarch took a very frugal meal, and was dressed in the robes which Cyrus the Elder wore before assuming kingship. H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg was the first to identify the Zendān-e Soleymān as Plutarch’s temple (Gk. hieron).
Consequently, she interpreted this building, as well as the Kaʿba-ye Zardošt, as “coronation tower.” Her view that these towers had dynastic functions, rather than a purely religious significance and definitely no funeral purposes, has become widely accepted, though her suggestion that a sacred fire was also kindled in these towers can no longer be upheld.
(2) The Royal Tombs. In the cliff wall four monumental tombs are cut out from the native rock (Schmidt, pp. 80-107). The oldest tomb (Tomb I) has inscriptions that assign it to Darius I.
The other three (Tomb II-IV) can only tentatively be attributed to Xerxes (east-northeast of Darius I), Artaxerxes I (west-southwest of the tomb of Darius I) and Darius II (westernmost).
The four monuments follow the same pattern. But it is completely different from that of the older tomb of Cyrus the Great at Pasargadae, which is a built structure consisting of a stepped platform and a tomb with a gabled roof. The model was first used for Darius I and has no exact prototypes in the Near East, Egypt or Greece, though the stone technique is Urartian in origin (Calmeyer, 1975, pp. 101-7; Gropp, pp. 115-21; Huff, 1990, pp. 90-91).
The rock tomb is characterized by the contrast between a cruciform composition in relief on the exterior wall and a very simple interior of chambers and grave cists. The center of the relief ensemble is a facade that represents the front of a palace with four engaged columns. On this architectural component rests a throne bench (Gk. klinē, OPers. gathu in inscription DNa) that is supported by 30 representatives of the empire’s peoples. The throne bench in turn serves as the platform of a religious scene with king, fire altar, and divine symbols.
The architectural register recalls the palace of the living monarch because the portico’s dimensions on the tomb of Darius I. are almost identical to those of his palace on the terrace of Persepolis (Schmidt, p. 81). A significant feature is the use of engaged columns, which appear on his tomb for the first time in rock architecture.
The so-called Median rock tombs, which are imitations of the Achaemenid monuments, do always show free standing columns (von Gall, 1966, pp. 19-43; 1973, pp. 139-154; 1988, pp. 557-82; “Dokkān”); the exception is the tomb of Qizqapan, where half columns have been placed on the rear of the antechamber (von Gall, 1988, pl. 23).
But at many tombs in the Median province, the originally freestanding columns have collapsed under the pressure of the superimposed rock. Consequently, there was not only the esthetic reason of creating the illusion that the antechamber’s front side and back wall were on the same level. More important were statical considerations. The architects and sculptors of the royal tombs used engaged columns because they could withstand the rock pressure despite their high slender shape.
In the middle register, the mighty throne bench with its 30 armed carriers does not show a realistic scene, and is not considered pictorial evidence for the supposition of real processions on the roofs of Achaemenid palaces (Schmidt, p. 80). It rather is a simile of the Achaemenid empire, the throne bench of which is supported by its peoples, dressed in their distinctive costumes and headgears (Schmidt, pp. 108-118).
On the tombs of Darius I in Naqš-e Rostam and that of Artaxerxes II (r. 404-359 BCE) in Persepolis, inscriptions describe the peoples’ order, and this order seems to correspond with the official geographical records of the empire’s extension (Calmeyer, 1982, pp. 109-123). According to P. Goukowsky (p. 223; cf. Calmeyer, 1982, p. 113 fig. 3) the empire was divided in three concentric zones: Persians, Medians and Elamites live in the inner circle.
An axis is leading from the center to the east, listing Parthians, Arians, Bactrians, Sogdians, and Chorasmians. Then the enumeration turns southeast, naming Drangians, Arachosians, Sattagydians (Thataguš), Gandharans, and Indians and reaches Central Asia, where the haoma-venerating Scythians and pointed-hat Scythians already inhabit the periphery.
On a second axis leading to the south the Babylonians, Syrians, Arabians, and Egyptians (Mudraya) are aligned, whereas on a third axis to the northwest the Armenians, Cappadocians, Lydians (Sparda), and Ionians are represented. Finally in the western periphery there live the Scythians beyond the Sea, the Thracians (Skudra), and the Petasos bearing Ionians.
The Libyans (Putaya) and the Ethiopians (Kušiya) roam the empire’s southernmost countries. Two men stand outside the throne bench, and their hands help lifting the platform which is slightly elevated above the ground.
They are a Makan (Maka, i.e., Oman and probably also the region on the Persian side of the Gulf) and a Carian (Karka). P. Calmeyer (p. 120) has convincingly argued that their exceptional corner positions reflects that these two peoples inhabit the south and the west corners of the empire, at the shore of the ōkeanos which in antiquity was believed to flow around the inhabited earth (Gk. oikoumenē).
All men (Schmidt, figs. 39-50), with the exception of the Babylonian (ibid., fig. 50 no. 16), are wearing weapons, mostly daggers and swords, and some also pairs of javelins.
Bearing arms in the presence of the monarch was a sign of honor and trust, so that the unarmed Babylonian represents an act of deliberate humiliation.
Since Xerxes (r. 486-465 BCE) probably supervised the final work on the tomb of his father Darius I (Schmidt, pp. 116-18 part. 117), this humiliation is likely to reflect to repeated rebellions of the Babylonians against him as well as against his father.
The scene in the top register has religious significance. The king is standing on a three-stepped platform, his left resting on a bow, while his slightly lifted right hand points to the winged symbol hovering above the scene. Since the late 19th, early 20th century, the winged ensign with a human figure, emerging from a circle, has been understood as a representation of Ahura Mazdā (Root, pp. 169-79), and recent attempts to interpret this symbol as the royal genius Frawahr have been rejected.
The king faces a blazing fire altar, though he stands at a considerable distance, whilst the ensign of a disc with inscribed crescent is hovering in the upper right corner. In general, scholars agree that this scene shows how the king is worshipping the holy fire. But the gesture of the king’s right hand corresponds in all details with that of the right hand of the Ahura Mazdā symbol.
The representation thus stresses the close connection between the king and Ahura Mazdā, whose will is decisive for the king’s actions. This interpretation is supported by the Achaemenid royal inscriptions, which are directly related to the reliefs.
On tomb I, Darius I wears a headdress (Gk. kidaris) with an upper rim of sculptured stepped crenellations. Reliefs on the jambs of the southern doorway in Darius’s Palace (Tilia, pp. 58-59) indicate that this was the personal crown of Darius, which was also worn by Xerxes as long as he was crown prince (von Gall, 1974, pp. 147-51).
On Tomb II, which is ascribed to Xerxes, in the king’s crown the rest of a sculptured crenellation is visible (von Gall, 1974, pl. 134 no. 2; 1975 fig. 3), suggesting that this monument was completed before he became the absolute monarch (von Gall, 1974, p. 151). The representations of this late time show a straight cylindrical crown without any decoration. All succeeding rulers of the Achaemenid dynasty adopted this shape, allowing only minor deviations (von Gall, 1974, pp. 150-60; 1975, pp. 222-24).
Another invariable detail of the royal tombs is the discoid symbol hovering in the upper right corner. The inscribed crescent indicates its Assyrian origins. While it represents the moon god Sin in Assyrian art, on the Achaemenid tombs its meaning is difficult to comprehend. Opinions differ whether the symbol has to be interpreted as lunar or solar (cf. Root, pp. 177-78), and there are no written sources to corroborate either view. E. F. Schmidt (p. 85) interpreted the sign as a symbol of Mithra.
But the Persian moon god Māh is relatively well documented in the imagery of the Achaemenid seals. In the central panel above the fire altar scene of the rock tomb of Qizqapan, this type of moon god is also represented (von Gall, 1988, pp. 571-72). These images, in connection with other, though scanty, pictorial evidence (von Gall, 1988, p. 572 n. 55), suggest that the moon played a certain role in Achaemenid concepts of death and afterlife.
On the tomb of Darius, the framework of the throne bench shows three superimposed figures on each side. On the left, two dignitaries are inscribed as the lance bearer Gobryas (Gaubaruwa) and the bearer of the royal battle-ax Aspathines (Aspačina), while the lowest man is an unnamed guard (Schmidt, pp. 86-87). On the right, three unarmed men are clad in the long Persian garment. Their gesture of raising a part their upper garment to the mouth has been interpreted as an expression of mourning, comparable to the Greek custom (Schmidt, p. 87).
More recently, scholars have suggested that this gesture captures the imperative of ’do not pollute the holy fire’ (Hinz, p. 63 n. 4; cf. Seidl, p. 168) or shows respect for the king’s majesty (Root, p. 179), but both alternatives seem less convincing. Additional figures are on the side walls of the recesses into which the tomb facade was carved. On the left, there are three superimposed panels with guards holding long lances. On the right, three mourners who need be considered either courtiers or members of the royal family (Schmidt, p. 87) stand above each other.
Two larger cuneiform inscriptions, as well as legends with the names of Darius I, of his two supreme commanders, and of the 30 bearers of the throne bench, are found in the facade of Tomb I. One is in the top register, to the left of the king (DNa), and the other (DNb) stands in the architectural register, on three of the five panels between the half columns of the portico.
Both are written in three languages, but DNa in Old Persian, Elamite, and Babylonian (Weissbach, pp. 86-91), and DNb in Old Persian, Elamite and Akkadian (Hinz, pp. 52-62 including R. Borger’s edition of the Akkadian version). In the Seleucid period, an Aramaic version was added to DNb below the Elamite text (Frye, 1982).
In stark contrast to the rich architectural decoration of the façade, the interior is bare of any architectural and figural elements. The general layout is also best demonstrated with the tomb of Darius I: A long vestibule is running parallel to the facade, and three doors in the back wall of this vestibule are leading to three separate barrel-vaulted tomb chambers. In each tomb chamber, a trough-like cavity was hewn into the solid rock to hold a probably wooden sarcophagus or klinē. These cists were sealed with monolithic lids after the deposition of the corpses, but nothing has remained of the original interments.
The combination of an oblique corridor and burial chambers with cists was preserved in the other three tombs, assigned to Xerxes (Tomb II), Artaxerxes (Tomb III), and Darius II (Tomb IV).
Yet they show inferior craftsmanship, because the chambers are not running axially, but obliquely to the facade. At Persepolis, the interior organization of the two tombs is also identical.
(3) Other architectural remains. In the Center Test of his 1936 and 1939 excavations, E. F. Schmidt found a building (Schmidt, pp. 10 and 64). In the West Test, he discovered remains of two mud-brick buildings, as well as evidence of an enclosure of the royal tombs (ibid., pp. 10, 54-55). In the west of the cliff, a polygonal cistern (diam. 7.20 m) hewn out from the native rock was excavated (ibid., pp. 10, 65).
The Sasanian Period. A fortified enclosure ran around the major part of the sculptured cliff, and its west and east ends were abutting with the rock. Seven semicircular towers strengthened this structure (Schmidt, pp. 55-58, figs. 2, 4; cf. Trümpelmann, p. 41, fig. 68, drawing by G. Wolff). On the slope of the Hosayn Kuh, there are two cut rock structures in the shape of a čahārṭāq. They are generally assumed to be Sasanian fire altars, but D. Huff (1998, p. 80 pl. 10a; “Fārs,” pp. 353-54 pl. 3) identifies them as astōdāns.
Τις βιβλιογραφικές παραπομπές μπορείτε να βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/naqs-e-rostam
Η νίκη του Σαπούρ Α’ επί των Ρωμαίων Αυτοκρατόρων Βαλεριανού (γονατιστού) και Φίλιππου του Άραβα
Επιπλέον:
Γενικά για τα μνημεία και τις επιγραφές:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naqsh-e_Rostam
ttps://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Накше-Рустам
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomb_of_Darius_the_Great
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNa_inscription
Τα κείμενα των επιγραφών, φωτοτυπίες, μεταγραμματισμός κι αγγλική μετάφραση:
https://www.livius.org/sources/content/achaemenid-royal-inscriptions/
https://www.livius.org/sources/content/achaemenid-royal-inscriptions/dna/?
https://www.livius.org/sources/content/achaemenid-royal-inscriptions/dnb/
https://www.livius.org/sources/content/achaemenid-royal-inscriptions/dne/
https://www.livius.org/articles/place/naqs-e-rustam/
Το Ιερό του Ζωροάστρη:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ka%27ba-ye_Zartosht
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kartir
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kartir%27s_inscription_at_Naghsh-e_Rajab
Σχετικά με τον Σαπούρ Α’, τον Φίλιππο Άραβα, τον Βαλεριανό και την Μάχη της Έδεσσας της Οσροηνής (260 μ.Χ.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shapur_I
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valerian_(emperor)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Edessa
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_the_Arab
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameo_with_Valerian_and_Shapur_I
Η ταπείνωση και αιχμαλωσία του Ρωμαίου Αυτοκράτορα Βαλεριανού από τον Σαπούρ Α’ όπως αναπαριστάθηκε σε πίνακα του 16ου αιώνα από τον Γερμανό ζωγράφο Hans Holbein der Jüngere (Hans Holbein the Younger) – 1521. Ο καλλιτέχνης δεν είχε υπόψει του το σασανιδικό ανάγλυφο του Ναξ-ε Ρουστάμ και κανένας Ευρωπαίος ταξιδιώτης, έμπορος, διπλωμάτης ή ερευνητής δεν είχε φθάσει ακόμη εκεί αλλά οι Ευρωπαίοι διετήρησαν πολύ αρνητικές αναμνήσεις από τον Βαλεριανό, δεδομένου ότι ο Ρωμαίος αυτοκράτορας είχε κηρύξει διωγμούς κατά των Χριστιανών και Χριστιανοί συγγραφείς είχαν δικαιολογημένα χαρεί από το ελεεινό τέλος του Βαλεριανού που μάλιστα περιέγραψαν ως πολύ χειρότερο από το ιστορικά τεκμηριωμένο τέλος του.
Το περίφημο καμέο του Σαπούρ Α’ νικητή στην Έδεσσα της Οσροηνής (Ούρχα, σήμερα Ούρφα στην νοτιοανατολική Τουρκία) επί του Ρωμαίου αυτοκράτορα Βαλεριανού που αιχμαλωτίστηκε.
======================
Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε PDF:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/240270
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/_-_fdcde1b109b965
https://vk.com/doc429864789_619827582
https://www.docdroid.net/tIpNqbY/naks-e-roystam-stauroskhimoi-laksefti-tafoi-ton-akhaimenidwn-anaghlifo-toy-balerianou-aikhmalotoy-romaioy-autokratora-gonatistou-p-pdf
Onager is the ass of Asia. However, the biggest difference from the African Wild Ass is that the Asian Ass could never be tamed. They are considerable bigger that its African cousins at about 290 kilos in weight. They are also among the fastest mammals on planet, being able to reach up to 70 Km/h.
The two species, (African and Asian Ass) shared the same ancestor: The Kiang, which will be described later, and which was considered a subspecies of the Onager. Nonetheless, further studies acknowledge as a distinct species.
Five subspecies are recognized. Two of them are close to extinction, other two are threatened and one, unfortunately, is extinct. There is the possibility of another subspecies, The Gobi Khulan but there is still debate on it.
Mongolian Wild Ass: It is the most widespread from all subspecies but has lost about %50 of its former distribution range in just 70 years. It’s main threat is poaching and competition for grassland with livestock.
Turkmenian Kulan: Also called Transcaspian Wild Ass or simply Kulan, the animal has slowly decline in former distribution ranges but its population has increase where it’s been re-introduced such as in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine where they used to inhabit. Also in Israel where th subspecies is making hybrids with Persian wild Onagers.
Persian Onager: Also called the Persian Zebra or Gur, The Persian Onager has been close to extinction. It is highly protected and hunting it is strictly forbidden. Breeding programs in different zoos associations in Europe and North America are keeping hope on this animal. That various spring born in captivity has been returned to its natural environment. Some other new borns in Khar Turan National Park, in Iran (it’s native environment) has been reported.
Indian Wild Ass: Also called Ghudkhur, Khur or Indian Onager. Form barely 300 animals in 1960, strong seizures of protection and adding better resources to its environment such as water holes, by 2004 its population increased to almost 4000. The most recent census in 2015 stated that its population is close to 5000. When you want you can.
Syrian Wild Ass: Known also as Hemippe, Achdari or the Mesopotamian Onager, he couldn’t make it to today. Huge herds used to be seen in the 15th and 16th centuries but its number began to drop precipitously during the next centuries due to overhunting by Europeans. Its existence became uncertain during the World War I (Nothing god from wars) and its last specimen was fatally shot in 1927 near Azraq Oasis in Jordan. The last specimen died the same year, in Vienna.
I had a nice discussion a few day back about subspecies. My friend was arguing that subspecies is silly because some of the differences are just molecular, dental, and barely hard to see. Me, on the other hand, I think subspecies is the first step for a new species to come. The subspecies of one species are found in environments that usually has small variables in between but somehow force the animal to change in order to survive.
These adaptations are what make the animal a subspecies, small changes. However, we all know that the environment is not still and it will eventually change, probably a lot. And if the animal wants to survive that environment, it also has to change, a lot as well. To the point that it might become a new species. So I think subspecies is something very subtle but can be the beginning of a new animal. Interesting isn’t it? Anyway, is just my thoughts from the little I know about the subject. If someone have another approach I’d love to hear it.
PD. My next family will be the camelidae, so if you know about this family or have good pictures of them, you are very welcome to help me with this investigation.
Nice Posters in my store: Here Follow my Instagram: Species of the World